

Press and Publication Report re:
GAITHER REPORT TS #104248

ER report #17

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after
Executive Registry
Room 7-E-12
Headquarters
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Matter of Fact By Stewart Alsop

Ike on the Defensive

HAS THE President's brilliant political instinct, which has been essentially an instinct for reflecting the underlying mood of the country, suddenly deserted him? The question is suggested by the President's reactions to the new situation in which he finds himself. The answer may be, pro-



Stewart Alsop, provided by the tone and content of the President's forthcoming State of the Union message.

For the President's reactions in the last few months have been surprisingly out of tune with the mood of the country as that mood is sensed by virtually all the returning members of Congress. His reactions have been consistently defensive.

A symptom has been the President's anger at the widespread publicity given to the Gaither report, calling for a major national effort to avoid future catastrophe. It was absolutely inevitable from the start that a report with such sensational implications, in which so many people of known views from outside the Administration participated, would become known in substance.

Yet the President, according to reliable report, is furious about what he considers "leaks" from the Gaither Committee. "Ike's so angry about the leaks," one of his subordinates has remarked, "that he's hardly got around to considering the substance of the report."

THIS PRESIDENTIAL reaction certainly inspired Press Secretary James Hagerty's statement that the Gaither report raised no question about the American defense posture "at this time." The statement was so obviously specious that, again entirely predictably, it had precisely

the opposite effect than that intended.

All the President's own public statements in recent months have been similarly defensive in tone. There were, for example, his press conference remarks brushing off the Soviet ICBM tests and the Soviet satellites as of little consequence. And there were his two "chins up" speeches, in which, while promising to give the "rough with the smooth," he gave a great deal of smooth and precious little rough.

If only as a practical political matter, taking this defensive stand was precisely calculated (as Vice President Nixon immediately sensed) to do the prestige of the Eisenhower Administration and of the President himself, the maximum of harm.

It gave the Democrats, and indeed all the President's critics and opponents, an opportunity to take the offensive—to belabor not only the Administration's past errors and inadequacies, but also its present "lack of a sense of urgency." Thus the Administration's defense policies have become, for the first time, a major national issue, and the Democrats count heavily on it for both the 1958 and 1960 elections.

SUPPOSE that the President, instead of reacting so defensively, had marched to the head of the parade and seized the banner of national defense. Suppose he had really given "the rough with the smooth," suppose that, instead of complaining about "leaks," he had used the Gaither report to support his case for a great national effort, suppose he had told the country of its danger as publicly and frankly as the recent report of the Rockefeller Fund has done. If one supposes General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower doing these things, it is obvious on the face of it that the defense issue would be of remarkably little use to the Democrats.

Why, then, has he not done

such things? There are several possible reasons. To take such a stand would involve at least an implicit admission of past error.

It is also entirely possible that the President does genuinely and wholeheartedly accept the George Humphrey theory that any markedly greater national defense effort will "destroy the free enterprise system." Former Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, after all, liked to call his budgets "Ike I" and "Ike II," and to claim the general's support for his policy of cutting the gizzard out of the national defense in the name of economy.

Perhaps, finally, it is just not in the nature of the President to take such a stand. Perhaps the President so faithfully mirrored the mood of the country when that mood was easy-going and unworried because it was natural for him to do so; and now that the mood has changed, it is no longer natural for him to reflect it.

One thing, at any rate, seems sure. If the President's State of the Union message is filled, like his "chins-up" speeches, with complacent reassurances, he will be handing the Democrats a winning issue for 1958 and 1960. And that is precisely what the Democrats (who are themselves by no means invulnerable on the defense issue) happily expect him to do.

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Correction

Through the accidental dropping of lines of type, the Stewart Alsop column on Monday was made to read: "Johnson himself has said that the defense issue will in turn be dominated by Lyndon B. Johnson." The paragraph should have read: "Johnson himself has said that the defense issue will dominate the upcoming session of Congress. The defense issue in turn will be dominated by Lyndon B. Johnson."

White House Disputed Over Gaither Report

Expert Testimony in the Senate On U. S. Military Lag Is Recalled

Editorial—"But What of the Future"—Page 12.

By Rowland Evans Jr.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 29.—The White House assertion that the Gaither Committee report finds the United States in a military position today that is "just the opposite" from a "position of weakness" differs from expert testimony much of it from Administration sources, that has recently been given to the Senate.

The single common strand of testimony by Army and Air Force generals and Navy admirals, along with high Defense Department officials, led to general agreement that the United States seriously lags behind the Soviet Union in the new technology of ballistic missiles; lacks the solid scholastic base for training engineers and scientists to start closing the widening gap between this country and Russia in the number of graduate technicians; and has failed to give its Strategic Air Command the tools to guarantee its maximum use as a retaliatory force.

Mansfield Retorts

There was angry reaction today from Sen. Mike Mansfield, Mont., assistant Senate Democratic leader, to the assertion yesterday at Gettysburg, Pa., by Presidential press secretary James C. Hagerty that the United States is not "at this time" militarily weak when compared with the Soviet Union.

Sen. Mansfield, appearing on the NBC-TV program "Meet the Press," said Mr. Hagerty's statement was "open to serious question." He said, Soviet missile progress has made this country's European allies reluctant to accept United States missile bases within their borders.

Gen. Curtis E. LeMay, Vice-Chief of Staff of the Air Force, testified under oath before Senators that he fears the forward momentum of military achievement in Russia has built up such a head of steam that it may be too late for the United States to catch up.

Those who worked on the top-secret Gaither Committee report were unwilling today to engage in a publicity battle with Mr. Hagerty over his statement yesterday which said in part:

"... stories that have been printed which indicate that the United States is in a position of weakness at this time are not true. It is not in the (Gaither) report and as a matter of fact is completely contrary to the report. The report says just the opposite."

The now-disbanded Gaither Committee, headed by H. Rowan Gaither, former head of the Ford Foundation, did by implication find that American retaliatory power—the Strategic Air Command—was equal at this precise period of time to perform the mission of obliteration that would be assigned to it in the event of Soviet attack and thus to deter that attack, sources in a position to know said today. But the chief emphasis of the voluminous Gaither report was not on the relative military position of the two great powers today. It was an assessment of where the United States would be two and three and more years hence if the Soviet momentum continues and if America does not at once accelerate its own military effort.

The stories on the Gaither report to which Mr. Hagerty referred have not claimed that the document asserts a second-

class military position for the United States today. They have, rather, reflected the report's view that the United States cannot retain military parity with Russia with present programs. That is what the report is all about. It recommends a series of immediate and expensive steps which it finds essential to move the United States out of its comparative inertia and to build up a momentum that, in time, will match the Soviet Union.

Thus Gen. LeMay testified before the Senate Preparedness subcommittee that he had doubts as to whether this country had not already painted itself into the corner as a second-class military power. At the same time, he asserted that, as of this moment and for perhaps another two years, the United States would still have the military power to win a war against Russia.

The fact that the Administration is now prepared to spend more dollars on missiles and other defense programs seems to some to be an acknowledgement of the basic thesis in the Gaither report.

Sen. Mansfield, in his TV appearance today, said he believes this country has been "out-manuevered, outwitted and outflanked" by the Soviet Union.

He called on President Eisenhower to "exercise a more aggressive leadership in the field of foreign affairs." In the field of defense, he promised that the Democratic-controlled Congress reconvening next week would provide all the funds necessary for the nation's security. He said it would even raise taxes if such a move seemed necessary.

DEC 30 1957

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

Hagerty View Is Challenged By Mansfield

Senate Whip Sees
U. S. Arms Lead
'Open to Question'

United Press
Senate Democratic Whip
Mike Mansfield (Mont.) yesterday challenged the White House assertion that the United States "at this time" is not militarily weak when compared with the Soviet Union.

He said the reassuring statement of Presidential Press Secretary James C. Hagerty was "open to serious question."

Mansfield said he believes this country has been "outmaneuvered, outwitted and outflanked" by Russia. He said the United States position in Western Europe has been particularly weakened by Soviet missile-satellite successes.

Hagerty said at the temporary White House in Gettysburg, Pa., Saturday that newspaper accounts of the so-called Gaither report have given the impression that the United States is in a position of weakness at this time.

These conclusions "are not true," and the Gaither report "says just the opposite," Hagerty declared.

Asked about Hagerty's statement on the NBC-WRC television program, "Meet the Press," Mansfield disputed the press secretary's conclusion.

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

NATIONAL SECURITY

Leak—And a Flood

Until last week, the most hush-hush document in Washington was the Gaither report, the first post-sputnik comparison of U.S. and Russian military power. When the report was submitted to an extraordinary session of the National Security Council last Nov. 7 (four days after Sputnik II went up), some of the 22 scientists and businessmen who worked on it urged that it be made public to alert the American people.

President Eisenhower himself overruled them and ordered the Gaither report stamped "top secret." Despite this security classification, however, details from the report began to leak out. Last week the leak poured into a flood.

By all accounts, the Gaither committee was alarmed at the state of U.S. military preparedness. It is clear, said the report, that Russian missiles pose an almost immediate threat to the heartland of America; and U.S. power to retaliate may not be enough to prevent the Soviet Union from launching an atom attack.

The first pressing duty of the U.S. is to strengthen its offensive power of retaliation, the committee said. Its second priority is a vast bomb-radiation shelter program to protect the U.S. population if a Soviet attack is made.

If, as the committee went on, the

U.S. must make an enormous increase in military spending. One report had it that the committee proposed spending about \$46 billion yearly on defense, perhaps through 1970 (as compared with the present level of about \$38 billion).

Among the Gaither committee's other recommendations:

► The U.S. should reorganize not only its military command system but also the roles and missions of the armed services; the present setup is obsolete in this nuclear age.

► As soon as the U.S. has recovered the full power of massive retaliation, it must get ready to fight limited wars—especially in the Middle East and Asia.

The committee conceded that its recommendations would cost huge sums of money, but argued that the U.S. had no alternative. Any tax cut is out of the question in the foreseeable future, the

report insisted; in fact, the debt ceiling must be raised and the possibility of a tax increase must be considered.

Some of those present at the NSC meeting said the President decided to withhold the report because he was afraid its publication would "panic" the U.S. and damage the present defense effort. Mr. Eisenhower was also reported

to have said he would like to follow the committee's recommendations, but had a nagging fear that U.S. taxpayers would refuse to pay the price.

THE GAITHER REPORT: WHAT WE KNOW OF IT

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

Parts That Have Leaked Support Demands for Stronger Defense

By E. W. KENWORTHY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 23—The Gaither report which has stirred controversy here has been leaking out—first in dribbles and then in sizable chunks. It has become the basis for Cassandra warnings for partisan recriminations. Today Press Secretary James Hagerly said the report will be the basis of some of what the President will propose in his State of the Nation and Budget messages. Yet the nation has still not seen the report.

The genesis of the Gaither report last spring was a proposal by the Federal Civil Defense Administration for a \$40,000,000,000 program to provide shelters against atomic blast and radiation. The President was reported to have hit the ceiling and said he could not see such a program in relation to the nation's whole defense effort. He asked for a study to be made for the National Security Council. The Gaither committee was the result.

The Gaither committee soon found it could not make intelligent recommendations on a program of active and passive defense against nuclear attack unless it went into the whole subject of the nation's defense posture and Soviet capabilities. Its inquiry widened.

Over its six-month life, its inquiry progressively widened as it became apparent that the question of defense involved not only weapons and military research and development, but also the organization of the Defense Department, the roles and missions of the three services, exchange of scientific information with our allies, the need to improve science education in the nation's high schools and colleges, the loss of technicians by the military services because of higher pay in industry and the role of economic aid in preventing Soviet penetration of less developed nations.

With a top priority mandate from the President, the committee could—and did—command the most authoritative and secret information from the Department of Defense, the Office of Atomic Energy, the Atomic Energy Commission, the National Science Foundation and the Central Intelligence

Moreover, the caliber of the committee and its advisory panel, the cumulative experience and judgment that these men brought to their task were such as to compel great respect for their findings.

Their report was known as the Gaither report after H. Rowan Gaither Jr., chairman of the board of the Ford Foundation, who had served as the first head of the committee that prepared it.

When Mr. Gaither stepped down because of illness, Mr. Foster and Robert C. Sprague of Sprague Electric Company became co-chairmen.

The Membership

In addition to Messrs. Gaither, Foster and Sprague, the members were: Dr. James P. Baxter, historian and president of Williams College; Dr. Robert D. Calkins of the Brookings Institution; John J. Carson of McKinsey & Co.; James A. Perkins of the Carnegie Corporation; Dr. Robert C. Prime of Bell Telephone Laboratories; Dr. Hector R. Skifter of Airborne Industries Laboratories; William Webster of New England Electrical System and Prof. Jerome B. Wiesner of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Among the distinguished men on the advisory panel, or as consultants to it, were Mervin J. Kelly and James B. Fisk of Bell Telephone Laboratories; James R. Killian Jr., president of M. I. T. and the President's scientific adviser; Ernest O. Lawrence of the University of California's Radiation Laboratory; former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett; Isador I. Rabi, chairman of the President's Scientific Advisory Committee, and Paul H. Nitze, former head of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff.

Even as partially disclosed, the Gaither report has made a considerable stir in Washington. What effect it has had, or will have, on Administration policy and planning is still a matter of speculation.

It was noted that the President's second chins-up speech at Oklahoma City, which was delivered a week after the committee submitted its report, at an N. S. C. meeting on Nov. 7, was noticeably less complacent than the first.

election when, for eight weeks, Mr. Eisenhower held no press conferences.

Information found other ways of escaping. It is known, for example, that in a series of successive "background" briefings Secretary of State John Foster Dulles leaked the story of the proposed Eisenhower doctrine for the Middle East.

On Dec. 23, 1956, for example, the New York Times carried the lead story "Congress may get bids to authorize force in Mideast." No authority was given. Reporters recognized the process of the Washington leak at work and the author was later identified as Mr. Dulles.

Two matters of grave concern are now associated with the Gaither Report.

First is the military situation vis-à-vis Moscow.

Bold Course Urged

Second is the reception which the report received when it was presented off-the-record, Nov. 7, to the National Security Council. In a copyrighted story in the Washington Post and Times-Herald of Dec. 20 it is stated that Mr. Eisenhower indicated "at that NSC meeting and, in subsequent conversations, a nagging fear that the American people would balk at paying the bill."

"The President also was fearful that full publication of the gloomy findings in the report would panic the American people into going off in all directions at once."

Hagerty Sees No Danger, Hits 'Leaks'

2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

GETTYSBURG, Pa., Dec. 28 (AP)—The United States is not "at this time" in a position of military weakness, a White House spokesman said today.

As for the future, President Eisenhower will give his ideas on that in his state-of-the-Union message to Congress January 9.

White House Press Secretary James C. Hagerty made a statement on the Nation's current defense status in the wake of recent newspaper reports based on leaks from the Gaither Committee Report.

"Stories that have been printed which indicate that the United States is in a position of weakness at this time are not true," Mr. Hagerty said in response to a news conference query.

He was asked to comment on the world repercussions from reports that the Gaither Committee, originally headed by H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., had found the United States in the gravest danger in its history.

Hagerty Talks Down Peril

The indications from these news reports was that the committee, which studied United States defense status, went into both the long-term and short-term national peril.

Mr. Hagerty, emphasizing that he was speaking of the present, maintained there was no current danger. Trying to discuss the future situation for the country was like looking into a crystal ball, he added, and conclusions varied.

The administration is keeping the Gaither Report secret, despite demands from Congress members and others that it be made public.

Mr. Hagerty said the President would begin to have business callers Monday at his Gettysburg farm, where he plans to work on his State-of-the-Union and "budget" messages for Congress, which convenes January 7.

He will see Marion Folsom, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, on Monday and Budget Director Percival Brundage on Tuesday.

Give Estimate of Strength

The President "will give in the State-of-the-Union message his estimate of the military position of our country as it is now and what has to be done in the future to continue that strength," Mr. Hagerty told newsmen.

He said the President would base his outlook on information from the Gaither Report as well as on information from other committees and on his own personal information.

Information regarding the National peril were true.

The Press Secretary said he had rather expected this query "sooner or later" and was prepared for it. He added his answer was not just off the cuff.

Denying the country is in a position of weakness at this time, he said that is not in the Gaither Report and "as a matter of fact is completely contrary to the report. The report is to the Senate group.

Mr. Hagerty said all of the factual information in the report was available to the Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness, although he said the report itself had not been given to the Senate group.

The Gaither Report: What It Is and Says

By A. T. Hadley

"Release the Gaither report." "Gaither report sees Soviet missile lead." "America to be in extreme danger in 1960, Gaither report believes." Such sentences as these have been appearing in newspapers over the last few weeks. What is the super-secret Gaither report that it should have caused such a stir? And what are some of its major top secret findings?

The Gaither report is the latest in a series of detailed looks at the power position of the United States vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. About once a year these reports are prepared in greatest secrecy. Usually, their mere existence is known at most to some 300 people. Sometimes, the reports merely bear National Security Council numbers such as the monumental NSC 68 that started America rearming a year prior to Korea.

Other reports are called by the place the committee meets, such as "Sofarium," a defense study conceived in the sun room of the White House that never got past the budgeteers. Most bear the name of their chairman. Bull on the early

warning problem. "Doolittle" on the reform of the most secret parts of C. I. A. and now finally Gaither on the whole panoply of American and Soviet power.

The secret knowledge that goes into such reports comes close to being overpowering. Those who have seen the entire reports are limited in the travels they may take for fear of kidnaping by Soviet agents. As the awful knowledge of the Gaither report unfolded to the committee members and they realized the full burden of the present Russian lead, some members became physically ill. Two members had heart attacks, as did a member of a peripheral committee.

The Gaither report, commenced last summer, surveyed the whole scheme of American and Soviet power: the two countries' economies, ideals, population, diplomacy, and, lastly, scientific knowledge and military power.

Among the secret findings of the report are the following:

The Russians are presently stronger than the United States. Unless drastic steps are taken,

they will continue to grow stronger in relation to us. In other words: Time has gone over to their side. No matter what we do between now and 1961, the Russians have the upper hand.

Submarines a Threat

Some 500 submarines armed with atomic missiles are capable of destroying our coastal population and industrial concentrations. Some twenty Red mid-range missile bases already in operation have neutralized the overseas bases of America's first line of defense, the strategic air command. By rapidly exploiting new electronic discoveries, the Russians have made the air defense of the Soviet Union more effective than that of America. By 1961, the Reds will have enough intercontinental ballistic missiles to make this weapon strategically decisive. We will not.

We have no defense against enemy planes entering our airways disguised as commercial aircraft. These planes could wipe out our major air bases in this country without warning. There is evidence to show the Russians have prepared special aircraft to exploit this weakness.

This portion of the Gaither report's findings has been summarized by one intimately familiar with them as follows: "Between now and 1961, the United States must rely primarily on the good-will of the Soviet Union to avoid destruction." Other committee members feel this goes too far; but none questions the commanding nature of the Soviet lead.

But the Gaither report moved beyond the strategic military picture. It dealt with the doctrine of limited war and found American strength in this area, also, sadly lacking. The organization of the Defense Department was also analyzed, and

THE GOBLINS TRY TO GET YOU

The so-called Gaither report, purporting to survey the chances of the United States to survive against the soviet threat, has been leaked into the open. It is calculated to frighten the wits out of the taxpayers.

The document was drafted by a group of internationalists who have long been mixed up with public affairs, mostly in the service of the New Deal. They say the United States is in the gravest danger of its history. The country is exposed, the report says, to an almost immediate soviet missile threat. America is supposed to be sliding rapidly downhill to the status of a second class power.

America's long term prospect is said to be one of cataclysmic peril. Soviet economy and technology are presented as vigorous and growing, and soviet propaganda and psychological warfare as masterful and persuasive.

And so, if all this is true, aren't we already sunk? Have we any other recourse than to sit back in resignation and await Armageddon? Why, say the panelists, suddenly less baleful, it isn't precisely as bad as that. We still have a few more years— maybe even until 1970—to get ourselves ready for the championship match. All we have to do [and if this sounds familiar, try to contain your surprise] is to accept sacrifice, a great increase in government spending, a bigger federal debt, and, perhaps, tax increases.

The study was commissioned by the office of defense mobilization and the national security council, both arms of the government dealing with preparations for war. The recommendations of the committee will be like music to the ears of these military mobilizers of the taxpayers' money.

First, says the Gaither report, we must pump another 8 billion dollars a year into the military establishment, which, with the atomic energy and foreign military aid programs, is already consuming more than 44 billion dollars a year. While there is to be expansion in line with the coming needs of space warfare, there is to be no cutback of any of the costly and obsolescent military methods of the present. We must be armed to the teeth against every conceivable contingency, from a brushfire local war to a battle on the plains of the moon.

At the same time, we must dig ourselves underground at a cost of 5 billion dollars a year expended on a shelter program against nuclear radiation, until all 177 million of us are housed like ground-

We must cheerfully hand out additional billions annually to keep the wavering nations from going communist. We must replace the radar networks with something better and far more expensive.

And, as if all that were not enough, the committee thinks we should not sit back and await the first punch, but should be prepared to strike first if and when we think the Communists are about to hit us. This policy is described as one of prudence, not of preventive war. If we depend upon the central intelligence agency for information about soviet plans and intentions, we are placing our reliance upon a frail reed. But perhaps we are to divine Der Tag by resort to a crystal ball.

This is dangerous business. We not only expose ourselves to moral obloquy for initiating hostilities, but the very statement of such a thesis places in the hands of Kremlin propagandists all the evidence they need to confirm their constant charge that American "ruling circles" are preparing aggression.

This program is a piece of social engineering intended to condition the American people to annual budgets running close to 100 billion dollars, to unlimited government power and control over our lives, and to supine acceptance of a war initiated by the executive any time it may happen to deem conditions propitious.

This is an unlimited gamble with the existence and future of the nation. If the Communists do not accomplish the destruction of the United States, the men who drafted this report would effect the same result from within.

DEC 21 1957

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

The Submarine Peril

The sixtieth annual edition of *Jane's Fighting Ships* makes about the gloomiest reading of any document available to the general public. It reminds us that the Soviet submarine fleet numbers something like 500 ships compared with 204 in the United States Navy and that Russia will commission 200 more underwater craft by 1961 while this country has 18 under construction and funds appropriated for four more. While this country was first with atomic-powered subs, Russia, according to *Jane's*, is at work on nuclear-powered undersea vessels capable of circumnavigating the globe without surfacing and armed with 1500-mile missiles equipped with nuclear warheads.

Presumably it was information about the pace of this Soviet effort that so alarmed the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee in the closed session with Central Intelligence Agency Chief Allen Dulles. The peril to this country posed by a nuclear-powered, missile-carrying Soviet submarine fleet in event of war could hardly be overstated. It would mean that the United States might expect a ballistic missile attack from almost any direction—not just from the north. It would mean perhaps seconds of warning, instead of minutes—if there is a useful difference. It would mean that retaliation, however effective, might never be complete enough to insure that sporadic and terrible raiding would not continue for months.

There are ways to deal with submarines, of course. But much of the answer must unfortunately lie in the matching of the Russian capability in the hope of deterring its use. That is why the speedier development of the Navy Polaris 1500-mile missile, to be fired from American nuclear submarines, is vital, along with stepped-up submarine production itself. Such a weapon could not reach the vast Russian interior as the Soviet naval

missile could reach this country's inland areas. But it would add immeasurably to the deterrent power of land-based missiles and the SAC and naval bomber forces. Nothing can match a submarine fleet's opportunities for stealth, concealment and surprise, especially if that fleet is freed by the harnessed atom to roam limitlessly and unpredictably in the seven seas. Such a power needs to be arrayed on the side of peace.

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

'Leak' Technique Spotlighted

By Richard L. Strout
Staff Correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Washington is now seeing the high tide of the "calculated leak."

The matter is not less significant because the particular present leak deals with the Gaither Report which is represented as one of the most momentous in American history.

According to the leak the Gaither Report says the United States is on its way to becoming a "second-class country" and that—to put it bluntly—the nation is in mortal danger.

Familiar Device

If this causes eyebrow raising it should be stated that the names involved in the situation are not (of themselves) to be taken lightly and that even Vice - President Richard M. Nixon has been brought in.

There are three elements that are essential to the process of getting out the calculated leak—a process, incidentally, with which Washington is long familiar and which has sometimes made a valuable service in American government.

1. There must be a secret of some sort.

2. There must be somebody, or some group, which wants to get it out.

3. The normal channels of communication are clogged.

All these conditions are present now.

As reported details of the Gaither Report are now being pushed out all over Washington the three foregoing elements in the situation can be taken up in order.

Report Made Verbally

There is a secret.

H. Rowland Gaither, Jr., former head of the Ford Foundation, was the initial chairman of the quasi-official body, but due to ill health of Mr. Gaither, co-chairmen William C. Foster of the Olin-Mathieson Chemical Company and Robert C. Sprague, of the Sprague Electric Company, took over.

The unanimous report, presented verbally to Mr. Eisenhower and the National Security Council at a special meeting Nov. 7 (the day of the President's first "chins up" speech) compared the United States and the U.S.S.R. on military and economic grounds, and drew what all declare to be an extremely dark picture.

The "secret" consists of the fact that although hints, rumors, and scraps from the report are known by hundreds all over Washington, it has not been given to the public.

There is a group favoring publication.

The authors of the so-called Gaither Report cannot be dismissed lightly. They are men from business or Wall Street, backed by an impressive technical panel which included James R. Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Members of the group appear to feel that the nation is not getting an adequate sense of urgency.

Private Gathering

As reported in this space, Dec. 13, Vice-President Nixon attended a private Washington gathering in the first week of December at the home of Mr. Foster to discuss next steps with some of the panel members. Ostensibly Mr. Nixon was present only as a listener. The group included such men as Paul H. Nitze, ex-chairman of the State Department's planning staff, Frank M. Stanton, head of Columbia Broadcasting, John Cowles of the Cowles Publications and men of like caliber. The widespread feeling is that Mr. Nixon belongs to the "pro-urgency" school in Washington as contrasted to officials who want to break the facts to the public a little at a time.

Anybody who knows Washington knows that in a situation like this details of the Gaither Report, perhaps magnified, are bound to leak. A calculated operation appears now to be under way.

Channels Clogged

The third necessary ingredient for the Washington leak is clogged channels of communication. This, too, is present.

The quickest and simplest means of clearing up this matter would be to ask President Eisenhower a question at a press conference. But Mr. Eisenhower's last press conference was Oct. 30, or 50 days ago.

Mr. Eisenhower has made two TV reports to the nation in speeches of reassurance (Nov. 7 and Nov. 13 respectively) and will make another next week on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization conference. But the press, of course, is unable to ask questions.


A situation like the present occurred right after the 1956

5 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1. This memorandum is for information only:

2. Richard Haikness, on his 11 o'clock news broadcast, Channel 4, 4 December, ran a film clip showing Senator O'Mahoney in a press interview urging the President to turn his duties over to the Vice President pending his complete recovery from his late illness. In endeavoring to make the point that the President's three illnesses have weakened him to the point where he cannot properly discharge his duties, the Senator began his speech by referring to testimony by "Mr. Dulles, brother of the Secretary of State" before the Johnson committee. O'Mahoney's comments were to the effect that CIA had furnished all needed intelligence regarding Soviet scientific developments but that the President had not acted on it. O'Mahoney inferred from this that either the intelligence had been withheld from the President (the White House "protecting" him, the President) or had read it and had been too incapacitated by his health to take appropriate action.


STANLEY J. GROGAN
Assistant to the Director


STAT

cc: DDCI

5 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR:

1. This memorandum is for information only:
2. The Democrats have obviously taken your testimony before the Johnson Committee to use to embarrass the President and the Administration.
3. Senator O'Mahoney's claim on TV last night that the intelligence the Director received and furnished to the White House was good but was kept from the President by his staff or else the President is too ill to act effectively is one strong indication of this.
4. The rather general press view that Ike should resign is also supported by the "shocking" testimony you reportedly gave in secret.
5. Speaker Martin, Senator Kefauver, Senator Fulbright are apparently using this same line, as well as the "lack of urgency" at the White House so as to gain political advantage.
6. Against your policy and practice the Director's alleged statements have become a Democratic base for attacks on the Administration.
7. This assumedly is not being over-looked at the White House. By your calling attention of the White House to this condition that is one contrary to your wishes might prove useful to the Agency.
8. I am attaching an UP dispatch of a debate between Dworshak (R) and Sparkman (D) in which Sparkman seems to have the enlightened viewpoint that should prevail. I am also attaching a report of a 5:00 p.m. meeting today between the Secretary of State and Senator Fulbright resultant from Fulbright's belief that Mr. Dulles's Soviet review was too rosy; and the UP report of a statement by Senator O'Mahoney.


STANLEY J. GOGAN
Assistant to the Director

STAT

cc: DDCI (less attachment)

UP104

(SPENDING)

NEW YORK--A REPUBLICAN AND A DEMOCRATIC SENATOR TODAY DEBATED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SPEND AVAILABLE MONEY ON FOREIGN AID OR MISSILES AND SATELLITES.

SEN. HENRY C. DWORSHAK (R-IDAHO) DEMANDED A THOROUGH OVERHAUL OF THE AMERICAN FOREIGN AID PROGRAM WITH A VIEW TO SAVING DOLLARS THAT COULD BE SPENT INSTEAD ON NEW WEAPONS AND SPACE MISSILES.

WE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN THEM, HE SAID, AND "IF WE CAN'T HAVE BOTH, PROBABLY WE SHOULD CHOOSE SATELLITES AND MISSILES."

SEN. JOHN J. SPARKMAN (D-ALA.), WHO APPEARED WITH DWORSHAK BEFORE 1,500 INDUSTRIALISTS ATTENDING THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS' 62ND ANNUAL CONVENTION, OPPOSED ANY FOREIGN AID CUT. ON THE CONTRARY, HE SAID, THE QUESTION IS NO LONGER WHETHER MUTUAL AID SPENDING IS JUSTIFIED, BUT WHETHER WE HAVE APPROPRIATED ENOUGH.

MOST PEOPLE FAIL TO REALIZE, SPARKMAN SAID, THAT A TAX DOLLAR SPENT ABROAD GIVES THE NATIONAL INTEREST "FAR GREATER" BENEFIT THAN A DOLLAR SPENT AT HOME.

IN THE LAST 10 YEARS THE UNITED STATES HAS SPENT ON FOREIGN AID 20 BILLION DOLLARS LESS THAN THE COST OF A SINGLE YEAR OF WORLD WAR II, YET HAS CREATED A WORLDWIDE SYSTEM OF ALLIANCES AND MILITARY BASES TO DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION, SPARKMAN SAID.

DWORSHAK ARGUED THAT THE MAIN DETERRENT TO SOVIET AGGRESSIVE EXPANSION HAS BEEN THE U. S. DOCTRINE OF INSTANT RETALIATION RATHER THAN FOREIGN AID TO AMERICA'S ALLIES. MANY NATIONS WHICH HAVE RECEIVED AID HAVE REFUSED TO JOIN THE FREE NATIONS OPPOSING COMMUNISM, HE SAID. HE CITED YUGOSLAVIA AS "A GLARING EXAMPLE."

DWORSHAK SAID "SENATOR SPARKMAN IS ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, WHILE I AM ON THE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE. IT IS OUR JOB TO SEE THAT THE SPENDING MAKES SENSE."

THE IDAHO SENATOR CONTENDED THAT THERE WILL BE NO CUT IN THE \$2,200,000,000 APPROPRIATED FOR MILITARY AID ABROAD THIS YEAR, BUT THAT THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT IS ENDING "MANY VITAL DEFENSE ACTIVITIES" AND CIVILIAN TRAINING PROGRAMS. HE SAID THIS SEEMS TO INDICATE THAT "MILITARY PROGRAMS ABROAD RECEIVE PRIORITY OVER OUR OWN NATIONAL DEFENSE."

SPARKMAN COUNTERED THAT THE CURRENT SPENDING RATE FOR BOTH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC FOREIGN AID IS LESS THAN ONE-TENTH THE COST OF MAINTAINING OUR OWN MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS. IF WE WERE TO TRY TO SHOULDER ALONE THE BURDEN NOW RESTING ON COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGAINST THE COMMUNIST MILITARY THREAT THE COST WOULD BE STAGGERING, HE SAID.

12/5--LZ245P

UP105

(SPVIET)

SECRETARY OF STATE DULLES AND SEN. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT SCHEDULED A MEETING TODAY TO IRON OUT A MISUNDERSTANDING OR DIFFERENCE OVER RUSSIA'S STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS.

THE MIXUP WAS SAID TO HAVE OCCURRED AT THE BIPARTISAN WHITE HOUSE MEETING EARLIER THIS WEEK.

ACCORDING TO REPORTS, DULLES SAID IN AN ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICIES THAT THERE IS A SHORTAGE OF CONSUMER GOODS IN RUSSIA, THAT ITS ECONOMY IS UNBALANCED IN FAVOR OF HEAVY INDUSTRY, AND COMMUNIST LEADERS ARE HAVING TROUBLE WITH SOVIET INTELLECTUALS.

DULLES, ACCORDING TO THESE REPORTS, SAID THESE PROBLEMS WERE SIGNS OF SOVIET WEAKNESS; THAT THE UNITED STATES, BY REMAINING ALERT AND STRONG, ULTIMATELY COULD FORCE THE SOVIET UNION TO ABANDON EXTERNAL ADVENTURES WHICH THREATEN PEACE.

FULBRIGHT, IT WAS SAID, SHARPLY DISAGREED. HE WAS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE TAKEN THE POSITION THAT DULLES WAS DESCRIBING SOVIET "STRENGTHS" AND CALLING THEM "WEAKNESSES."

THE ARKANSAS DEMOCRAT WAS SAID TO HAVE MADE THE POINT TO PRESIDENT EISENHOWER THAT TALK ABOUT SOVIET WEAKNESS WAS MISLEADING AND DANGEROUS. THE PRESIDENT, IT WAS SAID, DID NOT WANT ANYBODY TO GET THE IDEA THAT HE UNDERESTIMATED THE SOVIET MENACE.

DULLES SAID HE THOUGHT HE HAD BEEN MISUNDERSTOOD AND WOULD LIKE TO TALK IT OVER WITH FULBRIGHT.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID THE DULLES-FULBRIGHT MEETING WAS SET FOR 5 P.M.

12/5--LZ250P

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

WASHINGTON (AP)-SECRETARY DULLES SPENT 45 MINUTES CONFERRING WITH SEN. FULBRIGHT TODAY BUT EVIDENTLY FAILED TO OVERCOME FULBRIGHT'S MIS-GIVINGS ABOUT THE ADMINISTRATIONS ESTIMATE OF THE DANGER OF THE SOVIET THREAT.

FULBRIGHT TOLD REPORTERS ON LEAVING DULLES' OFFICE THAT HE THOUGHT THE SITUATION REQUIRED "A MUCH GREATER EFFORT" THAN THAT WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION HAS CALLED FOR.

HE ALSO DECLARED THAT DULLES DOES NOT THINK THE THREAT POSED BY SOVIET SCIENTIFIC ADVANCES--SYMBOLIZED BY SPUTNIK--IS AS SERIOUS AS FULBRIGHT CONSIDERS IT TO BE.

FURTHERMORE, HE SAID HE WAS NOT SATISFIED WITH THE ADMINISTRATION'S PROPOSED NEW FOREIGN AID PROGRAM WHICH WOULD CALL FOR AN INCREASE OF A LITTLE MORE THAN ONE BILLION DOLLARS IN APPROPRIATIONS AT THE NEXT SESSION OF CONGRESS. THE OVERALL REQUEST PROJECTED BY THE PRESIDENT WILL BE NEW APPROPRIATIONS OF 3,940,000,000 (B) NEXT YEAR AND FULBRIGHT SAID THE TOTAL WAS 400 MILLION LESS THAN LAST YEAR'S REQUEST. THE ADMINISTRATION, HE ADDED, HAS NOT LEFT ITSELF ANY "LEEWAY," APPARENTLY MEANING IT HAD PROVIDED NO MARGIN FOR CONGRESSIONAL CUTS.

FULBRIGHT'S COMMENTS WERE IN LINE WITH DEMOCRATIC CRITICISM FOLLOWING PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S BRIEFING OF REPUBLICAN AND DEMOCRATIC LEADERS AT THE WHITE HOUSE TUESDAY. THE THEME OF THE DEMOCRATS WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING HAS GENERALLY BEEN THAT THE ADMINISTRATION FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE A SENSE OF URGENCY ABOUT THE AMERICA AND ALLIED RESPONSE TO THE SOVIET CHALLENGE.

THERE WERE REPORTS THAT DULLES AND FULBRIGHT A LONGTIME CRITIC OF ADMINISTRATION FOREIGN POLICY, HAD DIFFERED SHARPLY DURING THE WHITE HOUSE CONFERENCE OVER THEIR ESTIMATE OF THE SOVIET THREAT.

THE ADMINISTRATION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN SEEKING A BROADER BI-PARTISAN BASIS FOR ITS POLICIES IN ADVANCE OF THE ALLIED SUMMIT CONFERENCE AT PARIS, NOW ONLY TEN DAYS OFF. IT HAS GOTTEN INSTEAD A RESPONSE CHALLENGING THE ADEQUACY OF ITS PROGRAMS.

MC518P 12-5

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

WGMS (Washington) and the MBS Network

4 December 1957

(EXCERPTS)

Reporters Roundup at 7:35 P.M. over WGMS (Washington) and the MBS Network:

Guest: Honorable Murray Snyder, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs

Moderator: Robert Hurlaigh.

Panel: Jack Bell, Associated Press.

Ralph De Toledano, Newsweek Magazine.

Mr. Snyder was asked about releasing information to the American people about short-range missiles, and the following was heard, in part:

BELL: "Wouldn't it be to the benefit of the American people to know that we have something in that field, that we're not just left caught completely unaware?"

SNYDER: "Well, we always approach these problems with a good deal of doubt. How much does the Russian government know, and how much should we give them free? Some of the best minds in American, including Dr. Vannevar Bush, has said that's one of the President's problems, deciding between alerting the American people and giving Russia something they don't have. Now, why do they still have spies working for the Russian government if they have all the information they want? We just convicted one, Mr. Abel, a couple of weeks ago."

BELL: "We have some spies too, don't we?"

SNYDER: "I assume that we have some pretty good sources of information."

BELL: "Well, don't you think you're being on the side of being over-cautious on this? In other words, denying information that would really be of no military value to them, and yet leaving the American people in the dark?"

SNYDER: "Of course, we have nothing to gain in this building from being over-cautious. We don't make the decisions; the laymen do not; it's the intelligence people. If they say that the security of the country is endangered by disclosure of a piece of information, such as where our ships are, or where our planes are at a given point, or what we have in our arsenals, we have to accept their judgment. They're the ones in whose hands is the security of the country, and that means the security of the free world."

* * *

BELL: "Secretary Snyder, who tells you what you can tell the public?"

- 2 -

SNYDER: "Well, when it comes to releasing certain aspects of missiles information or information about the development of planes or the location of bases, these announcements are determined by the--principally by the military people who have the responsibility for the safety of these installations or for the continued usefulness of these missiles. They make their judgments principally on the basis of--if we announce something today, does that enable a potential enemy to develop something just that much faster as a counter weapon. We get this information from the best technological minds at our disposal."

QUESTION: "I don't think you've answered the question in the sense of who immediately above you tells you what you can say. Is it the Secretary of Defense, does it come from the White House, is it the Operations Coordinating Board, as Representative Moss has suggested?"

SNYDER: "Well, there is a definite responsibility by the Department of Defense to mesh its news policy with the foreign policy of the United States, and in that respect where we adopt an overall general policy, such as missiles or movement of troops or movement of atomic-carrying planes, or that sort of thing, we do receive our guidance from the State Department, the White House, and the OCB, which, as you know, represents the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION AGENCY, as well as the State Department and Defense. So this is all--none of these people operate independently or in a vacuum. The standards of our classification system never overlook the fact that what we say here and what we do here affects our international relations."

BELL: "Well, do you believe, as Mr. Moss suggests, that there's any blueprint for secrecy in this setup, in other words, that some of these people would rather keep information secret that easily could be given to the public?"

SNYDER: "I don't know anyone who believes in secrecy for secrecy's sake. They are concerned at all times for the stability of our international relations."

BELL: "Don't you think there's anybody in this organization who might want to cover up for a mistake he might make?"

SNYDER: "I've heard that said many times, Jack, and I've asked Mr. Moss for a bill of particulars on that. We have some strict regulations here that classification shall not be used as a shield to protect someone from publicity for their personal mistakes."

December 3, 1957

(EXCERPT)

Richard Harkness at 11:00 P.M. over WRC-TV (Washington):

RICHARD HARKNESS WAS SEEN ON THE TV SCREEN,
SEATED AT A DESK IN THE STUDIO.

"Well, on Capitol Hill two Democrats spoke out today, calling on President Eisenhower to give way to Vice President Nixon. One was Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, who originally was a pro-Eisenhower man. Morse called for the President's resignation. Then there was this statement by Senator Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming."

A FILM CLIP WAS SEEN OF SENATOR O'MAHONEY.

O'MAHONEY: "Either this information supplied by Mr. Dulles, brother of the Secretary of State, has been suppressed before it got to the President or, having reached the President, because of his illness he was unable to handle it as the leader of the greatest nation in the free world should handle it. But the illness of a man, illnesses of the kind that the President has, heart attack, ileitis, and now this mild stroke, all of those things impede a man's facility, particularly when such person is at the age of 65 when they begin. So I think the neglect of this information lies largely in the fact that there was nobody to take the Presidential authority. The Constitution makes the Vice President the acting President when the President is unable to discharge the duties of the office. And I feel that the time has come, and it can come without any Constitutional amendment, because the Constitution is clear. I think also that the friends of President Roosevelt--President Eisenhower at this moment should be urging him to take a rest until he's completely recovered and I'm sure Nixon would step aside as Acting President when he had recovered. We should not have the authority over the lives and the future of the American people resting in the hands of a man who is in convalescence."

QUESTION BY REPORTER: "Are you suggesting at all, sir, that the President might be incompetent at the present time?"

O'MAHONEY: "I would not use the word incompetent."

REPORTER: "Or unable to act?"

O'MAHONEY: "I do--I do suggest that for three years he's had very serious illnesses, and common sense teaches us that a man of that age who has those illnesses doesn't have his old pep and vigor. And we need a man with complete pep and vigor in this crisis, the crisis of survival."

MR. HARKNESS WAS SEEN AGAIN.

HARKNESS: "Well, speaking of age, as the Senator did, Senator O'Mahoney is approaching 73 years of age."

WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD

DEC 18 1957

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

**Gaither Report
Release Sought**

By Drew Pearson

An extremely hush-hush dinner was held at the home of William Foster, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, now chief sparkplug of Olin-Mathieson. It was held not so much in honor of Vice President Nixon, as reported, but was inspired by Nixon in order to pry loose the suppressed Gaither report.



Pearson

This report, one of the most important in the history of the Nation, concludes that the United States is on the way to becoming a second-class power because of the missile lag.

It also hints in guarded terms that the United States may have to desert its traditional policy of never going to war unless attacked first. The first attack in modern atomic war would be so massive, the report points out, that the country which makes the attack would probably win. And with the arms race going against the United States, the inference is: We can't afford to wait.

This, in blunt language, is preventive war.

Though the White House wants the report suppressed, Nixon and the business executives who wrote the report want the American people alerted regarding the danger facing the Nation.

Educate the Public

Because of the importance of the report, this column has been able to secure the main highlights and they are published below:

- The report strongly urges educating the public on national defense. The security of the Nation, it points out, depends upon the understanding of the people.

- The USSR probably will have operational ICBMs with megaton warheads by the end of 1959. By this time, Soviet military supremacy over the United States should be complete.

- Russia was stronger than America following our disarmament after V-J day, but we caught up and jumped ahead of Russia during the Korean war. Recently we have dropped back. Though our strength today is about parallel, the Soviet is swooping ahead so rapidly that it will be well ahead of us in the next 18 months.

- The report urgently calls for stepping up the "initial operational capability" of our IRBMs (intermediate-range missile) four times the present goal. Even more vital, it recommends increasing our planned ICBM (intercontinental missile) capability almost 10 times.

- The report sketches a five-year defense spending almost

\$20 billion. It recommends a \$3 billion increase in 1959, \$4 billion in 1960, \$5 billion in 1961, \$4 billion in 1962, and \$3 billion in 1963.

Quick Retaliation

- The report declares solemnly that the fate of the United States and its population today rests on the Strategic Air Command. The report urgently recommends wider dispersal of SAC's striking power and quicker reaction to an alert. SAC can now get one-third of its bombers into the air within 15 minutes after an alert. The report urges increasing this capability by at least one-half. It also calls for improving the warning networks.

- The report recommends "hardening" of our bomber and missile bases either by building concrete shelters or putting them underground.

Note—Assistant Defense Secretary Mansfield Sprague fought inside the committee for an even stronger report. This is significant since he is an Administration man. He argued for a stronger recommendation on the question of letting the enemy hit us first, and, though not advocating preventive war, he made the point that if war appears inevitable some time in the future, it would be disastrous for us to wait until the Kremlin strikes the first blow.

Washington Pipeline

John L. Lewis won't hook up with the ousted Teamsters. He feels he has enough problems, what with competing fuels and shrinking coal production. Lewis also is planning another safety campaign in Congress to make every coal mine in the country subject to the Federal mine inspection act. Several hundred smaller coal mines, with 15 or fewer employees, are still exempt. Most farmers and Vice President Nixon may be against Agriculture Secretary Ezra Benson, but Benson's boss, President Eisenhower, is still 100 per cent for him. This was why Benson confidently told the press recently that he had no intention of resigning. If Nixon ever gets into the White House it will be another story. He has already been maneuvering to get Benson out. The American Medical Association is already lobbying against a bill, due to come up in Congress next year, which would provide hospitalization and surgical benefits to recipients of social security. AMA lobbyists are now making the rounds on Capitol Hill, even though most Congressmen won't be back till January.

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Gaither's Findings to Stay Secret U.S. Won't Yield Report to Senate

By Rowland Evans Jr.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 16.—The White House had decided to withhold the top-secret Gaither Committee report from the Senate Preparedness subcommittee, it was understood today.

Despite a formal request from the subcommittee, headed by Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson, D. Tex., the Gaither Committee proposals for an immediate and costly American defense response to Soviet weapons advances will be kept from Congressional view. There were indications, however, that the Administration might agree to brief the subcommittee on certain portions of the Gaither Committee findings in executive testimony.

Budget Curbs Cited

The subcommittee heard more testimony today that budget restrictions the last few years, particularly in research and development funds, have hampered the Navy. Garrison Norton, Assistant Secretary of Navy for air, testified that the overall missile structure in the Pentagon "is a maze" of confusing parts and that, based on "firm, hard intelligence" of Soviet progress, the American missile effort has "not (been) the effort" that is needed.

Mr. Norton, former Assistant Secretary of State, proposed a sharp curtailment of all the post-Sputnik talk of what he called "Buck Rogers stage" of weapons development—manned space satellites and the like. His feelings about top-priority research into these space-age techniques differed radically from top Army officers who testified last week that the principal emphasis on weapons development today should be on long-range projects taking perhaps fifteen years to accomplish.

Mr. Norton said: "Nothing should dilute the effort of achieving a capability of a warhead 'from here to there.' The country is 'very close' to

obtaining that result, he said, in all five intermediate and long-range ballistic missiles now in development.

Wants First Things First

"Let's get first things done first," Mr. Norton said.

This question—whether to embark now on a "tremendous space program," as he put it, or whether first to master the ballistic missile—is becoming one of the chief features of the subcommittee investigation of the American missile program.

To discuss the Soviet submarine build-up and its consequences to American defense the subcommittee called Rear Adm. C. E. Weakley, Navy Director of Undersea Warfare. Adm. Weakley described the Russian submarine fleet as "a threat . . . without parallel in the peacetime history of the world."

The Soviet union, he said, but the Russians already have 475. When Sen. Styles Bridges, R., N. H., said the subcommittee has received a "different" and higher estimate on the number of Soviet submarines, Adm. Weakley explained he was talking in general terms. Top intelligence officers of this country reportedly told the subcommittee last month that perhaps as many as 600 submarines were available to the Russians today.

No Air-Breathing Missiles

Adm. Weakley also appeared to discount other testimony before the subcommittee that some Soviet submarines may already be equipped with air-breathing guided missiles. Aside from one article in a Russian military publication, he said he has "no concrete information that they have missiles in their submarines."

The statement, again somewhat less alarming than earlier testimony, drew from Sen. Estes Kefauver, D. Tenn., the comment that there seemed to be "some difference" of opinion between the Central Intelligence and Naval Intelligence.

The Navy is building its own submarine-based 1,500-mile ballistic missile, the Polaris, but it is far from completed. Navy experts said today, however, that work on the Polaris has not suffered from budget limitations and indicated the program is well ahead of its original schedule.

Navy Less Concerned

Throughout today's all-day session, Navy officials seemed

somewhat less concerned than the Army brass had been last week. Sen. Johnson was moved to remark at one point: "If you men do not co-operate with us in laying the facts on the line there is no way that this committee can help you."

Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, jumped to his feet to exclaim that the Navy was, indeed, short of money, personnel and ships to accomplish its mission.

The Navy's Vanguard satellite project, and the great publicity that surrounded the unsuccessful effort to put a baby satellite into an orbit ten days ago, was scrutinized at great length today. Mr. Norton said the Navy "was not responsible for the policy under which the publicity was issued" and put that responsibility squarely on Murray Snyder, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs.

The Navy itself, he said, wanted the experiment conducted in strict privacy. Despite three previously successful tests, one on each of the three stages of the Vanguard rocket, he said, the odds for failing the first firing test of the complete rocket were enormous. Such is the nature of applied research.

"I was not at all surprised at the failure," Mr. Norton said. "I thought it quite likely that it would fail."

Could Not Change Policy

But even the Secretary of the Navy, Thomas S. Gates Jr., could not change the policy set by the Defense Department and, presumably, the White House. Rear Adm. Rawson Bennett, the Chief of Naval Research, testified that his objections to "this excessive publicity" started in January, 1957, and that he "so stated." As a result, he said, he was "castigated by the press."

When committee counsel Edwin F. Weisl asked: "Apparently Snyder didn't pay any attention to the Secretary of the Navy?" Adm. Bennett, a man

with a battleship build, replied tartly: "That is my opinion."

The Air Force testifies tomorrow, then the subcommittee breaks off until Jan. 6, one day before the new session of Congress convenes. For six days starting then, it will take testimony from industry experts, and others, to round out a hearing record on which it hopes to base strong recommendations for a drastic acceleration of the missile program. The final witness tonight was J. Sterling Livingston, of the Harvard Business School, who attributed the American defense lag to bad military-industrial planning and long lead-time in producing weapons.

The White House decision to withhold the Gaither report will have repercussions in Congress. The report analyzed urgent defense problems and, it is understood, proposed a host of immediate actions by the Federal government, including an atomic-shelter program. Dr. Rowan Gaither, former president of the Ford Foundation, headed the panel.

DEC 17 1957

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

White House to Keep Gaither Report Secret

By Rowland Evans Jr.

N. Y. Herald Tribune News Service

The White House has decided to withhold the top-secret Gaither Committee report from the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, including an atomic-shelter program. H. Rowan Gaither, former president of the Ford Foundation, headed the panel.

Despite a formal request from the Subcommittee, headed by Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Tex.), the Gaither Committee proposals for an immediate and costly American defense response to Soviet weapons advances will be kept from congressional view. There were indications, however, that the Administration might agree to brief the Subcommittee on certain portions of the Gaither Committee findings.

The White House decision to withhold the Gaither report will have repercussions in Congress. The report analyzed urgent defense problems and, it is understood, proposed a host of immediate actions by the Federal Government,

Senators Ask Firing Of Holaday

Stennis Declares Missiles Job Has Outgrown Director

By Jack Bell
Associated Press

Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy faced strong senatorial pressure yesterday to replace Missiles Director William M. Holaday and shake up the top civilian command of the missiles program.

Democratic Leader Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas called for replacement of officials he said had permitted vital missile decisions to "get lost somewhere in the Defense Department."

Johnson avoided direct mention of Holaday's name in public comment. But the Democratic majority of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee was reported unanimous in the belief that the Pentagon's missiles director ought to go. Johnson heads the Subcommittee, which is investigating the missile and satellite programs.

Stennis for a "Top Man"

Sen. John C. Stennis (D-Miss.), vice chairman of the Subcommittee, said he thinks Holaday ought to be replaced.

"The job has outgrown the man," he said. "We have got to have a top man there."

Johnson said in a separate interview he thinks McElroy "may be the kind of man who can find some 'sundowners' and put them in charge of the missile program." He defined "sundowners" as men who run a taut ship, get their men back aboard at sundown and are ready for any fight.

"It is apparent that we have the technical skill, the resources and the necessary enthusiasm among our technicians to build any missile we need and to build it on time," Johnson said. "What we have been lacking are hard, firm decisions at high levels."

"There has been a common refrain through all our hearings. It is that a request was made for a decision and it got lost somewhere in the Defense Department. With 'Sundowners' in charge nobody would be singing that song today."

Defended by Saltonstall

Holaday apparently failed to impress Democratic Subcommittee members when he testified Friday that he has the "sense of urgency" most of them say is needed to catch up with the Russians in space weapons.

Holaday's insistence that missiles ought to have priority over satellites also was challenged by members impressed with statements by scientist Wernher von Braun that Soviet satellite accomplishments indicate they can fire a missile with a nuclear warhead to any point in the world.

However, Sen. Leverett Saltonstall (R-Mass.), a Subcommittee member and chairman of the conference of all Republican Senators, said he thinks Holaday is "doing a good job." He said he had heard no reports that the missile director might be ousted.

McElroy seems likely to be recalled before the Subcommittee after his return from the NATO conference in Paris. He made a good impression in his previous testimony but subsequent developments indicate he will face some tough questioning about missile delays caused by the Administration's freeze of funds voted by Congress.

DEC 14 1957

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

BUSH SCORES 'LEAKS' FROM SENATE GROUP

WASHINGTON, Dec. 13 (UP) —Senator Prescott Bush, Republican of Connecticut, accused fellow members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, today of having failed to "safeguard secrets" entrusted to them.

He said he was "deeply shocked" by "leaks" about testimony given to the group's preparedness subcommittee recently by Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Senator Bush specifically cited an article in Newsweek magazine that he said purported to give an account of Mr. Dulles' testimony. The Senator said he would neither confirm nor deny the information but he said that it apparently been based on information leaked to the writer.

John Denson, managing editor of Newsweek magazine, said last night that he considered the article "a legitimate job of reporting." He said the article, which appeared in the magazine's issue of Dec. 9, had contained no facts not known to the Soviet Union.

"The article says this was the substance of testimony of Allen Dules before the committee, but we don't see that there were any security factors involved, because it referred to Russian strength primarily," Mr. Denson declared.

WAKE UP, CITIZENS!

Demand that the True Story of the U.S. Satellite, and How
The Soviet Was Able to Use it for a Communist Victory,
be Given You

*MERCURY'S Open Letter to The President of
the United States and to the American People:*

THE United States Government is presently under the influence of the most powerful, and crafty, subversive organization in history. As a result, none of our Government secrets are safe. Our vital secrets are relayed daily to the Soviet Union. We invest billions of our taxpayers' earnings in research and the results, no matter how vital to the life and death of this Republic, are in the hands of the Soviets almost immediately.

This is in accordance with Marx and other Marxian leaders, including those in our midst, who stated that the Capitalist Systems and Governments should be used to finance their own downfall.

This network of Super-Espionage allows the Kremlin to build quickly as a result, not of their own research or technological money expenditures, but as a result of our research and vast investments—and to obtain quickly devices which our best brains and research organizations have per-

fectured. When a stage of perfection is reached and successful tests made, these sinister, subversive influences exert their pressure upon our Government in Washington—and even The Congress in part—by "Committee" delays to confuse and slow-up our own use of our invention. The results are, as recently experienced—when the Kremlin launched "its" satellite ahead of us. We had perfected a better satellite long ago through our own scientists and with our own money and industrial know-how.

One of the major leaks is through the supposedly super-secret CIA—it was involved in the research on our satellite and also in our "policy" committees and their decisions. The CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) has long been a source of intelligence for the Soviets. Some of its most secretive operators were placed in their key positions by the cabal in which Harry Dexter White-

OVER

Henry Morgenthau's assistant—was a director—in spite of the FBI's warnings. These people were one of the reasons the U.S. Army was not allowed to fire its satellite 15 months ago. They are, in turn, controlled by men who hate the brilliant German scientists we rescued from Soviet secret police and employed—for the safety of America rather than Communist Russia and Red China—in U.S. Army research centers.

With this background we urgently offer the following advice:

To the President: As a loyal American why not look around you, outside your Secretariat box, and within the White House at your own advisers. Reappraise the men who killed actions by "Committee" systems. Ask the FBI who these people are. The traitors in our midst have continuing sanctuary as long as their dossiers are not brought personally to the attention of the President. They are those same people, guided by those secret influences, who originally financed the Red Communist Revolution—that now has enslaved millions of people of both Europe

and Asia. They financed the Rosenbergs.

To the American People: Demand, and quickly, as your Congress is reassembling, a real investigation which will eliminate these subversive men's influences from all contact with our federal Government and its projects. Demand that their "friends" be eliminated from contacts with the White House staffs, from the Department of State, the CIA, the Bureau of the Budget and, especially, in the Atomic Energy Commission.

UNLESS this is done we will live to see the words of one of their leaders, before a Congressional Committee of 1950, come true. This man said, for the record, that he would live to see a "Collective America"; that we would be but a part of a World Government—whether we the people of the United States liked it or not! Remember, "No man can serve two masters" (Matthew 6:24). Let's get rid of all those who hold alliance to more than one temporal power.

SABOTAGE

Patriotic Americans know, though the details for security reasons can't be made public, that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) must be placed exclusively in the hands of loyal native-born men. The fact is that our secrets are getting too quickly into the enemy hands of the Soviets. We are vulnerable, today, to a secret sabotage by which we may discover, some day, that none of our atomic weapons will explode if dropped on the Kremlin—with the Soviet aggressors knowing in advance this asset for atheistic Communism. Demand, at last, an Atomic Energy Commission of men with long—and known to the F.B.I.—records of adamant patriotism and loyalty to the People of the United States!

HOW CAN WE CATCH UP?

An expert tells the shocking story of how the Soviets licked us in developing the deadliest weapons in history.

What do we do now?

By STEWART ALSOP

Mr. Alsop Knows His Missiles

When they formed their partnership in 1946, Joseph and Stewart Alsop realized that new weapons had changed the nature of the world we live in. They therefore decided that, though neither brother had a scientific background, it was their function as reporters to master the essential facts about those weapons. One of the first fruits of that decision was an article published in the Sept. 6, 1947, issue of The Saturday Evening Post. It was titled "ARE WE READY FOR A PUSH-BUTTON WAR?" The Alsops say that this article required the hardest reporting they ever have done. However that may be, the timetable

for future missile development in that article stands up astonishingly well today.

The Alsops have been going to school on new weapons ever since. Some remarkably prescient reporting has resulted. For example, on last July 5, Stewart Alsop reported the first Soviet intercontinental missile test. For a time this report was scoffed at in the Pentagon, but some weeks later it was officially confirmed, in Washington and in Russia. The Alsops have to their credit a whole series of such news beats, including the dawn of Sputnik's day around 1957-58.

—The Editors.

When Sputnik One roared into space, many official voices were raised to assure us that it was a mere "bauble," a "neat scientific trick," and that it had "no military significance." Nevertheless, a kind of collective uneasiness settled over the United States like a dark cloud. When Sputnik Two followed Sputnik One, with its half ton of weight and its pathetic "passenger," there were no more complacent voices to be heard. For Sputnik Two meant—it could mean nothing else—that the Soviets were ahead of the United States in the race for the decisive weapons of the future, the ballistic missiles of strategic range.

How far ahead? That question cannot be answered with absolute precision, because there are still certain unknown factors involved. But it is possible to draw up an accurate balance sheet of where both this country and the Soviet Union stand today in the missile race. The balance sheet is based, moreover, not on indiscreet confidences whispered to beautiful blond spies somehow smuggled into the Kremlin, but on absolutely solid, indisputable evidence. But before drawing up the balance sheet, it is first necessary to understand why the missile race is important—why, indeed, its outcome will determine the future of the world we live in.

In late August, the Soviets announced that they had successfully tested a ballistic missile of intercontinental range. The Era of Complacency then still persisted, and the President remarked reassuringly that a missile is "a means of delivering an explosive charge, and that is all it is for."

The statement is true as far as it goes, of course. But it could equally have been said in the fourteenth century that "the longbow is a means of delivering an arrow, and that is all it is for." Yet the longbow was the decisive weapon of those times. At two hundred and fifty yards," Sir Winston Churchill has written, "the arrow hail produced effects never again reached by infantry missiles at such a range until the American civil war." The possession of the longbow gave the British one of history's great decisive victories at the Battle of Crécy in 1346. And there is at least as much difference between the longbow and the broadswords in the hands of the French knights who were slaughtered at Crécy, as there is between the long-range strategic missile and the manned bomber.

There are two simple but wholly fundamental differences between these two "means of delivering an explosive charge." The B-52 bomber, the main means of delivery of the American Strategic Air Command, can fly from the SAC base in Maine, for example, to Moscow, in about nine hours' flying time. An inter-

continental missile can travel between available Soviet bases and the SAC base in Maine in about twenty minutes.

The second difference is related to the first. Because it flies so fast, and also because it flies during most of its trajectory at several hundred miles' altitude, there is no known way to intercept a long-range ballistic missile. There are theoretical ways, which are taken seriously by the experts. But the most optimistic of the experts agree that the defense against the ballistic missiles will remain strictly theoretical for a long time to come.

By contrast, the marriage of the short-range, ground-to-air defensive missile and the nuclear warhead is bringing nearer the day when our manned bombers will no longer be able to reach their targets. Nikita Khrushchev said that that day is here already—it would be "inhuman," he has said, to try to send bombers over the Soviet defenses. Unquestionably, the Soviets have developed a remarkably effective target-seeking nuclear missile defense, and there are knowledgeable Americans—especially in the United States Navy—who are inclined to agree with Khrushchev.

But the greater threat to the manned bombers of SAC is not over Soviet targets, but on their own home bases, in this continent and abroad. George Kennan once compared the United States and the Soviet Union to "two scorpions in a bottle," each capable of stinging the other to death. SAC is the sting of the Western scorpion, and Khrushchev has never made any bones about it. The main targets of the long-range missiles he is so fond of boasting about are SAC's bases. Their primary mission is to knock out those SAC bases, and thus

purge capacity for retaliation. Khrushchev's purpose, in short, is to remove the sting of the Western scorpion. Moreover, there is no doubt at all that strategic missiles will surely replace the manned bombers, as the longbow replaced the knights' swords. The prospect which immediately confronts us is that Soviets will achieve this replacement before we do. There will then be a gap—in the Pentagon it is known simply and ominously as The Gap—during which we shall be in somewhat the position of the mounted French knights at Crécy, sword in hand, facing the skilled British bowmen killing them at will with their long-range "infantry missiles."

The analogy of the sword and the longbow is not thanks be to God, absolutely precise. There are ways as we shall see, in which our retaliatory sword can be strengthened and shielded even during The Gap. Yet the fact must be faced that The Gap will be a period of deadly danger, the deadliest

(Continued on Page 66)

How Can We Catch Up?

(Continued from Page 2)

this country has known. And the further fact must be faced that we shall enter this time of danger soon, and may have entered it already. To do this, it is only necessary to examine the balance sheet of where we stand today.

The balance sheet is largely based on the comparative rate of missile testing in the Soviet Union and this country. The testing rate is accepted without question by the intelligence experts as an accurate guide of missile progress. And the Soviet testing rate is not a matter of guesswork.

When the Soviets test a ballistic missile, we know about it just as we know about it when they test a nuclear weapon. How we know about it has been an open secret for a long time among those who interest themselves in such matters, and it has certainly long been known to the Russians too. It was publicly revealed in October, in an article in the authoritative technical magazine, *Aviation Week*.

In brief, in early 1955 the United States established in Turkey and elsewhere a long-range radar monitoring system which records the upper trajectory for Soviet missile tests. This is another wholly reliable means of being able to ascertain not only the number of Soviet missile tests but the point of origin and impact, the general configuration of the missile (whether it is multistaged or single-staged, for example), the speed, the approximate thrust of the engine, and so on.

The radar system, which makes use of a new kind of enormous radar screen, was set up in the first place as a result of intelligence reports of Soviet missile tests which began to come in as early as 1953. Almost on the day it began for business, the system began to track numerous missile firings in the Soviet Union. Thus we do not know for certain how many firings there had been before the radar system was established. But it is reasonable to assume—and it is assumed by the United States intelligence community—that the first firings of the shorter-range strategic missiles probably began in 1953, certainly in 1954.

In drawing up the balance sheet, there are four main categories of missiles considered. Category One includes the IRBMs, or intermediate ballistic missiles, with ranges from 600 to 1,500 miles. Category Two includes the ICBMs, or intercontinental ballistic missiles, with ranges of 4,000 to 5,500 miles. Category Three concerns engine power, a vital factor in missile efficiency. Category Four concerns accuracy, an even more vital factor, since a missile which does not destroy its target is a useless weapon. Let us examine each category in turn.

IRBM's. The Soviets began test-firing their shorter-range strategic missiles, of 600 to 1,000 miles, back in 1953-54. The best estimates are that they have tested several hundred of these shorter-range missiles. We have no equivalent missiles—unless you count a hopped-up, nonoperational version of the Army's Redstone—and thus the score card on these shorter-range but extremely useful weapons is several hundred to zero.

The Soviets began testing their longer-range IRBM's, in the 1,000-to-1,500-mile ranges, at about the time our radar system went into operation. At least eleven tests misfired, but since then they have tested more than 100 such missiles. In early 1956, the Soviets shifted to a regular test-firing pattern of five such IRBM's a month. This is the sort of thing we would do if we had already frozen on an operational model, and put it into mass production.

In 1956, some months after the time the Soviets shifted to the five-a-month pattern, we tested our first IRBM "test vehicle," the Army's Jupiter C. Since then there have been a small number of tests of Jupiter and of Thor, the Air Force model. The American Government has not yet, as of this writing, decided whether the Jupiter or Thor—or both—is to be the model for the operational IRBM's of the future.

Meanwhile, it is important to understand that neither Jupiter nor Thor is a weapon—at the present stage. Neither could be used in war, and neither will be an operational weapon for at least a year, and perhaps a good deal more. Consider this balance sheet, and it seems rather optimistic to conclude that the Soviets are

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Instant Parachute
(It don't mean a thing if
you don't pull that string)

only 100 years ahead of us in their IRBM category.

ICBM's. Americans have a rather personal interest in this category of weapons, since the main targets for the Soviet ICBM's are, of course, in this country. At first glance, the balance sheet in the ICBM category does not look quite as lopsided as in the case of the IRBM's. The Soviets began testing ballistic missiles of ranges of 4,000 miles and more early this year. We also began our ICBM tests this year. As of this writing, there have been two tests of the Atlas ICBM vehicle, and more are imminent. One might conclude from these facts that we were in a tight race with the Russians for the ICBM, and only a little behind. The conclusion is, alas, incorrect.

The Soviet rockets were multistage missiles, with an "operational configuration." They were, in short, weapons designed to be used in war. The Atlas vehicles tested so far have been nothing of the sort. The fact that both of the first two Atlas tests misfired is unimportant—misfirings are inevitable in the missile business, and can be usefully instructive. What is important is that the much-publicized Atlas tests were simply tests of the big first-stage rocket. After this first-stage rocket is successfully fired (and that may have happened before these words are printed) there will be a long way to go before the "marriage-and-divorce" of the second stage is successfully achieved, and sufficient accuracy for an operational weapon built into the missile. It may be three years, and it may be five, before we

are producing an operational ICBM. As we shall see, the Soviets may be producing such a weapon now. So the balance sheet may be more lopsided in the ICBM category than in the IRBM's.

Power. When the Soviets launched Sputnik One, the experts were shocked to learn that the satellite weighed 184 pounds. This meant that the Soviet had an engine with an initial thrust of 250,000 to 300,000 pounds. Our most powerful operating engine has a thrust of about 130,000 pounds. But we are working on an engine with 300,000-pound thrust for our Titan ICBM model, so it seemed at least that we were still in the race. Then the Soviets fired Sputnik Two, weighing more than half a ton.

This meant to some of the experts, at least, a Soviet engine with a thrust of 800,000 to 1,000,000 pounds, and strongly supported Soviet claims that they had perfected a new kind of power source. So here again, the balance sheet is frighteningly lopsided.

Accuracy. At the time of the launching of Sputnik Two, the Air Force Association issued an angry statement, "deploring the apparent willingness to permit the American people to remain . . . misinformed on major issues regarding our own weapon development." Sputnik One had been followed by a series of much-publicized missile firings off Cape Canaveral, in Florida. These missiles, the Association charged, were simply aimed at "10,000 miles of Atlantic Ocean." In other words, they wholly lacked the accuracy necessary in operational weapons. The Association's statement may have been a trifle exaggerated, but not much. For the fact is that we do not yet have, and shall not have for an uncomfortably long time, a ballistic missile of strategic range which can be brought down accurately on target.

Before the Sputnik firings, the great hope of the more hopeful intelligence experts was that the Soviets, like ourselves, had not yet really mastered the crucial accuracy problem. There was no way to tell, after all, whether the missiles picked up on the radar monitoring system really landed where they were supposed to land. Even since the Sputniks, the hope lingers faintly on. But it is faint. An engineer with a slide rule will tell you that Sputnik Two's power and payload means that the Soviets can lift a 5000-pound payload for 5000 miles.

This capability, which we will not be able to match for a long time, makes it only prudent to suppose that the Soviets have also largely solved the problem of accuracy, and the problem of atmospheric re-entry as well.

Where, then, do we stand? At the time of the firing of Sputnik Two, Nikita Khrushchev made a double-barreled boast. The Soviets already had, he said, "intercontinental rockets" capable of "delivering hydrogen bomb warheads to any point in the globe." As for the nearer targets, the American "military bases in Europe, Africa, and Asia," had "long since" been rendered "useless" by the Soviet intermediate missiles.

Before the Sputniks, the experts would have been inclined to discount these boasts. The generally accepted estimate then was that the Soviets would only begin to have an operational IRBM system capable of threatening our forward SAC bases and our allies' cities by the end of 1958, and that they were not yet producing operational ICBM's. Now many of the experts take Khrushchev's boasts almost at face value. They believe that the Soviets already have, or will very soon have, an operational IRBM system. They further believe that they are already producing operational ICBM's, although

they will probably not be able to establish the complex weapons system necessary to threaten the whole target system of this country until 1959.

All this suggests an obvious conclusion. The Gap—the time of deadly danger when the Soviets will have operational ballistic missiles systems while we must rely on our manned bombers—is either upon us or very nearly upon us. This grim conclusion, which is accepted as substantially accurate throughout the Washington intelligence community—suggests a couple of questions. How did we let the Russians get so far ahead? And what can be done about it?

Another "great debate" on defense policy is getting under way. Although all concerned will protest piously that their motives are of the purest nonpartisan hue, the debate will have obvious political overtones. In fact, neither party can take much comfort from the real answer to the first question asked above.

For the main reason why the Russians are ahead is perfectly obvious. They started a lot sooner than we did—probably five years sooner. The best intelligence estimates are that they started an all-out effort to master the strategic missiles in 1948-49. That was the era of our "atomic monopoly"—and the illusion of the atomic monopoly oddly persisted for a long time after the Soviets tested their first atomic bomb in 1949. It was also the era of Louis Johnson, who hoped to ride to the Presidency on the boast of having "cut the fat" out of the American defense effort.

One bit of "fat" cut out in the Johnson era was the Atlas ICBM project which his predecessor, James Forrestal, had assigned to the Convair company. Another bit of fat was a pilot project for the satellite which Forrestal had also started. The Atlas project was not revived until 1950, when Johnson ignominiously departed. One successor, Robert Lovett, was fully aware of the importance of the missile race. So was Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter, and, perhaps especially, Air Force Under Secretary John McCone, who fought unsuccessfully for a "Manhattan Project" for missile development. Yet the long-range-missile effort never really got out of the slide-rule stage until early 1954.

This was partly because of the atomic monopoly illusion, partly because of the hostility of some SAC-minded Air Force officers to "all that long-hair missile stuff." But there was another reason, too, and a peculiar one.

Throughout the Truman years, there were no hydrogen bombs in the American stockpile. The existing atomic bombs had a destructive range of only half a mile or so against fairly sturdy targets. So an "accuracy requirement" for the missiles of "one in ten thousand" was laid down. This meant that a missile of five-thousand-mile range had to be designed to hit within half a mile of a target.

A missile can be rather accurately compared to a rifle bullet. During the brief initial period of its flight, it is guided, as a bullet is guided in the barrel of a rifle. Thereafter it flies free, like a bullet, and where it lands depends on the accuracy of aiming and the atmospheric and other conditions it encounters on the way. If a twenty-two rifle at the right angle will travel a mile or more, a missile will hit within half a mile of a target like trying to put a bullet in the mouth of a

their slide rules. Meanwhile, the Soviets had adopted a far more realistic one-in-a-thousand requirement—five miles of error to 5000 miles of range—even before they had tested their first atomic bomb. With astonishing self-confidence, they were then already looking forward to their hydrogen bomb.

For it is the marriage of the hydrogen bomb and the missile which makes the missile of strategic range a practical weapon. Only a hydrogen warhead provides the necessary radius of destruction. And it was only after—and quite a long time after—our own first hydrogen test in November, 1952, that our long-range-missile program really began to get off the ground.

Our first "thermonuclear device" was known as "Mike." Mike was a monstrous great thing, bigger than a big house. But its yield was also monstrous—about eight megatons, the equivalent of eight million tons of TNT. You can't shoot something as big as a house into space—not now, at any rate. So the problem was to thin Mike down, so that a hydrogen warhead small enough to be carried on a ballistic missile would still deliver a megaton-range punch.

Shortly after the Mike shot, Trevor Gardner, newly appointed Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, made a journey of inquiry. He asked the leading scientists in the thermonuclear field—men like Dr. Edward Teller, Dr. Ernest Lawrence, and Dr. Charles Lauritsen—the same question: "Can you give us a megaton for half a ton?" Being translated, this means: "Can you devise a thermonuclear warhead with a megaton punch weighing a thousand pounds or less?"


In each case, the answer was a flat "yes." (In fact, recent technical advances have made it possible to pack a good deal more than one megaton into a warhead weighing a good deal less than a thousand pounds.) The Gardner journey of inquiry was the real start of our long-range-missile program. For the scientists' "yes" made it possible to reduce the accuracy requirement to a realistic ratio of one in a thousand—the same ratio the Soviets had adopted long before.

But the mills of the Government, like the mills of the gods, grind slow. It was not until early 1954 that Gardner succeeded in reorganizing the strategic-missile program, getting it a high priority, and assigning Gen. Bernard A. Schriever to push it with all speed. It is ironical that both Gardner and Air Force Secretary Talbott, who backed his efforts, resigned under fire. Yet if you want to talk in political terms, the fact remains that the long-range-missile program only got seriously under way after Dwight D. Eisenhower became President.

But the story, alas, does not end there. The story is a story of falling between two stools—the stool of election promises to balance the budget and reduce taxes, and the stool of the hideous cost of the new weapons. The Eisenhower Administration tried to solve the dilemma by pouring the new missile wine into the old service bottles, at the same time reducing the size of the bottles. The result was an inadequate missile effort coupled with insanely complicated organization and unnecessary rivalry and duplication between the services.

The story of how we got beaten to the satellite punch illustrates this falling-between-two-stools process. As early as 1954, the Central Intelligence Agency—whose record in the missile field has been generally excellent—got wind of Soviet

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and alkalisers
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New
Or
Ye
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Motoring at
\$6.95 and
\$3.50
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by Secretary of Defense Charles McNamara, who, asked in late 1954 whether he would be "concerned" if the Soviets launched the first satellite, replied cheerfully, "I wouldn't care if they did."

On the other side were those, especially in the CIA, who foresaw the psychological effect of a first Soviet satellite launching. The result was a compromise. The satellite project was never accorded the highest priority. Because the Navy was then desperate to get into the missile act, the project was assigned to the Navy instead of the Army, which was best equipped to do the job. And so the project limped along, an over-advertised orphan, until the fatal day when Sputnik One roared into space.

But the indictment of the Administration's handling of the missile program does not end with this falling between two stools. The hard fact is that the policy-making officials knew without a shadow of doubt, thanks to the Turkish installations, that the Soviets were forging ahead. And their response to this knowledge was not greatly to increase the American missile effort, but actually, and incredibly, to cut it back. Overtime was virtually eliminated from the missile program, in the name of economy. Last summer, after the first Soviet ICBM tests, basic research and development funds were cut back by \$170 million. The schedule for Titan, the second ICBM program, was stretched out by ten months. The Navaho air-breathing missile, which might have provided a good interim answer to the Soviet ICBM, was dropped on the eve of successful tests. And so on.

This economy-first policy was coupled with a secrecy-first policy, and the two dovetailed neatly. When this reporter described the first Soviet ICBM test in July, "high Pentagon sources" put it about that the Soviets were in "an early motor-testing stage" with their ICBM—this when the monitoring system had already told its grim, irrefutable story. If the facts of Soviet progress had been known, the country would surely have demanded an all-out effort to match the Russians. But the facts were concealed, in the name of "security," and this secrecy-first served as the handmaiden of economy-first.

But all this is water over the dam. What of the future? The first fact to recognize is that The Gap—that period of deadly danger for the West—is upon us, and cannot be wished away. No miraculous "breakthroughs" are going to make up for the time we have lost. The Soviets are far ahead in the missile race, and they are going to stay ahead for some time to come.

Yet it is silly and defeatist to suppose that this country, with its immense resources, need permanently accept second place to the Soviets in the race for the decisive new weapons. Of course we can close The Gap, if we have the will to do so. Indeed, we have already started to do so. For sad as the story of our missile effort has been, there is one bright spot. The Soviets started their missile race at least five years before we did, and that gap has already been narrowed, perhaps by two years, perhaps by more, despite the inadequacy of our effort.


The first thing that must be done, obviously, is to close The Gap entirely, to achieve operational ICBM and IRBM systems as soon as possible, at whatever cost. To do so will not, of course, solve all our problems, but at least both of the "scorpions in a bottle" will then have an equally lethal sting.

But however great our efforts, it will take time, certainly two years or more, to close The Gap. As long as The Gap exists, Nikita Khrushchev, who is a gam-

to gamble high. For Khrushchev knows that his lead in the ballistic missiles will not last forever. He will therefore be tempted to use the period of The Gap to force a "preventive showdown." The newly truculent tone which Khrushchev adopted immediately after the first successful Soviet ICBM tests and the bogus Turkish-Syrian crisis which he engineered were clear warning that something of the sort is already in his thoughts.

Yet there are ways to cool Khrushchev's gambling ardor. For there are things that can and must be done to maintain our deterrent power, so that Khrushchev will never be in a position to attack, or to threaten to attack, free of the fear of terrible retaliation, even during The Gap.

The most foolish thing we could do is to starve SAC while trying to close The Gap, for then we should have neither sword nor longbow. On the contrary, everything possible must be done to make certain that SAC can do its grisly job, come what may. One way to do this is to keep the maximum proportion of SAC's bombers bomb-loaded and ready to hit Soviet targets at all times. This is, in fact,



already being done—the present objective is to keep a third of SAC's bombers always either air-borne or on fifteen-minute alert. Another way is to disperse the SAC bases as much as possible, to present the Soviets with the maximum number of difficult targets. A third way is to provide an answer to the formidable defenses of which Khrushchev has boasted, in the form of the air-to-ground missiles with a nuclear warhead, of the Rascal type, which will permit SAC's manned bombers to release their bomb load many miles from the heavily defended target areas.

Yet, while SAC must on no account be starved, we must face the fact that SAC's elaborate forward-base system, while it has not been rendered "useless," as Khrushchev claims, is far more vulnerable than it has ever been. This applies also to the intermediate land-based missiles, like Thor and Jupiter, which will be operational, in one form or another, well before our ICBM's. Because their range is limited, the IRBM's must be fired from bases located in or controlled by foreign countries. Thus there is always a danger that, in case of a direct threat to the United States, the use of the intermediate missiles, like the use of the forward-based SAC planes, will be subject to foreign veto power.

This is why an overriding priority must be given to Polaris, an intermediate missile designed to be fired from a submerged nuclear submarine. Our atomic subs, like Nautilus and Seawolf, will carry a number of these small, easily handled missiles with ranges up to 1500 miles. It is obvious that only a few Polaris-equipped atomic subs will constitute in themselves a retaliatory power with which the Soviets must most seriously reckon, and whose

There are even good arguments for giving Polaris priority over the ICBM itself. For the ICBM bases, necessarily large and immovable, will themselves be subject to surprise missile attack, while missiles based on fast-moving atomic submarines will be almost wholly invulnerable.

Unfortunately, even given a crash program, Polaris is probably two years or more from the operational stage. But there are other ways in which the Navy can help to fill The Gap, given an end to the fruitless rivalry over "roles and missions." There are the ship-based and submarine-based short-range missiles, like Regulus. And there is the water-based jet plane, which can use not the fixed and vulnerable landing strips of SAC, but the limitless surface of the seven seas.

Such planes, capable of landing in eight-foot waves, could be refueled by submarine, and could be used either to refuel SAC's bombers in case SAC's forward bases were knocked out, or to take on the retaliatory role themselves. Two prototypes of such sea-based jets were built by the Martin Company, and blew up in tests. But the project, in the view of those best able to judge, could and should be revived on an urgent basis.

These are only a few of the ways in which The Gap can be bridged on an emergency basis, and our deterrent power maintained in the period of deadly danger which lies ahead. As for the more distant future, one thing is clear. In the game of leapfrog which we have been playing with the Soviets since the war, the Soviets over-leaped us in the race for the ballistic missiles. It is our turn to leap next, and we must do so. The next target in the grim game of leapfrog will be the manned hypersonic bomber. The hypersonic bomber will skip through space over the surface of the earth's blanket of atmosphere, at speeds approaching those of the ballistic missiles, like a stone skipped on a pond by a small boy. The hypersonic bomber will be a way-station on the road to true manned space travel, and it will be the first step toward the domination of the space around us. The Soviets are hard at work on a hypersonic bomber, known as the T4A, already, and we cannot afford to be beaten to this punch also.

Beyond the hypersonic bomber lies the manned space platform, and the final conquest of space. Dr. Walter Dornberger, who headed the German V-2 project, and who is the father of modern missilery if there is one, has said that the nation which first conquers space will "lead mankind into the future." Yet the United States now has no real space program, just as we had no real strategic-missile program until 1953-54. If we do not want to be "led into the future" by Nikita Khrushchev or his heirs, this omission must be most urgently rectified.

To do such things will require a lot of money, an effort of will, and even, perhaps, some personal sacrifice of comfort. It will require something more; as well. Especially during the time of The Gap which now is upon us, it will require an indisposition to succumb to Communist blackmail, and a stoutness of heart of a kind which Americans, in their fortunate geographic security, have never had to show before. But given the kind of leadership which tells the people the facts and shows them how to face up to those facts, stoutheartedness will surely be forthcoming. And it may well be enough both to avert the appeasement which can lead only to surrender, and a universal war which would destroy the kind of life we have known. But in the best of circumstances, the time ahead will not be an easy time for any of us.

THE END

**SATURDAY EVENING
POST**

DEC 14 1957

HOW CAN WE CATCH UP?

An expert tells the shocking story of
how the Soviets licked us in
developing the deadliest weapons in history.

What do we do now?

BY STEWART ALSOP

Mr. Alsop Knows His Missiles

When they formed their partnership in 1946, Joseph and Stewart Alsop realized that new weapons had changed the nature of the world we live in. They therefore decided that, though neither brother had a scientific background, it was their function as reporters to master the essential facts about those weapons. One of the first fruits of that decision was an article published in the Sept. 6, 1947, issue of The Saturday Evening Post titled ARE WE READY FOR A PUSH-BUTTON WAR? The Alsops say that this article required the hardest reporting they ever have done. However that may be, the timetable

for future missile development in that article stands up astonishingly well today.

The Alsops have been going to school on new weapons ever since. Some remarkably prescient reporting has resulted. For example, on last July 5, Stewart Alsop reported the first Soviet intercontinental missile test. For a time this report was pooh-poohed in the Pentagon, but some weeks later it was officially confirmed, in Washington and in Russia. The Alsops have to their credit a whole series of such news beats, including the dawn of Sputnik's day around 1957-58.

—The Editors.

When Sputnik One roared into space, many official voices were raised to assure us that it was a "bauble," a "neat scientific trick," and of "no military significance." Nevertheless, a collective uneasiness settled over the United States like a dark cloud. When Sputnik Two followed the first, with its half ton of weight and its pathetic passenger, there were no more complacent voices to be heard. For Sputnik Two meant—it could mean anything else—that the Soviets were ahead of the United States in the race for the decisive weapons of the ballistic missiles of strategic range.

How far ahead? That question cannot be answered with absolute precision, because there are still certain factors involved. But it is possible to draw up a balance sheet of where both this country and the Soviet Union stand today in the missile race. This sheet is based, moreover, not on indiscreet rumors whispered to beautiful blond spies smuggled into the Kremlin but on absolutely indisputable evidence. But before drawing up the sheet, it is first necessary to understand why the race is important—why, indeed, its outcome will determine the future of the world we live in.

In August, the Soviet Union announced that they had successfully tested a ballistic missile of intercontinental range. The Era of Complacency then still persisted, and the United States did not even remark reassuringly that a missile is not of delivering an explosive charge and that it is not a bomb.

But the statement is true as far as it goes, of course. But it would equally have been said in the fourteenth century that "the longbow is a means of delivering an arrow and that is all it is for." Yet the longbow was the main weapon of those times. At two hundred and thirty yards, Sir Winston Churchill has written, "the arrow produced effects never again reached by the missiles at such a range until the American B-29 Superfortress." The possession of the longbow gave the English one of history's great decisive victories at the Battle of Crécy in 1346. And there is at least as much difference between the longbow and the broadsword as there is between the French knights who were slaughtered at Crécy, as there is between the long-range strategic missile and the manned bomber.

There are two simple but wholly fundamental differences between these two "means of delivering an explosive charge." The B-52 bomber, the main means of the American Strategic Air Command, comes from the SAC base in Maine, for example, to its target in about nine hours' flying time. An inter-

continental missile can travel between available Soviet bases and the SAC base in Maine in about twenty minutes.

The second difference is related to the first. Because it flies so fast, and also because it flies during most of its trajectory at several hundred miles' altitude, there is no known way to intercept a long-range ballistic missile. There are theoretical ways, which are taken seriously by the experts. But the most optimistic of the experts agree that the defense against the ballistic missiles will remain strictly theoretical for a long time to come.

By contrast, the marriage of the short-range, ground-to-air defensive missile and the nuclear warhead is bringing nearly the day when our manned bombers will no longer be able to reach their targets. Nikita Khrushchev has said that that day is here already—it would be "inhuman," he has said, to try to send bombers over the Soviet defenses. Unquestionably, the Soviets have developed a remarkably effective target-seeking nuclear missile defense, and there are no doubt knowledgeable Americans—especially in the United States Navy—who are inclined to agree with Khrushchev.

But the greater threat to the manned bombers of the SAC is not over Soviet targets, but on their own home bases, in this continent and abroad. George Kennan once compared the United States and the Soviet Union to two scorpions in a bottle, each capable of stinging the other to death. SAC is the sting of the Western scorpion, and Khrushchev has never made any bones about it. The main targets of the long-range missiles he is so fond of boasting about are SAC's bases. Their primary mission is to knock out those SAC bases, and thus to remove the sting of the Western scorpion.

Moreover, there is no doubt at all that strategic missiles will surely replace the manned bombers, as the longbow replaced the knights' swords. The prospect which immediately confronts us is that the Soviets will achieve this replacement before we do. There will then be a gap—in the Pentagon it is known simply and famously as The Gap—during which we shall be in somewhat the position of the mounted French knights at Crécy, sword in hand, facing the skilled British bowmen killing them at will with their long-range "infantry missiles."

The analogy of the sword and the longbow is not, thanks be to God, absolutely precise. There are ways, as we shall see, in which our retaliatory sword can be strengthened and shielded even during The Gap. Yet the fact must be faced that The Gap will be a period of deadly danger, the deadliest

(Continued on Page 66)

How Can We Catch Up? (Continued from Page 20)

this country as known. And the further fact must be faced that we shall enter this time of danger soon, and may have entered already. To prove this, it is only necessary to examine the balance sheet of missile progress today.

The balance sheet is largely based on the comparative rate of missile testing in the Soviet Union and this country. The testing rates accepted without question by the intelligence experts as an accurate guide of missile progress. And the Soviet testing rate is a matter of guesswork.

When the Soviets test a ballistic missile, we know about it just as we know about it when they test a nuclear weapon. How we know about it is in an open secret for a long time among those who interest themselves in such matters, and this secret has mainly long been known to the news community. It was publicly revealed in October in an article in the authoritative technical magazine, *Aviation Week*.

In brief, in early 1955 the United States established the Turkey and elsewhere a long-range radar-monitoring system which records the upper trajectory of Soviet missile tests. By this and other wholly reliable means, it is possible to ascertain not only the number of Soviet missile tests, but the point of origin and impact, the general configuration of the missile (whether it is multistaged or single-staged, for example), the speed, the approximate thrust of the engine, and so on.

The radar system, which makes use of a new kind of enormous radar screen, was set up in the first place as a result of intelligence reports of Soviet missile tests which began to come in as early as 1953. Almost on the day it opened for business, the system began to track numerous missile firings in the Soviet Union. Thus we do not know for certain how many firings there had been before the radar system was established. But it is reasonable to assume—and it is assumed by the United States intelligence community—that the first firings of the shorter-range strategic missiles probably began in 1953, certainly in 1954.

In drawing up the balance sheet, there are four main categories to be considered. Category One includes the IRBM's or intermediate ballistic missiles with ranges from 600 to 1,500 miles. Category Two includes the ICBM's or intercontinental missiles, with ranges of 1,500 to 5,500 miles. Category Three covers the line power, or the factor of an missile's efficiency. Four covers the accuracy, or the factor of an missile's ability to hit its target. A missile which cannot hit its target is a useless weapon. Let us examine each category in turn.

IRBM's. The Soviets began test-firing their shorter-range strategic missiles, of 600 to 1,000 miles, back in 1953-54. The best estimates are that they have tested several hundred of these shorter-range missiles. We have no equivalent missiles, unless you count a hopped-up, nonoperational version of the Army's Redstone—and thus the score card on these shorter-range but extremely useful weapons is several hundred to zero.

The Soviets began testing their longer-range IRBM's, in the 1,000-to-1,500-mile ranges, at about the time our radar system went into operation. At least eleven tests misfired, but since then they have tested more than 100 such missiles. In early 1956, the Soviets shifted to a regular test-firing pattern of five such IRBM's a month. This is the sort of thing we would do if we had already frozen on an operational model, and put it into mass production.

In 1956, some months after the time the Soviets shifted to the five-a-month pattern, we tested our first IRBM "test vehicle," the Army's Jupiter C. Since then there have been a small number of tests of Jupiter and of Thor, the Air Force model. The American Government has not yet, as of this writing, decided whether the Jupiter or Thor—or both—is to be the model for the operational IRBM's of the future.

Meanwhile, it is important to understand that neither Jupiter nor Thor is a weapon at the present stage. Neither could be used in war; and neither will be an operational weapon for at least a year, and perhaps a good deal more. Consider this balance sheet, and it seems rather optimistic to conclude that the Soviets are

Hal Blocks Inventions FOR A BETTER TOMORROW



Instant Parachute
(It don't mean a thing if you don't pull that string)

only two years ahead of us in the IRBM category.

ICBM's. Americans have an advantage in this category of weapons, since the main targets for the Soviet ICBM's are of course in this country. At a glance, this balance sheet in the ICBM category does not look quite as lopsided as in the case of the IRBM's. The Soviets began testing ballistic missiles of ranges of 1,500 miles and more early this year. We have been our ICBM tests this year, as of this writing, there have been two.

ICBM vehicle, and more are imminent. One might conclude from these facts that we were in a tight race with the Russians for the ICBM, and only a little behind. The conclusion is, alas, incorrect.

The Soviet rockets were multistage missiles, with an "operational configuration." They were, in short, weapons designed to be used in war. The Atlas vehicles tested so far have been nothing of the sort. The fact that both of the first two Atlas tests misfired is unimportant—misfirings are inevitable in the missile business, and can be usefully instructive. What is important is that the much-publicized Atlas tests were simply tests of the big first-stage rocket. After this first-stage rocket is successfully fired (and that may have happened before these words are printed) there will be a long way to go before the "marriage-and-divorce" of the second stage is successfully achieved, and sufficient accuracy for an operational weapon built into the missile. It may be three years, and it may be five, before we

are producing an operational ICBM. As we shall see, the Soviets may be producing such a weapon now. So the balance sheet may be more lopsided in the ICBM category than in the IRBM's.

Power. When the Soviets launched Sputnik One, the experts were shocked to learn that the satellite weighed 134 pounds. This meant that the Soviets had an engine with an initial thrust of 250,000 to 300,000 pounds. Our most powerful operating engine has a thrust of about 130,000 pounds. But we are working on an engine with 300,000-pound thrust for our Titan ICBM model, so it seemed at least that we were still in the race. Then the Soviets fired Sputnik Two, weighing more than half a ton.

This meant to some of the experts, at least, a Soviet engine with a thrust of 800,000 to 1,000,000 pounds, and strongly supported Soviet claims that they had perfected a new kind of power source. So here again, the balance sheet is frighteningly lopsided.

Accuracy. At the time of the launching of Sputnik Two, the Air Force Association issued an angry statement "deploring the apparent willingness to permit the American people to remain in the dark on major issues regarding our own weapons development." Sputnik One had been followed by a series of much-publicized missile firings off Cape Canaveral, in Florida. These missiles, the Association charged, were simply aimed at "10,000 miles of Atlantic Ocean." In other words, they wholly lacked the accuracy necessary in operational weapons. The Association's statement may have been a little exaggerated, but not much. For the fact is that we do not yet have, and shall not have for an uncomfortably long time, a ballistic missile of strategic range which can be brought down accurately on target.

Before the Sputnik firings, the great hope of the more hopeful intelligence experts was that the Soviets, like ourselves, had not yet really mastered the crucial accuracy problem. There was no way to tell, after all, whether the missiles picked up on the radar monitoring system really landed where they were supposed to land. Since the Sputniks, the hope lingers a little, but it is frail. An engineer with the due will tell you that Sputnik One's power and payload means that the rockets can lift a 5,000-pound payload for 5,000 miles.

This capability, which we will not be able to match for a long time, makes it only prudent to suppose that the Soviets have also largely solved the problem of accuracy, and the problem of atmospheric re-entry as well.

Where, then, do we stand? At the time of the firing of Sputnik Two, Nikita Khrushchey made a double-barreled boast. The Soviets already had, he said, "intercontinental rockets" capable of "delivering hydrogen bomb warheads to any point in the globe." As for the nearer targets, the American military bases in Europe, Africa, and Asia, "had long since" been rendered "useless" by the Soviet intermediate missiles.

Before the Sputniks, the experts would have been inclined to discount these boasts. The generally accepted estimate then was that the Soviets would only begin to have an operational IRBM system capable of threatening our forward SAC bases and our allies' ones by the end of 1958, and that they were not yet producing operational ICBM's. Now many of the experts take Khrushchey's boasts almost at face value. They believe that the Soviets already have, or will very soon have, an operational IRBM system. They further believe that they are already producing operational ICBM's, although

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by Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, who, asked in late 1954 whether he would be "concerned" if the Soviets launched the first satellite, replied cheerfully, "I wouldn't care if they did."

On the other side were those, especially in the CIA, who foresaw the psychological effect of a first Soviet satellite launching. The result was a compromise. The satellite project was never accorded the highest priority. Because the Navy was then desperate to get into the missile act, the project was assigned to the Navy instead of the Army, which was best equipped to do the job. And so the project limped along, an over-advertised orphan, until the fatal day when Sputnik One roared into space.

But the indictment of the Administration's handling of the missile program does not end with this falling between two stools. The hard fact is that the policy-making officials knew without a shadow of doubt, thanks to the Turkish installations, that the Soviets were forging ahead. And their response to this knowledge was not greatly to increase the American missile effort, but actually, and incredibly, to cut it back. Overtime was virtually eliminated from the missile program, in the name of economy. Last summer, after the first Soviet ICBM tests, basic research and development funds were cut back by \$170 million. The schedule for Titan, the second ICBM program, was stretched out by ten months. The Navaho air-breathing missile, which might have provided a good interim answer to the Soviet ICBM, was dropped on the eve of successful tests. And so on.

This economy-first policy was coupled with a secrecy-first policy, and the two dovetailed neatly. When this reporter described the first Soviet ICBM test in July, "high Pentagon sources" put it about that the Soviets were in "an early motor-testing stage" with their ICBM—this when the monitoring system had already told its grim, irrefutable story. If the facts of Soviet progress had been known, the country would surely have demanded an all-out effort to match the Russians. But the facts were concealed, in the name of "security," and this secrecy-first served as the handmaiden of economy-first.

But all this is water over the dam. What of the future? The first fact to recognize is that The Gap—that period of deadly danger for the West—is upon us, and cannot be wished away. No miraculous "breakthroughs" are going to make up for the time we have lost. The Soviets are far ahead in the missile race, and they are going to stay ahead for some time to come.

Yet it is silly and defeatist to suppose that this country, with its immense resources, need permanently accept second place to the Soviets in the race for the decisive new weapons. Of course we can close The Gap, if we have the will to do so. Indeed, we have already started to do so. For sad as the story of our missile effort has been, there is one bright spot. The Soviets started their missile race at least five years before we did, and that gap has already been narrowed, perhaps by two years, perhaps by more, despite the inadequacy of our effort.

The first thing that must be done, obviously, is to close The Gap entirely, to achieve operational ICBM and IRBM systems as soon as possible, at whatever cost. To do so will not, of course, solve all our problems, but at least both of the "scorpions in a bottle" will then have an equally lethal sting.

But however great our efforts, it will take time, certainly two years or more, to close The Gap. As long as The Gap exists, Nikita Khrushchev, who is a gam-

bler by instinct, will be constantly tempted to gamble high. For Khrushchev knows that his lead in the ballistic missiles will not last forever. He will therefore be tempted to use the period of The Gap to force a "preventive showdown." The newly truculent tone which Khrushchev adopted immediately after the first successful Soviet ICBM tests and the bogus Turkish-Syrian crisis which he engineered were clear warning that something of the sort is already in his thoughts.

Yet there are ways to cool Khrushchev's gambling ardor. For there are things that can and must be done to maintain our deterrent power, so that Khrushchev will never be in a position to attack, or to threaten to attack, free of the fear of terrible retaliation, even during The Gap.

The most foolish thing we could do is to starve SAC while trying to close The Gap, for then we should have neither sword nor longbow. On the contrary, everything possible must be done to make certain that SAC can do its grisly job, come what may. One way to do this is to keep the maximum proportion of SAC's bombers bomb-loaded and ready to hit Soviet targets at all times. This is, in fact,

use no foreign country can veto. There are even good arguments for giving Polaris priority over the ICBM itself. For the ICBM bases, necessarily large and immovable, will themselves be subject to surprise missile attack, while missiles based on fast-moving atomic submarines will be almost wholly invulnerable.

Unfortunately, even given a crash program, Polaris is probably two years or more from the operational stage. But there are other ways in which the Navy can help to fill The Gap, given an end to the fruitless rivalry over "roles and missions." There are the ship-based and submarine-based short-range missiles, like Regulus. And there is the water-based jet plane, which can use not the fixed and vulnerable landing strips of SAC, but the limitless surface of the seven seas.


Such planes, capable of landing in eight-foot waves, could be refueled by submarine, and could be used either to refuel SAC's bombers in case SAC's forward bases were knocked out, or to take on the retaliatory role themselves. Two prototypes of such sea-based jets were built by the Martin Company, and blew up in tests. But the project, in the view of those best able to judge, could and should be revived on an urgent basis.

These are only a few of the ways in which The Gap can be bridged on an emergency basis, and our deterrent power maintained in the period of deadly danger which lies ahead. As for the more distant future, one thing is clear. In the game of leapfrog which we have been playing with the Soviets since the war, the Soviets overleaped us in the race for the ballistic missiles. It is our turn to leap next, and we must do so. The next target in the grim game of leapfrog will be the manned hypersonic bomber. The hypersonic bomber will skip through space over the surface of the earth's blanket of atmosphere, at speeds approaching those of the ballistic missiles, like a stone skipped on a pond by a small boy. The hypersonic bomber will be a way-station on the road to true manned space travel, and it will be the first step toward the domination of the space around us. The Soviets are hard at work on a hypersonic bomber, known as the T4A, already, and we cannot afford to be beaten to this punch also.

Beyond the hypersonic bomber lies the manned space platform, and the final conquest of space. Dr. Walter Dornberger, who headed the German V-2 project, and who is the father of modern missilery if there is one, has said that the nation which first conquers space will "lead mankind into the future." Yet the United States now has no real space program, just as we had no real strategic-missile program until 1953-54. If we do not want to be "led into the future" by Nikita Khrushchev or his heirs, this omission must be most urgently rectified.

To do such things will require a lot of money, an effort of will, and even, perhaps, some personal sacrifice of comfort. It will require something more, as well. Especially during the time of The Gap which now is upon us, it will require an indisposition to succumb to Communist blackmail, and a stoutness of heart of a kind which Americans, in their fortunate geographic security, have never had to show before. But given the kind of leadership which tells the people the facts and shows them how to face up to those facts, stoutheartedness will surely be forthcoming. And it may well be enough both to avert the appeasement which can lead only to surrender, and a universal war which would destroy the kind of life we have known. But in the best of circumstances, the time ahead will not be an easy time for any of us.

THE END



already being done—the present objective is to keep a third of SAC's bombers always either air-borne or on fifteen-minute alert. Another way is to disperse the SAC bases as much as possible, to present the Soviets with the maximum number of difficult targets. A third way is to provide an answer to the formidable defenses of which Khrushchev has boasted, in the form of the air-to-ground missiles with a nuclear warhead, of the Rascal type, which will permit SAC's manned bombers to release their bomb load many miles from the heavily defended target areas.

Yet, while SAC must on no account be starved, we must face the fact that SAC's elaborate forward-base system, while it has not been rendered "useless," as Khrushchev claims, is far more vulnerable than it has ever been. This applies also to the intermediate land-based missiles, like Thor and Jupiter, which will be operational, in one form or another, well before our ICBM's. Because their range is limited, the IRBM's must be fired from bases located in or controlled by foreign countries. Thus there is always a danger that, in case of a direct threat to the United States, the use of the intermediate missiles, like the use of the forward-based SAC planes, will be subject to foreign veto power.

This is why an overriding priority must be given to Polaris, an intermediate missile designed to be fired from a submerged nuclear submarine. Our atomic subs, like Nautilus and Seawolf, will carry a number of these small, easily handled missiles with ranges up to 1500 miles. It is obvious that only a few Polaris-equipped atomic subs will constitute in themselves a retaliatory power with which the Soviets must most seriously reckon, and whose

M'ELROY ORDERS THOR AND JUPITER INTO PRODUCTION

1,500-Mile Missiles Will Be
at British Sites in '58,
He Tells Inquiry

NOT FULLY DEVELOPED

Allen Dulles Report on Soviet
'Steady' Nuclear Gains
Is Called 'Shocking'

Excerpts from testimony are
printed on Page 26.

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 27—The Secretary of Defense announced at the Senate defense hearing today that both the Thor and the Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic missiles had been authorized for combat production.

The Secretary, Neil H. McElroy, pointed out to the Senate Preparedness subcommittee that neither of the 1,500-mile weapons, developed in rivalry by the Air Force and Army, had been fully developed.

However, the decision to go ahead was considered "sound" to permit installation of the missiles on sites in Britain by the end of 1958, and other sites in Europe soon afterward, he explained.

'Good News' to Senator

"The statement you have made just now to the committee and to the country is good news," Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, chairman of the subcommittee, remarked.

Earlier, in closed session with Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the committee heard a "sad and shocking story" in a comparison of this country's missile development with that of the Soviet Union.

Senator Stuart Symington, Democrat of Missouri, described the secret test in that fashion. He added, "the sooner the American people know about it, the better."

Senator Styles Bridges, Republican of New Hampshire, said the committee had received "very unpleasant information" and William N. Holaday, the director of missiles at the Pentagon, submitted its report, it would "shock any complacency out of various officials and the American public."

Mr. Dulles and Dr. Herbert Hoover, director of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, discussed the "steady progress" of the Soviet Atomic energy program in providing nuclear warheads for Russian missiles as well as other weapons, it was made known.

Russian's 'Boasting' Discounted

The presentation also covered Soviet bomber and submarine strength, it was disclosed. These aspects of Soviet military power were considered in terms of the potential Russian threat with such forces until Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles were assigned to operational forces.

But when Edwin L. Weisl, chief counsel of the subcommittee asked Secretary McElroy whether he agreed with the "boasting" of Nikita S. Khrushchev, Soviet Communist party leader, that Russia was now militarily stronger than this country, the response was emphatic:

"I don't take it seriously for five minutes—not even for one minute."

He conceded—as he has before—that the Soviet was "obviously" ahead of the United States in missiles that could lift earth satellites into orbit—and that they thus probably had a military applicability, too. But he would not endorse statements that the Soviet led the United States in long-range missile development.

Statements to that effect had been made by prominent witnesses since the hearings opened Monday. The Senate inquiry was prompted by the Soviet successes in launching two earth satellites.

Variety of Questions

Facing a Senate committee for the first time since he took over as Secretary of Defense last month, Mr. McElroy had ready answers to a variety of questions, even those with a sharp political edge.

Except for the statement about the Thor and Jupiter missiles, which he read as the session began, Mr. McElroy had no

notes before him. He was ac-

quired to answer questions taken "late last evening" as the result of "an intensive reassessment of our position" and the "success" that has been achieved in the recent tests of both these missiles.

Ballistic missiles, unlike true guided missiles that are guided electronically with remote controls, receive their power and guidance in the initial stage of flight. After that they follow a determined trajectory, as do cannon shells.

Intermediate-range missiles, such as the Thor and Jupiter, are designed for distances of 1,500 miles. Intercontinental ballistic missiles, which the Russians say they have tested successfully and the United States still has in an early stage of development, are designed for distance of 5,000 miles.

Jupiter Failure Noted

Mr. Weisl asked the Defense Secretary how he could refer to "successful tests" when this morning's newspapers reported an official announcement of a failure yesterday in the testing of a Jupiter. The Defense Secretary smiled as he replied that he referred to the test program rather than a specific instance.

At the Pentagon, the Air Force announced that the Thor already was "in production," but the number coming off the lines at the Douglas Aircraft Company was not revealed. The Army's Jupiter is under production jointly by the Army's Ordnance Department and the Chrysler Corporation.

According to authoritative sources, the Thor's production prototype is farther advanced than that of the Army. Mr. McElroy refused to reveal in open session the anticipated production figures for the weapons.

UP 81

(MISSILES)

SENATE INVESTIGATORS HEARD A SECRET REPORT TODAY ON INFORMATION GLEANED BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY ABOUT SOVIET STRENGTH.

ALLEN W. DULLES, DIRECTOR OF THE AGENCY, AND HIS AIDES TESTIFIED BEHIND CLOSED DOORS BEFORE THE SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATING U.S. MISSILE AND SATELLITE PROGRAMS.

DURING A 15-MINUTE BREAK SHORTLY BEFORE NOON, SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER LYNDON B. JOHNSON, CHAIRMAN OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE, TOLD REPORTERS THE SENATORS "RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF VERY IMPORTANT AND VERY VALUABLE INFORMATION ON THE DEFENSES OF THIS NATION."

HE DOUBTED THAT EVEN A CENSORED RECORD OF THE TESTIMONY WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC.

DULLES SPENT ABOUT TWO HOURS AT A CLOSED SESSION OF THE COMMITTEE LATE YESTERDAY AND RETURNED TODAY FOR AN ADDITIONAL THREE TO FOUR HOURS. THE COMMITTEE EXPECTED TO RESUME ITS PUBLIC HEARINGS WITH SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MCELROY THIS AFTERNOON.

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY JOLTED SENATORS TODAY WITH ITS SECRET APPRAISAL OF SOVIET STRENGTH AND MISSILE DEVELOPMENT.

"THERE IS LITTLE COMFORT TO BE GAINED FROM REALIZING WHAT THE FACTS ARE ABOUT THE ADVANCES THE SOVIET UNION HAS MADE IN CERTAIN RESPECTS," SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN JOHNSON SAID AFTER DULLES'S SECRET BRIEFING.

"VERY UNPLEASANT LISTENING," COMMENTED SEN. STYLES BRIDGES (R-N.H.).

SEN. STUART SYMINGTON (D.MO.) SAID DULLES'S BRIEFING ADDED UP TO A "SAD AND SHOCKING STORY. THE SOONER THE AMERICAN PEOPLE KNOW ABOUT IT, THE BETTER," HE SAID.

SEN. RALPH E. FLANDERS (R-VT.) SAID HE WAS "JUST A LITTLE DISTURBED, BUT WE SUSPECTED IT."

SEN. ESTES KEFAUVER (D-TENN.) SAID THE COMMITTEE WAS GIVEN "A RATHER DREARY PICTURE BUT IT'S NOT HOPELESS."

"THIS IS NO TIME FOR EITHER A SIESTA OR HYSTERIA," JOHNSON TOLD REPORTERS.

"AMERICA IS FACED WITH A GREAT CHALLENGE. I HAVE NO DOUBT ABOUT OUR WILLINGNESS OR OUR ABILITY TO MEET IT."

DULLES AND HIS CHIEF AIDES SPENT ABOUT SIX HOURS BRIEFING THE SUBCOMMITTEE BEHIND CLOSED DOORS YESTERDAY AND TODAY.

JOHNSON LATER TOLD NEWSMEN THAT THIS MORNING'S BRIEFING INCLUDED AN "UP-TO-
THE MINUTE REVIEW OF SOVIET PROGRESS IN THE SHORTER RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES."

THE CIA WITNESSES SAID THEY HAD ESTIMATED "SOME TIME AGO" THAT RUSSIA WOULD HAVE THE CAPABILITY OF SUCCESSFULLY LAUNCHING AN EARTH SATELLITE IN 1957 BY USING A MISSILE ROCKET.

"THE BRIEFING INDICATED THAT THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM WAS MAKING STEADY PROGRESS WITH THE VIEW TO PROVIDING NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THEIR FAMILY OF MISSILES, AS WELL AS OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS," JOHNSON SAID.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE WAS GIVEN SECRET FIGURES ON RUSSIAN BOMBERS AND SUBMARINE STRENGTHS, "PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THEIR ROLE AS THE MAJOR FORCES IN BEING WHICH COULD POSE A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES, AT LEAST UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THEIR ICBM'S BECOME OPERATIONAL," JOHNSON SAID.

THE CHAIRMAN INDICATED THAT THE SUBCOMMITTEE WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT SOME OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES.

AT ONE POINT, HE SAID "WE RECEIVED A RATHER THOROUGH AND I TRUST ACCURATE PICTURE," THE SUBCOMMITTEE ALSO REVIEWED THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF CIA AS TO "THE RELATIVE FIRMNESS OF VARIOUS CRITICAL ESTIMATES OF SOVIET STRENGTH...AND THE VALIDITY" OF THEM, HE SAID.

"THROUGH A HEALTHY AND CLEAR-CUT EXCHANGE OF VIEWS, IT WAS CONCLUDED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST TO TAKE A GOOD LOOK AT CERTAIN PROCEDURES, AT THE COORDINATION BETWEEN THE CIA AND THE SERVICES AND THE CONGRESS WITH A VIEW OF ATTAINING MAXIMUM EFFICIENCY," HE SAID.

BRIDGES TOLD REPORTERS THAT IN THE LIGHT OF THE CIA TESTIMONY THE SENATE COMMITTEE WAS "CERTAINLY JUSTIFIED" IN UNDERTAKING ITS INVESTIGATION.

HE PREDICTED THAT ANY COMPLACENCY FELT BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WOULD BE SHOCKED OUT OF THEM WHEN THE COMMITTEE DISCLOSES WHATEVER IT CAN MAKE PUBLIC OUT OF THE CIA REPORT.

11/27 -- LZ204P

Closed Session

It presented a "sobering, but by no means hopeless" situation, he said, adding that one good thing the Russian sputnik had done was to put us on the alert in this country.

The committee heard Allan W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency and Dr. Herbert Scobille, director of scientific intelligence, in closed session after Doolittle's public appearance.

Senator Johnson later said the intelligence chiefs had testified that the Soviet economy was growing "relatively faster" than our own, and Russia's production of military hardware was "roughly equal," although its gross national produce was only 42 per cent as large as ours.

He said they pointed out, however, that the Soviet Union faced "growing difficulties" in maintaining its high level of military spending and investment in heavy industry while trying simultaneously to improve living standards as a "stimulation to high productivity."

Johnson said the CIA officials gave the committee an assessment of Soviet guided missiles capacities and intentions. They pointed out, he said, that the Russians took from Germany after World War II several hundred missile specialists as well as operational and prototype missiles with ranges up to about 200 miles. Russia was credited with developing a co-ordinated native missile and research and development program by 1948.

Manpower Pool

General Doolittle testified that our program was not shaped up until 1953.

The CIA officials reported that Russia's scientific and technological manpower pool was outstripping ours. They disclosed that this year the Soviets will turn out 140,000 graduates in science and engineering as compared with 100,000 in this country.

The Soviets are using their highly skilled technicians not only at home, but have them available in large numbers for export to underdeveloped countries, the committee was told.

NOV 27 1957

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

UNITED PRESS

UP 14

(MISSILES)

SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER JOHNSON CALLED FOR A STREAMLINING OF THE NATION'S MISSILE AND SATELLITE PROGRAMS AS A NECESSARY STEP IN BETTERING RUSSIA IN SPACE WEAPONS.

THE TEXAS DEMOCRAT TOLD NEWSMEN THE SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE WHICH HE HEADS "WILL HAVE TO INQUIRE VERY CAREFULLY INTO WHO IS RUNNING WHAT."

THE SUBCOMMITTEE CALLED BACK CIA DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES AND HIS CHIEF AIDES FOR FURTHER QUESTIONING BEHIND CLOSED DOORS (9:30 A.M.) ON WHAT THEY KNOW ABOUT RUSSIA'S MISSILES, SFUTNIKS, WAR INDUSTRY AND OVERALL MILITARY POWER.

JOHNSON SAID THE "ONE CLEAR PATTERN THAT HAS EMERGED" IN THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF THE BROAD INVESTIGATION IS "THE EXTREME DIFFICULTY OF PINNING DOWN LINES OF AUTHORITY IN THE MISSILE AND SATELLITE PROGRAMS."

"I DO NOT BELIEVE IN SHAKING EVERYTHING UP AND TURNING THINGS UPSIDE DOWN," HE SAID. "BUT WE WILL HAVE TO FIND OUT HOW TO STREAMLINE THE ORGANIZATION."

11/27--TS 925 A

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

Russia Held Able Now to Bomb N. Y.

From Submarine 500 Miles at Sea

On Nov. 23, the Herald Tribune revealed Soviet missile progress so extensive it might neutralize America's Strategic Air Command (B-52 nuclear bombers) by 1960. The story was based on the still top-secret "Gaither report" to President Eisenhower. Yesterday, a Central Intelligence Agency report disclosed new perils from Russian submarines equipped with nuclear bombs.

By The United Press

WASHINGTON, Nov. 28.—

As of today Russia can fire a missile armed with an H-bomb from a submarine 500 miles at sea and all but wipe out a city like New York, according to United States secret agents.

This evaluation of Russia's military might was one scrap of a top-secret report made to the Senate Military Preparedness subcommittee yesterday by the Central Intelligence Agency. The report shocked the seven Senators who heard it.

One informant, who refused use of his name, said the C. I. A. told the Senators that Russia now has the capability of launching an intermediate range ballistic missile with an atomic or hydrogen warhead from a submarine. He set the effective range at 500 miles.

IRBM in Production

Another Senator, who also heard the C. I. A. report, said Russia has already put the IRBM into mass production "and apparently has them in quantity."

The Navy, it was reported, is sure that it can detect and cope with any large-scale Russian submarine movements which would foretell any major attack on the United States.

But it is pointed out that the United States radar systems are designed to track high-flying bombers, and would probably be unable to detect a mis-

meanwhile, pushed for quick production quantity of two American IRBMs. Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy yesterday gave the order to put both the Army Jupiter and the Air Force Thor into full-scale production.

Acts Under Pressure

Mr. McElroy took the action under heavy pressure from Congress and the swift Russian missile advancements, despite the fact that neither the Jupiter nor the Thor has been fully tested. He said, however, that tests so far have warranted the gamble.

The C. I. A. report, made at a closed-door session to the Sen-

ate subcommittee by C. I. A. director Allen W. Dulles and his top aids, covered Russian power in missiles, submarines and strategic bombers.

How much of the C. I. A. report would eventually be made public was not known.

Thor in Production

The Defense Department was not sure how quickly this country would begin actual mass production of the Jupiter and Thor. The Air Force said the Thor was "already in production" and has been "for some time."

It was understood that the Thor was being produced at the rate of two a month. Informed sources said this rate could be quickly jumped to ten a month and to two or three dozen a month within a year.

Mr. McElroy said yesterday the Defense Department expected to be able to send "squadrons" of IRBMs, with crews, to England and other defense posts by the end of 1958.

The Army said it expects to put its Jupiter into mass production "in a relatively short time." An unnamed Chrysler Corp. plant has been selected as the production center for the missile.

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

CIA Report Shocks Senate Missile Quiz

Pentagon Clears Jupiter, Thor For Production

By WILLIAM HINES and
L. EDGAR PRINA

Defense Secretary McElroy announced today that the Pentagon has authorized the placing in production of both the Air Force Thor and Army Jupiter intermediate-range (1,500 mile) ballistic missiles.

The Defense Secretary made his announcement in a statement prepared for delivery before a senatorial group which was still disturbed by a grim picture painted by Allen W. Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency director.

The Senators, members of an Armed Services Preparedness Subcommittee investigating the lagging United States missile program, heard Mr. Dulles in closed-door session this morning and then went into open session to receive testimony from Mr. McElroy.

The first hint that Mr. Dulles had been the bearer of dire tidings came shortly after 1 p.m. when his top-secret briefing of the subcommittee broke up.

Senator Symington, Democrat of Missouri, his face set in a stern and worried expression, left the closely guarded hearing room an dtdold waiting newsmen.

"It was a sad and shocking story and the sooner the American people know more about it the better off we'll be."

Flanders, "Disturbed"

Even the usually puckish Senator Flanders, Republican of Vermont, found no occasion for his dry humor.

"I have no comment other than to say I'm just a little disturbed."

Senator Johnson, in addition to issuing a statement, made it clear in reply to a reporter's question that he, too, was affected by what he had heard.

"America is faced with a great challenge," the Texas legislator said. "I have no doubt of our willingness or ability to meet it."

The precise nature of the challenge was alluded to in the formal statement which Senator Johnson read to newsmen. The text of the statement followed:

"In the morning session a general review of the role and functions of the CIA in the national security system was held; in this connection the relative firmness of various critical estimates of Soviet strength was reviewed and the validity of past estimates carefully examined."

Future Progress Studied

"A briefing on the general estimates of the Soviet missile program was continued, particularly with respect to the likely future progress of this program. An up-to-the-minute review of Soviet progress in the shorter-range ballistic missiles was given. Through an analysis of the Soviet guided missile program the CIA said that the intelligence community had estimated some time ago that the Soviets would have the capability of orbiting earth satellites during the year 1957, employing for that purpose the same propulsion developed in their missile programs."

"The briefing indicated that the Soviet atomic energy program was making steady progress with the view to providing nuclear warheads for their family of missiles as well as other nuclear weapons. The extensive Soviet test activity of 1957 was analyzed in terms of the implications of this testing to future progress in the missile field."

"The CIA presentation covered figures on Soviet bombers and submarine strengths." Senator Johnson interpolated. "And Soviet fighter strength, I might add." "These were viewed particularly with respect to their role as the major forces in being which could pose a

threat to the United States at least until such time as their ICBMs become operational.

"The briefing concluded with a presentation of the defensive strengths of the Soviet Union in terms of missiles and aircraft."

Johnson Adds Comment

Senator Johnson orally added these words to the statement:

"By exchanging through a healthy and clear-cut exchange of views it was concluded that it would be desirable in the national interest to take a good look at certain procedures, at the coordination between the CIA and the services and the Congress with a view of attaining maximum efficiency."

Senator Johnson was informed of Senator Symington's remark about "a sad and shocking story." His own comment was:

"I gave you my reaction earlier. I thought we received a rather thorough and I trust accurate picture of what our intelligence people believe of the Russian capabilities."

"There is little comfort to be gained in realizing what the facts are concerning the advances the Soviet Union has made in certain respects."

"I shall do all within my power to see that the American people receive all the information on the record consistent with the national interests. I know of no better way to express my views on the testimony received up to now than to say this is no time for either siesta or hysteria."

"I might observe that there is no committee of Congress in whom I have more confidence in their patriotism, their judgment and their desire to secure America than this committee and that means every member on both sides of the aisle."

Confidence Expressed

"America is faced with a great challenge. I have no

doubt of our willingness or ability to meet it."

Mr. Dulles, brother of the Secretary of State, was accompanied by numerous assistants. Possibilities of leaks were minimized by a number of precautions.

The main door from the committee room to the second floor corridor of the Senate office building was locked and guarded from the inside. Another door communicating with an anteroom was guarded from the outside by two men who kept reporters well out of earshot of what was going on behind closed doors. As newsmen were admitted to the room following Mr. Dulles' departure, they noted functionaries hastily covering up charts which apparently had been shown to the Senators.

Note Pads Collected

The final precaution, as the press surged in, was taken by Subcommittee Staff Director Dan McGillicuddy. Mr. McGillicuddy sent a pair of assistants scurrying along the long committee table picking up all pads on which Senators had made notes and doodled during the CIA briefing.

The CIA chief was the first, but not the last, witness to go before the committee behind closed doors. It was expected that much of the testimony to be given later today by Secretary of Defense McElroy and his deputy, Donald Quarles, would be in executive session.

Mr. McElroy was scheduled as the first witness of the afternoon session in a meeting open to the public in the Senate Caucus Room beginning at 2:15 p.m.

NOV 26 1957

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

ASSOCIATED PRESS

233

WASHINGTON ADD MISSILES (203)

THE SUBCOMMITTEE SPENT ALMOST TWO HOURS BEHIND CLOSED DOORS WITH DULLES AND SOME OF HIS AIDES, INCLUDING DR. HERBERT SCOVILLE, DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE OF CIA.

AFTERWARDS JOHNSON ANNOUNCED THAT THE SECRET CIA BRIEFING WOULD CONTINUE TOMORROW MORNING AT 9:30 A.M. TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE TESTIMONY OF DEFENSE SECRETARY MCELROY WHICH WILL BE PARTLY IN OPEN AND PARTLY IN CLOSED SESSION.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN SAID THE CIA PRESENTATION COVERED AN ASSESSMENT OF GUIDED MISSILE CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS, AND A REVIEW OF THE BASIC SCIENTIFIC ECONOMIC AND SCIENTIFIC ELEMENTS OF SOVIET TECHNOLOGICAL STRENGTH.

"THE CIA BRIEFING WAS BASED ON THE U. S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S LATEST ESTIMATES OF THE SITUATION. IT POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET ECONOMY HAS GROWN RELATIVELY FASTER THAN THAT OF THE U.S.A. AND THAT SOVIET PRODUCTION OF MILITARY GOODS AND SERVICES WAS ROUGHLY EQUAL IN VALUE TO OUR OWN ALTHOUGH ITS GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT WAS ONLY ABOUT 42 PER CENT OF THAT OF THE U. S.

"THIS WAS DUE TO THE HIGH PRIORITY THE SOVIETS PLACED ON MILITARY PROGRESS AND THE SMALLER AMOUNT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT WHICH WAS DEVOTED CONSUMER GOODS. IT WAS POINTED OUT HOW THE U.S.S.R. WAS ENCOUNTERING GROWING DIFFICULTIES IN MAINTAINING THE HIGH LEVEL OF MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND INVESTMENT IN HEAVY INDUSTRY AND, AT THE SAME TIME, IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS AS A STIMULUS TO HIGH PRODUCTIVITY.

GG733P 11/26

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

NOV 26 1957

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

ASSOCIATED PRESS

234

WASHINGTON ADD MISSILES (233)

"THE CIA CONFIRMED REPORTS THAT THE SOVIET IS NOW OUTSTRIPPING THE U.S. IN DEVELOPING A SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL MANPOWER POOL. EVERY SOVIET STUDENT BY THE TIME HE FINISHES HIGH SCHOOL HAS HAD FIVE YEARS OF PHYSICS, FIVE OF BIOLOGY, FOUR OF CHEMISTRY AND TEN YEARS OF MATHEMATICS. IN 1957 THE SOVIET WILL HAVE 140,000 GRADUATES IN SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING AS COMPARED TO ONLY 100,000 IN THE U.S. ALL EVIDENCES SUGGEST THAT THE SOVIET REALIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF SCIENCE AND RESEARCH TO THEIR MILITARY AND ECONOMIC FUTURE, ARE TURNING OUT HIGHLY SKILLED TECHNICIANS, NOT ONLY FOR USE AT HOME, BUT TO HAVE THEM AVAILABLE IN LARGE NUMBERS TO SEND AS ADVISERS IN SUPPORT OF ECONOMIC AND INDUSTRIAL SCIENTIFIC PROGRAMS OF PENETRATION IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS.

"IN THE FIELD OF GUIDED MISSILES, THE SOVIET SYSTEMATICALLY EXPLOITED WHAT THEY ACQUIRED FROM THE GERMANS IN WORLD WAR II WHEN IN 1945 THEY TOOK OVER OPERATIONAL AND PROTOTYPE MISSILES WITH RANGES UP TO ABOUT 200 MILES, AS WELL AS RESEARCH AND PRODUCTION FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT, AND SEVERAL HUNDRED GERMAN MISSILE SPECIALISTS. BY 1948 THEY HAD A COORDINATED NATIVE SOVIET MISSILE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM.

"THE C.I.A. BRIEFING THEN COVERED AN ANALYSIS OF IMPORTANT SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1948 WHICH INCLUDED THE EXTENSIVE TESTING OF VARIOUS TYPES OF SHORT AND MEDIUM RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES, LEADING UP TO THEIR RECENTLY REPORTED TESTING OF MISSILES IN THE INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE."

GG738P 11/26

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

NOV 26 1961

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

UNITED PRESS

UP213

ADD 12 MISSILES

AT A CLOSED-DOOR MEETING LATER, CIA DIRECTOR ALLEN W. DULLES TOLD THE SUBCOMMITTEE RUSSIA WAS "ENCOUNTERING GROWING DIFFICULTY" IN MAINTAINING HIGH LEVEL MILITARY EXPENDITURES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME IMPROVING LIVING STANDARDS.

SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LYNDON B. JOHNSON (TEX.), TOLD NEWSMEN LATER THE CIA OFFICIALS REPORTED RUSSIA'S ECONOMY HAS BEEN GROWING "RELATIVELY FASTER" THAN THIS NATION'S AND THAT ITS MILITARY PRODUCTION WAS "ROUGHLY EQUAL IN VALUE" TO THAT OF THE UNITED STATES.

11/26--N735P

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

NEW YORK
HERALD TRIBUNE

DEC 9 1957

*Judging the Enemy***How Many Pearl Harbors?—II**

By Marguerite Higgins

IF OUR Vanguard's failure is considerably less than fatal, and if Russia's Sputnik was something less than totally decisive, the question nonetheless



Higgins

remains as to why these events set off such shock waves throughout the world and particularly in America. This question contains the core of the problem that will beset this country long after the Sputniks have given way to space platforms and the Vanguards have vanished to the moon.

It involves nothing less than this country's capacity to cope with and, above all, understand the workings of the Communist totalitarian dictatorship. For it has been the incapacity to judge the self-proclaimed enemy that has been primarily responsible for bringing us to the present time of troubles. In the realm of fundamentals, it is this incapacity—if it continues—that is most likely to undermine the chances of our form of democracy to stay in the running against the Reds.

As distinguished from the time of Pearl Harbor, or the Chinese intervention in Korea, and so on, the causes of today's scientific Pearl Harbors are far more complicated—and far less susceptible of simple cure—than the causes of our previous national setbacks.

For as this column pointed out last week, information on Soviet military and technological progress was available to our leaders through diplomatic reports, the C. I. A., and indeed, for any one really interested, through the increasingly voluminous reports of Western experts on Russia culled from Soviet publications, tourists, the increased number of international meetings attended by Soviet scientists, physicians, writers, etc.

It is not that the warning was not given, but that the warning was not heeded.

Why?

In this connection West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, a man who has known the torments of resisting a dictator, remarked recently to this correspondent: "In the United States your leadership has never known, personally, the experience of being ruled by the totalitarian system. It is a terrible experience. But it has its uses.

For we who have endured it could not avoid becoming realists in the ways of dictators."

In what way is America unrealistic about the dictators?

Dr. Adenauer did not go into details, but countless experts on the Soviet Union, ranging from Soviet defectors to disillusioned Communists, to students and diplomats, have often spelled it out in talks with this correspondent and the theme is usually very much the same.

As one European diplomat—a victim of both Nazi and Soviet concentration camps—recently put it: "When will you Americans recognize that in international affairs, even more than in every-day individual life, virtue hardly ever is its own reward? Despite everything, some stinkers will make progress. You Americans are forever talking about the superiority of the West because of its 'spiritual values, its spiritual strength.' Hooray for fine moral fiber and spiritual strength. But will you explain to me how it is the atheistic East with its population of some two hundred million has been able to muster some 175 divisions—not to speak of Sputniks—to defend its unspiritual way of life while Europe with far greater population and far greater riches is unable to muster even twenty divisions to give Western virtues some concrete assistance?"

"Concerning this latest fiasco (meaning the Sputniks) it might not be unhealthy to look up all those reassuring speeches by your American officials about how 'learning and science can only flourish in an atmosphere of freedom.' How can you blame your public for being lulled into the assumption, that lacking Western type freedom, Russians must ipso facto be backward in the sciences? How short is human memory. Is it possible that you have forgotten that under the bitter discipline of the Nazi dictatorship, German scientists produced instruments of terror that brought Hitler within a hairsbreadth of the conquest of the world?"

But the real trouble in our understanding the Russians is so simple as to be elusive. It is that Americans persist in applying their own psychology, their own reactions, their own standards to the Russians and this is about as misleading as talking to someone in terms of miles when the only measurements he understands is that of kilometers.

For example: Russia's top-level purges; whether it be the demotion of Zhukov or the firing of Malenkov, inevitably bring forth comments from America's leaders that the

power struggle is symbolic of the "deep divisions" and weaknesses of the totalitarian system and is bound to "create unrest" among the Soviet masses.

Certainly such a dog-eat-dog struggle at the top in America—in addition to being impossible because of the nature of our system—would provoke a storm of editorials, protest petitions, and probably a change of government. But let us remember that in America, petitions, outraged editorials, impassioned speeches bring neither torture nor concentration camps for the individual concerned and still less for his family.

What is the real situation in Russia? Certainly the power struggle at the top doesn't enhance the stability of the government. But deep unrest or division? To the contrary, the facts show that at this particular epoch in history the Soviet masses are so grateful to have the purges confined to the top that they tend quickly to look the other way from any trouble so long as it doesn't affect them. Remember that under Stalin, when the purges started they swept deep into the heart of Russia touching with tragedy every layer of society. Khrushchev and company are pikers compared with Stalin for, with just an exception now and then, they strike at each other and the upper layers of Russian bureaucracy.

Not only is it misleading for us to look on these power struggles as a solution of our problems, as being a true harbinger of break-up from within and therefore a solution of our problems. The fact is that the Khrushchev purges have produced very little visible strain on the great bulk of the Soviet world.

The Soviet triumph in the Sputnik has brought to America a partial new look at a lot of automatic assumptions to the effect that anything made in an atmosphere of freedom somehow was better than that which is made under the enforced discipline of dictatorship. But so far this self-examination has largely been in matters scientific and technological.

Isn't it time that a new look be given to the entire assortment of assumptions governing the view of this country concerning Russia as an economic power, ideological foe and long-term competitor? Does frank acknowledgement of a dictatorship's accomplishments have to lessen in the slightest our determination that those accomplishments shall not be translated into a final Pearl Harbor for our way of life?

NEW YORK TIMES

Circ.: m. 557,224
S. 1,189,293Front Page Edit Other
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Date: DEC 8 1957

HOW GOOD IS OUR DATA ON RUSSIAN STRENGTH?

Many Facts Are Available But They Are Not Always Acted on Quickly

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 7.—The Congressional investigations into the state of America's military power have raised questions also about the state of Russia's military power.

The testimony offered at these investigations—a third is due to begin soon—has confirmed the premise that the Soviet Union's success with its earth satellites denotes a formidable ballistic missile military capacity.

Inevitably, the investigators have been prompted to add to their questions about the Soviet missile threat inquiries about the Soviet Union's over-all military prowess.

This was done at a closed hearing of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee, with Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, in the witness chair.

What the Senators heard, a few of them afterward described as "shocking" and "disturbing."

But published reports of an asserted Soviet power to knock out United States bomber bases and destroy American cities were soon countered in official quarters.

Mr. Dulles had advised the Senators of an assumed Soviet military capacity, and by no means an authenticated power, officials said.

Difficult to Get

Material about Soviet bomber production, or the production of any major combat weapon, undoubtedly is difficult to obtain and authenticate. Yet there are many obvious ways to do this, ranging from occasional reports by defectors to simply studying published photographs or counting submarines as they are identified in international waters.

Only a little of what United States intelligence agencies learn is made public, but plausi-

ble conclusions about available information would be as follows:

(1) The Soviet Union has the largest uniformed land forces in the world armed with modern weapons, the biggest submarine force, a formidable force of manned aircraft which is increasing more rapidly than that of the United States, and a presumed superiority in long-range ballistic missiles.

(2) The Soviet Union, despite a standard of living and industrial product that is substantially below that of the United States, has demonstrated phenomenal speed in industrialization, scientific achievement and preparation of technicians and other trained workers for whatever engineering project may be assigned them by a one-party government.

Result of System

The Soviet accomplishments are due not to stolen secrets or American "complacency," but to a given system of political and economic direction with huge natural resources available. The result should dispel the idea that only democracies can be successful in a material sense—whatever other factors must be considered in a moral sense.

After the sputniks were launched, it was said United States officials were forewarned. In addition, it was warned, Government spending pointed out that the Soviet progress with ballistic missiles, manned aircraft, submarines and even in pure science—had been published in the United States and referred to for many months and even years.

An uninformative official outline of Allen Dulles' testimony before the Senate committee repeated an earlier statement that the intelligence community had estimated some time ago that the Soviets would have the capability of orbiting earth satellites during the year 1957.

Then why, if the intelligence information was "shocking" and so much of it presumably had been known—either in the press or in the "intelligence community"—was not something done about it before the sputniks shook American and world public opinion?

Aspects of Intelligence

The answer would appear to be in the three aspects of intelligence. The first is the amassing of the facts, or, as is often the case, assumptions. The second is the interpretation of these data that is made by the intelligence authorities. And the third, and most important, is the receptiveness of responsible officials to these interpretations and the actions they take as a consequence.

There is little reason to doubt officials who say they knew what the Russians have been doing. Ever since the Soviet jet planes were demonstrated in the Korean war United States military officials have publicized their respect for Soviet military prowess.

There have been many published indications of Soviet advances in science and education that have impressed experts in other countries.

Presumably, the intelligence officials must have come to conclusions that were similar to those of independent scientists and educators with respect to the quality behind the Soviet effort. Certainly, American military officials are on record with their forebodings.

That leads to the third consideration, the responsiveness and willingness to act on the part of the United States leaders.

Two Factors

In this connection two important factors must be stated.

The first is that until the sputniks were launched the United States people had demonstrated a distinct inclination to reduce Government spending and a disinclination to accept all the warnings posed by military leaders about Russia. News stories about fleets of Soviet submarines seemed all ways to appear at budget time and were correspondingly discounted.

The second is that in recent years a growing sentiment had developed against the argument of nuclear war preparedness, against the policy of dealing from strength, and for the assumption that the Russians do not want war and therefore are moderating their war economy.

It is quite clear that not all American officials were "complacent" about the Soviet military power, impressed as they were with United States power to destroy the Soviet Union with huge armadas of heavy nuclear bombers.

At the same time, the American people, enjoying prosperity, were quick to draw conclusions, nurtured by some officials, that the Soviet Empire was doomed from within. Titoism in Yugoslavia, Stalin's abortive Korean

War, Czech and East German riots, and the open Polish and Hungarian rebellions reinforced these conclusions.

The post-Stalin maneuvers in the Kremlin hierarchy were only too quickly seized upon as evidence of an imminent Soviet political upheaval that might spare the United States the cost of an arms build-up.

Despite the Iron Curtain, the West has had pretty good information about the Soviet Union. But there appears not to have been any successful translation of this information into programs that seemed justifiable.

Now, there is talk of a "sense of urgency," and the result is a new effort to bolster defenses and re-examine some major premises about American society. In that connection, a closer look is being cast upon the American educational system and the validity of certain material incentives in a democracy.

The specific program has not yet been spelled out. The Administration is talking about a "crash" effort to develop long-range ballistic missiles as well as contra-missiles for defense. It is more ready than ever before to share with allies "secrets" of American military production. It is talking about a vast education program, stressing science.

Threat Is Political

But intelligence officials say that the basic threat to the United States is not any possible inherent weakness in American military defenses. It is the possibility that America may be isolated from her allies if the Russians capitalize politically on their newly demonstrated military and scientific progress.

For this reason, more than anything, it is felt that the United States needs now to rally the people of the West not only by matching Soviet progress. It is felt that the most effective counter-action would be a successful American political rallying program for all the world to see and accept.

O'er the Ramparts We Watch

One of our spies has sent us a photostatic copy of a one-page "Service Report" (unclassified) dispatched by the Agricultural Attaché of the American Embassy in Caracas to the Department of Agriculture in Washington, headed "Fertility Congress to Meet." The three-paragraph report merely calls attention to the fact that there is to be a Pan American Congress of Fertility in Caracas late next year, and that quite a few people will attend. Beyond those bare facts the report makes two observations: 1) "Sterile couples want children even though the excess of births over deaths may be excessive for the population as a whole"; and 2) "Venezuelans, with their low ratio of people to acres, have a lively interest in fertility as anyone who walks the streets can see for himself."

Now as it happens, we have several times walked the streets of Caracas and we *don't* see for ourselves what the Agricultural Attaché is talking about; but we confess to being out of touch with the rhetoric of the bureaucrats—who certainly know a thing or two about fecundity that nobody else knows. The message undoubtedly has meaning for the 24 persons to whom copies were sent. The Agriculture Department is down for ten copies. State Department gets a mere two. Commerce gets one. Something called DEW (Department of Eugenic Warfare?) gets five. And, finally, CIA gets four. (Perhaps CIA's cryptanalysts will understand what it is one sees for oneself walking down the streets of Caracas.) We mean to write the Agricultural Attaché and ask if, in his bounty, he won't please put us on his mailing list. The things we'd miss but for the vigilance of our far-flung diplomats makes us *shudder!*

NEW YORK TIMES

DEC 6 1957

In The Nation

Carrying on Government After an Attack

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5—The speculative estimate made by intelligence units for the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee of the devastation that could be wrought in this country by a Soviet Russian submarine equipped with nuclear missiles has emphasized the need for prompt Congressional action on a neglected problem the disaster would create. The problem is how to carry on government in the stricken area and the surrounding territory that also would be affected. The subcommittee was told that the Russians have submarines, perhaps as many as four, which from 500 miles at sea could launch a missile that might possibly be capable of wiping out forty-eight urban square miles and poisoning the water for an additional forty-eight. The subcommittee was also told that the United States is not yet equipped with a submarine of this capacity. Among the many tasks to confront the authorities if a missile found an urban target, one of the most important that remains to be charted is the maintenance of government. Doubtless this has been considered in the still secret report made by the distinguished committee appointed by Gordon Gray, director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, to survey the general problem of civil defense. Also, hearings are soon to be held on recommendations on the same general subject by the Hoifield subcommittee of the House. But until Congress takes some action, which should include a more precise demarcation of the provinces of the O. D. M. and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, respectively, no one will know exactly by what processes the local governments of stricken areas will be preserved. This is outside the O. D. M. function to maintain the national economy and the F. C. D. A. function to care for the population.

Professor Fairman's Proposal

The new regime of O. D. M., with the President's approval, appears to have abandoned the plan of "limited martial law" that was proclaimed in Operation Alert of 1955. This concept was attacked on the ground that it is impracticable as well as undesirable to impose a military administration to maintain the structure of government. Among the most effective of its critics was Prof. Charles Fairman of the Harvard Law School. His latest comments on the general subject, made to the Industrial War College, particularly merit public and official attention in view of the launchings of the two Soviet satellites and the testimony before the Senate Preparedness subcommittee. The following is all too brief a summary:

It is inescapable that our common defense is a Federal responsibility. But in the event of nuclear attack this responsibility can be discharged only by means of the energetic action of state and local governments. This creates a problem without precedent.

In advance of any possible attack "a sturdy channel of civil authority" should be established, "running from the President through the state governments to the country—a channel of legal and moral authority whereby the American people could be steadied and directed by the President's . . . voice."

The function of the armed forces . . . would be, not to act as the great conduit between the national administration and the country, but rather to come in at weak points in the governmental structure, as needed and as available: food kitchens, blankets, tents, transport, medicine, and so on.

The more military units become involved in civil business, the greater "the tendency to take over and dig in. . . . Once martial rule got into operation there would be enormous practical difficulties in getting it out of business."

A Plan of Action

The appropriate mode of action . . . in time of an alert or attack, as in war, would be: Field representatives of the Federal departments and agencies would join the F. C. D. A. at a regional command post. This substation would "transmit the power and leadership of the Federal Government." Units of the armed forces employed for civil relief and control would follow directives from the service channels, and would render specified aid requested by the local authority.

These units should avoid administering justice: nothing else is so likely to land the Pentagon "on the rocks, in military actions to meet a domestic emergency, as the military trial of civilians." "There is no reason to suppose that Federal and state courts would be destroyed," since there would be replacements for casualties. In this connection, state governors in time of war should have the same power to fill vacancies in the House of Representatives that they have to fill vacancies in the Senate.

The F. C. D. A., like the O. D. M., now reports directly to the President. The Administration is not disposed to raise it to a department from an agency, as has been proposed in Congress and by Professor Fairman. But this point is less important than his main thesis: that the 1955 concept of maintaining government by martial law after nuclear attack should be permanently abandoned and "the channel of command" be substituted.

NEW YORK TIMES

DEC 6 1957

Soviet Is Said to Increase Heavy Jet Bomber Output

By JACK RAYMOND,
Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5.—The Soviet Union is increasing its production of medium and heavy jet bombers, according to the latest information accepted by high authorities as authentic. The rise in Soviet production of manned bombers is considered significant in view of the advances in the development of long-range ballistic missiles claimed by Moscow.

An official source here rejected as incorrect a report that the Russians had halted production of manned bombers and were concentrating on long-range ballistic missiles.

The Soviet Union has contended it has perfected an intercontinental ballistic missile, presumably with a range of 5,000 miles. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Soviet Communist party chief, has argued that manned bombers were virtually obsolete.

Soviet Gains Believed

Mr. Khrushchev's recent statements, implying that the fleets of American bombers of the Strategic Air Command would be powerless in war against Soviet ballistic missiles, were expected from him.

United States authorities are ready to believe that the Soviet Union has perfected long-range ballistic missiles. This readiness is based on independently obtained information as well as the ballistic missile power displayed in launching the Soviet satellites.

However, according to the best available information, the Soviets themselves have not even begun to place their strategic

air power reliance on ballistic missiles rather than manned bombers.

The ability of the Russians to increase heavy bomber production at the same time that they presumably are beginning quantity production of long-range missiles represents a formidable military capacity on the part of the Soviet Union, it is pointed out.

Estimates Were Revised

A high source conceded that accepted information about the Soviet Union had not always turned out to be reliable. For example, last year the Air Force said that earlier estimates of Soviet bomber production had been too high.

A downward revision in the estimated production of the Soviet Bison—the equivalent of the United States B-52—was used to justify subsequent reductions in the rate of United States bomber production. Plans to produce twenty a month were cut back to fifteen.

In April, 1956, intelligence estimates indicated that the Soviet Union had 100 Bison bombers compared with seventy-eight the United States Air Force then had. Existing plans call for about 500 B-52's by the end of next year.

But last February, United States sources corrected their 1956 estimate and said the Russians had had only fifty Bisons.

No figures were available today on the present estimated number of Soviet heavy jet bombers, dubbed Bison or the medium Bears.

The size of the Strategic Air Command is classified, but it has been estimated at 2,000, including medium range B-47's, the heavy B-52's and the heavy B-36's, which are being retired in favor of the B-58's.

Bomber Output Rises

A rising rate of bomber production for the Soviet Union would indicate that the Soviets might have approached or even surpassed United States bomber strength.

A year ago it was estimated that the Russians had about 1,000 heavy and medium jet bombers and would have at least 2,000 of such types by mid-1959.

Discussing Soviet military capabilities, some sources called attention to recent reports of "shocking" testimony by Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Dulles testified Nov. 27 at a closed hearing of the Senate Preparedness subcommittee. The subcommittee is investigating the nation's defense capacity in view of reported Soviet ballistic missile achievements.

Persons present at the hearing said that published reports of the testimony had neglected to distinguish between the Soviet Union's known and assumed military capacities.

For example, according to one report, the Russians were said to be able to launch ballistic missiles from submarines. Such

missiles armed with nuclear warheads could destroy United States seaports and contaminate the drinking water of cities, it was said.

A Hint by Russians

It was stressed that missile-launching capacity of Soviet submarines had been stated as a premise, only because the Russians probably could build such ships. In an article in a Soviet newspaper yesterday, two experts hinted that the Russians could fire missiles from submerged submarines.

However, it was emphasized by those present at the subcommittee hearing that the Russians were not known as yet to have developed missile-launching submarines. No testimony that they had developed such submarines was presented by Mr. Dulles, it was said.

A report that the Russians now had the capacity to destroy United States heavy bomber bases, here or abroad, was described today by an official source as an incorrect version of Mr. Dulles' testimony.

At the same time, one of the persons present during the closed session said Mr. Dulles had reported a decrease in the number of heavy bombers being produced in the Soviet Union. This was in contradiction to official estimates in another quarter.

While taking a calmer view of Mr. Dulles' testimony than indicated by public statements of some Senators at the hearing, a source present at the meeting said that some estimates of authenticated Soviet military capacity were considered causes for United States concern.

The subcommittee will resume its hearings Dec. 13, with William M. Holaday, the Pentagon's Director of Guided Missiles, as the first scheduled witness.

WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD

DEC 5 1954

Pentagon Will Set Up Space Projects Unit

By Elton C. Fay
Associated Press

A new top-level "Advance Research Projects Agency"—wants to switch from the current effort to build a high-performance, militarily useful nuclear-powered airplane to a crash program designed to get an atom-driven aircraft aloft before Russia does. It is recognized that the Soviet would have more propaganda laurels if it got one in the air, even though the craft might be of little military value.

This is one of a series of developments in the Defense Department in the wake of Russia's long, threatening strides in technology. On the basis of talks in responsible quarters yesterday, there are these other points:

• A decision must be made soon whether the United States wants to switch from the current effort to build a high-performance, militarily useful nuclear-powered airplane to a crash program designed to get an atom-driven aircraft aloft before Russia does. It is recognized that the Soviet would have more propaganda laurels if it got one in the air, even though the craft might be of little military value.

• A drive is on to have one squadron of Air Force Thor intermediate-range ballistic missiles and one of Army Jupiter ICBMs by the end of 1958. Each squadron would have 15 missiles.

• Part of the proposed 2-billion-dollar increase in the next defense budget will be used to hasten by at least two years the development of the Navy's solid-fuel IRBM, the Polaris. This could mean the Polaris might join the family of operating IRBMs by 1960, or earlier.

• Another portion of the increase would be used to reduce the vulnerability of the United States' Strategic Bombing Command by cutting down the number of big bombers on one base at one time. Under this plan, no more than one squadron (15 planes) of the long-range B52 nuclear bomb carriers would be at one base. This apparently would mean building more bases.

• The boast of Russia that she has her IRBMs "zeroed in" to hit every major allied base in Western Europe on instant notice is challenged. Present missiles, either Soviet or American, aren't that accurate or reliable, it is contended.

• Whether some of the stepped-up defense spending will be used for building and supplying United States IRBM bases in Western Europe will depend upon what kind of agreements are made and how soon. The forthcoming NATO talks in Paris will bring clues on that.

• Who in the United States Government would decide whether conventional or nuclear weapons would be used in event of the outbreak of less-than-global war is still uncertain. The Pentagon apparently inclines to the view that such a swift decision would be the function of the Defense Department with probable ref-

erence to the President. The State Department presumably may have other ideas.

Civilian to Head Agency

The Advance Research Projects Agency will be headed by a civilian, still to be selected, having a dual background of broad executive experience and scientific training.

ARPA, as it will be known, will be an actual operating military agency, to put into effect some of the broad guidelines suggested by the newly established office of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. This post is held by James R. Killian Jr.

Additionally, the new agency will have direction of existing projects including the satellite program and the anti-missile missile project.

Those familiar with the situation see two basic reasons behind Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy's decision to create this super-agency:

1. To prevent some valuable bit of basic research from being ignored simply because one of the armed services might not consider it applicable to its requirements.

2. To gain control over duplication of basic research efforts and interservice rivalry.

Objects of ARPA

ARPA will do the basic research, the development, the testing of an item—a missile, a moon-seeking research rocket, a platform orbiting in the fringe of space. When testing is done, an armed service would be assigned to operate the device or system.

The race with Russia to be first in the air with an atom-driven aircraft, like the now-lost race in satellites, has both military and prestige overtones.

The question is: Can the United States tolerate another prestige defeat by being second to build an A-plane, even though it might not be what military designers want.

Some experts long have expressed doubt the combat value of the nuclear-powered plane outlined in preliminary plans. They contend it would be too heavy, too slow for bomb delivery although it might be highly useful for cargo or passenger transport.

First contracts for a major study of an A-plane were let about 1951.

The program came to a virtual stop when former Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson ordered suspension soon after he took office. He later restored the program, but until Russia suddenly burst into technological bloom, the tempo was something less than frantic.

Target Date Move-up

The target date for creation of the first IRBM squadron (probably to be hurried to Europe) has been moved up from an original goal of July, 1959, to December 1958.

Last month, McElroy ordered both the Jupiter and the Thor into production. This terminated, at least temporarily, the contest between the Army and the Air Force. But the word is that eventually, one or the other missile will be phased out of production after actual, extended use of both has provided full trial. This, however, does not exclude the possibility that the best features of both may be combined into a single IRBM design.

Both the Thor and Jupiter are liquid-fueled rockets. The difficulty of making those missiles work has been demonstrated in frustrations at the Cape Canaveral, Fla., test site—and currently in the trouble with launching the Vanguard satellite test vehicle.

WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD

DEC 6 1957

U. S. Satellite Attempts Arouse Senate Critics

By Rose McKee
International News Service

Senior Senators criticized yesterday the United States attempts to launch its satellite, which one referred to as a "toy" and another said is making this country a laughing stock.

Sen. Joseph C. O'Mahoney (D-Wyo.), former chairman of the Senate Military Appropriations Subcommittee, said that all launching attempts should be called off until the Administration removes restrictions which he said are holding up the whole satellite-missile program. He said the restrictions include money.

O'Mahoney said that "even if the grapefruit-sized satellite is launched successfully, it will injure our prestige because it will emphasize definitely the fact this Administration has allowed the country to lag behind Russia."

He referred to the 3 1/4 pound weight of the United States satellite and the more than 1000 pounds that Russia's dog-carrying Sputnik II weighed.

Russell Is Critical

Senate Armed Services Chairman Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.) criticized the Pentagon for publicly reporting every stage of delay in launching what he termed a "toy" earth satellite at Cape Canaveral, Fla.

Russell said in an interview: "I think it's a mistake to announce every stage of preparation in advance of this launching. That's particularly true since we're playing with toys compared to the satellites Russia has already launched. I can only hope we can succeed in getting some satellite up."

Sen. Clinton P. Anderson (D-N.M.), vice chairman of the Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, told a reporter: "People are starting to laugh and that doesn't do us much good around the world. One man called me this morning and said we should name the thing 'Civil Service'—be-

cause you can't fire it and it won't work."

Anderson said he is in favor of continuing tests "but we must know we have something significant before we shoot it off."

Defended by Republicans

Leading Republicans defended the handling of the launching program. Asked what he thought about the delays, Sen. Alexander Wiley (R-Wis.) replied: "I don't make mountains out of molehills."

House GOP whip Leslie Arends of Illinois, commented: "The difficulties were mechanical and from the weather. I see no significance in the firing delay. I'm sure one will be launched successfully quite soon."

Sen. Thomas H. Kuchel (R-Calif.) praised the Pentagon for the publicity it has given attempts to launch the sphere. He said: "I'm in favor of the widest kind of public information except where security is involved."

U. S. Satellite Draws Ridicule in Europe

VIENNA, Dec. 5 (AP)—"United States disgrace. Spaetnik doesn't start."

That was the banner headline in today's Vienna Welt Presse, an anti-Communist newspaper, reporting on the off-postponed American earth satellite-project.

Several non-Communist papers here have taken to calling the American satellite the "Spaetnik," which in German means late sputnik.

There also has been a lot of jesting about its small size. One paper cartooned President Eisenhower swinging his golf club at a ball labeled "U. S. Sputnik" as dozens of cameramen focused. The caption was: "Will it fly?"

Other papers talked about "the inept publicity" attending the United States satellite effort, with the comment that the Russians made no an-

nouncement until their satellites were up for all the world to see.

The Paris Journal cartoonist drew a picture of the unlaunched American satellite with the caption: "It appears there is a worm in the grapefruit." The French have been ridiculing the United States satellite as a "pample mousse" (grapefruit).

Papers in Moscow ignored the whole thing.

WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD

DEC 5 1950

Hill Democrats Plan Fight Next Session For Strong Defense

Some for Fiscal Belt-Tightening In Face of Peril

By Robert C. Albright
Staff Reporter

Congressional Democrats yesterday took the offensive for a substantially strengthened defense posture, even at the cost of fiscal belt-tightening, in the third day of critical reaction to the Administration's two-day legislative briefing.

One pattern began to emerge from the Capitol Hill statements: nothing short of bold and dramatic action to meet the missile-satellite challenge is going to satisfy the second session of the Democratic 85th Congress convening on Jan. 7.

In fact, Democrats in Congress were talking about making up for what they charge is a deficiency in Administration leadership on this front by prodding in the new session for: (1) More and faster missile-satellite production; (2) better utilization of the Nation's scientists and technicians; and (3) Federal aid legislation to produce more, and (3) increased spending for these and other space-age needs even if it means some tax increases or "adjustments."

For the time being, however, there was no thought of bringing out a formal "Democratic program," Democratic spokesmen said, informally they will wait to see details of President Eisenhower's State-of-the-Union recommendations. If it reflects the im-

pression they brought away from their White House talks—namely, that the Administration "lacks a sense of urgency," they said they will move to raise the Administration's ante in every field they regard as critical.

House Majority Leader John W. McCormack (Mass.), one of the Capitol's "Big Four" Democratic leaders, meanwhile aimed a salvo at the Administration's economy efforts in the face of the Soviet challenge.

"It is about time the Administration got out of its dream world and into the world of reality," said McCormack. "If anyone thinks the Soviets will let us catch up with them if they have the advantage, they are doing a disservice to our country."

Saying President Eisenhower and the Republican leaders "are evidently thinking of the defense of our country in terms of a balanced budget," McCormack went on to assert:

"As between a balanced budget and a strong defense, they had better think in terms of a strong defense. It is talk like that which justifies the impression that this Administration does not appreciate the urgency of the situation."

"We had better catch up with the Soviets in the field of intercontinental ballistic missiles within the next year. Furthermore, there are other fields of warfare, such as biological, chemical and psychological. What are we doing in these fields? One thing is certain, the Russians are not sleeping."

Although Congressional Democrats seemed to agree to a man on an urgent defense effort, some of them were still at odds on the fiscal approach. Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), for example, said he had no quarrel with the Administration's budget-balancing objective. To help meet the estimated \$2-billion additional defense costs for missiles and related equipment, Russell

said less essential military spending is going to have to be cut.

"I certainly am opposed to deficit spending and to increasing taxes," said Russell. "But if it comes to a showdown between deficit spending and more taxes, I would rather see taxes raised."

Sen. Harry Flood Byrd (D-Va.) also said, in a speech prepared for the National Association of Manufacturers in New York that waste and non-essential spending will have to be pruned to make way for modern weapons.

"Our military danger is great, no doubt," Byrd said, "but further to imperil our national security by impairment of our fiscal stability and loss of confidence in our Government would be overwhelming."

In contrast, Sen. John Carroll (D-Colo.) said he would rather see some deficit spending than economies in the domestic program that might contribute to a business recession. Carroll said he agreed there might be some belt-tightening in nonessential military areas.

Despite these continuing differences between Democratic conservative and liberal-wing factions, Sputniks I and II appeared to have united the

Party more solidly than ever on the central defense issue. Democratic leaders plainly were hopeful this unity would spread to other things as the new session progresses.

One responsible Democratic authority said that the little band of Eisenhower Democrats that so often broke ranks to vote with the Administration has been decimated by the missiles issue.

Instead of starting out with some 40 Senate Democratic votes on a Party test issue, one well-informed Senate Democrat estimated Senate leaders can count on a minimum of 45 on basic issues at the start of the new session.

Federal a. a. committee recommends giving states part of telephone tax receipts. Page A2.

President Eisenhower returns to farm for long weekend of rest. Page A2.

Pay raises for postal and classified employees discussed at White House. Page D1.

WASHINGTON POST
AND TIMES HERALD

DEC 1957

Letters to the Editor

Freedom and Science

It seems to me that in discussing the present problem of meeting the challenge created by the Soviet launching of the sputniks and ICBMs, the *Washington Post* has created a dilemma and a paradox which it has neither stated as such nor resolved.

The claim is made that secrecy currently imposed upon scientific research in fields involving national defense is pernicious. Also, the official climate attitude regarding scientists is such that many have been harried and forced from research on vital projects, thus weakening our national scientific efforts in many fields.

Yet, the recent scientific accomplishments of the Soviet Union occurred in the most complete totalitarian state which the modern world has known. Day after day the press reports astounding new developments in Soviet science, but the point is not concomitantly noted that they were produced in a massive dictatorship.

How can this be? If freedom is essential for scientific progress, how are we to explain the frightening Soviet progress behind the walls of great secrecy and within a governmental system which severely punishes variations from official policy?

If freedom is strength, and, as a member of a democratic and republican system, I sincerely hope it is, how can suppression of thought and adherence to orthodoxy in all fields also be strength?

This concept of the inherent superiority of free scientific research also appeared, if I remember correctly, in Dr. Vannevar Bush's book of a few years ago, *Modern Arms and Free Men*, in which he postulated that the victory of the Allies over the Axis in part was due to the advantage which free scientific inquiry had over the science of a regimented state.

However, German science apparently progressed rapidly, so much so that if Germany had not been ruled by a madman, the products of the scientific research of Von Braun and his associates would have caused fearful damage to the Allies. To what extent was German research weakened by being conducted within a dictatorship?

I submit that the Soviet system should be carefully re-examined to ascertain the source of its scientific strength in the midst of doctrinal rigidity. I certainly deplore the existence of any fetters in the name of security in our system which may hamper our own scientific progress. However, I am most perplexed at the sight of the Soviets repressing and progressing simultaneously.

GLENN G. MORGAN,
College Park, Md.

NEW YORK TIMES

DEC 6 1957

In The Nation

Carrying on Government
After an Attack

By ARTHUR KROCK

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NE-HOUR ST

ME

WITH PRESIDENT AILING, A YOUNG—BUT SEASONED—ASSISTANT STANDS IN

third time in just over two years the man riding meditatively to his Washington had taken on sudden and urgent importance to his nation and to the world. Amid a drama set in motion by Dwight Eisenhower's illness Vice President Richard M. Nixon more than on the two previous occasions, he had stepped calmly and authoritatively to keep the seemingly crucial business of the White House in gear. He spent long hours helping

inlet and National Security Council meetings.

There was great need for a strong supporting figure. The President's heart and ileitis attacks had occurred at comparatively tranquil times. His new illness—a mild stroke (pp. 40, 41)—had come as the U.S. was confronting three matters of overwhelming importance: 1) the NATO meeting in Paris, crucial to Western unity, which the President wanted to attend; 2) the Administration's planning of next

braved the wintry air to greet an important foreign leader (*next page*). But by week's end the President was making a good recovery (pp. 42, 43), which did not eliminate the problems raised by his illness. The seizure made newly apparent the need for clear-cut procedures—not now in existence (pp. 36, 37)—for the orderly transfer of presidential powers. The President would have to curtail his activities. However much he could undertake, there would remain greater



in airport greeting,
McLaughlin (right)

makes welcoming speech to Morocco's King Mohammed V (wearing light-colored cap) and official party.



ceremony in 45°
tes king's remarks.

LOOKING UP (below), the President smiles as the interpreter continues. Now the king starts to snifle.




DEEP ATTENTION IS GIVEN NEWS OF PRESIDENT'S

SUSPENDED DUTY

The disturbing news of Eisenhower's illness came during a period of intense crisis, a time when critically heavy duties and responsibilities lay upon him. He had the diplomatic task of holding extensive talks with Morocco's visiting King Mohammed V, on whom the U.S. is counting to assert progressive and pro-Western leadership in North Africa. When the President fell ill, immediately after greeting the king at the airport, the U.S. State Department took over most of this job.

But a more urgent problem needing the President's attention was being aired on Capitol Hill where Democratic Senator Lyndon Johnson began his investigation into the U.S.'s progress.



"Unpleasant Information"

No sooner did Sputnik I go into orbit last Oct. 4 than Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, orbiting in his own familiar sphere, ordered a full-fledged tracking of U.S. preparedness. Last week, gaveling his seven-member Preparedness investigating Subcommittee to order for the first three days of the hearing, Texan Johnson tersely outlined the Senate's objectives. Said he: "With the launching of Sputnik I and II and with the information at hand of Russia's strength, our supremacy and even our equality has been challenged. Our goal is to find out what is to be done."

The Johnson subcommittee got a dour estimate of U.S. strength from its first witness. In four hours of testimony, shaggy-browed, often emotional Dr. Edward Teller (TIME, Nov. 18) ran off a grim morning line on U.S. chances in the race for survival. The University of California physicist estimated that Russia is closing the gap in nuclear weapons, is about equal to the U.S. in aircraft and radar development, is ahead in ballistic missiles. Said Teller: "I would not say that the Russians caught up with us because they stole our secrets. They caught up with us because they worked harder. A Russian boy thinks about becoming a scientist like our young girls dream about becoming a movie star."

Pay & Priority. Moving from past and present to the potentials of the future, Teller predicted that the Russians "within the next decade or two" may be able to manage even the weather. Said he: "Please imagine a world in which the Russians can control weather in a big scale, where they can change the rainfall over Russia, and that might very well influence the rainfall in our country in an adverse manner . . . What kind of a world will it be where they have this new kind of control and we do not?"

Behind Teller came a top-name team of experts on science and military matters

to criticize and suggest. Dr. Vannevar Bush, able wartime director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, urged a revamping of the Armed Forces Unification Act "so that we can have in this country unified central military planning that transcends the interest of any particular service." Lieut. General James Doolittle warned that the U.S. must overhaul its educational system. "Certainly," said he, "the scientist and the educator must be given more prestige and more pay." Beyond that, said Doolittle, the Defense Secretary needs the services of a new type of general staff, i.e., "an advisory military staff to assist him in resolving the honest differences of opinion that now occur between dedicated military people." Dr. John P. Hagen, director of Project Vanguard, insisted that if the U.S. had treated its own satellite as less of a bauble, had assigned it higher priority, "I think that we probably would have come very close to the same time [as Sputnik I], if not ahead of them."

"Sad & Shocking." To each of these witnesses the subcommittee pressed a single serious question: Is a missile czar necessary to speed the U.S. missile program? All but Vannevar Bush thought that one was. But when the Senators turned to testimony from Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy, they were informed politely but firmly that the missile programs had a top man: Neil McElroy. Missileman William M. Holaday, explained the Defense Secretary, is missile "director," and "I consider that I am easily accessible to him when he needs the power that I happen to possess." As for President Eisenhower's new missile adviser, M.I.T.'s Dr. James Killian: "I do not believe it was intended at any point for Dr. Killian to come into the Defense Department for order-giving, and I do not believe that he thinks so."

Rounding out the three-day hearing, the subcommittee went behind closed doors with CIA Director Allen Dulles and his staff. U.S. intelligence officers crisply

informed them that the Russians were far, far ahead of the U.S. in some important areas. "Moving ahead rapidly in military technology," were "untroubled by budgets, manpower needs, or the necessity of competing with private industry for brains. One result, according to CIA: Russia has produced a handful of probable four of submarines capable of launching nuclear-headed missiles from as far as sea as sea miles."

Emerging from the briefing, the Senators quickly put their distress on record. "A sad and shocking story," said Missouri Democrat Stuart Symington. Said New Hampshire Republican Styles Bridges: "Very unpleasant information."

Missile Count Down

Along with reports that both an Atlas ICBM and a satellite-carrying Vanguard rocket will be launched from Cape Canaveral, Fla. in early December, the week brought solid missile news. Items:

¶ A committee of eight top Administration civilian officials flashed the production green light for both the Air Force's Thor and its intermediate-range (1,500 mi.) Army rival Jupiter, temporarily resolving the two missiles' nose-and-nose race for survival. Both IRBMs have flown successfully three times, and both have flopped several times. Only last week a Jupiter rocketed away promisingly from its Cape Canaveral launching pad, was exploded a few minutes later—"because of technical difficulties," said the Army's inscrutable announcement. As Defense Secretary Neil McElroy admitted, neither Douglas Aircraft Co.'s Thor nor Redstone Arsenal's Jupiter (future manufacturer: Chrysler Corp.) is "a thoroughly proved missile," but the urgent need for IRBMs to arm both the U.S. and NATO makes it desirable to go ahead with production of both missiles without waiting months for additional tests to show which has the performance edge.

¶ Air Force Chief of Staff Thomas D. White (TIME, Nov. 25) served public



TELLER



DOOLITTLE



BUSH

Associated Press; United Press

The goal is to find out what is to be done.

SPENDED DUTY AS DANGER WARNINGS ARE SOUNDED

Disturbing news of Eisenhower's illness during a period of intense crisis, a time of critically heavy duties and responsibility upon him. He had the diplomatic task of conducting extensive talks with Morocco's visiting Mohammed V, on whom the U.S. is trying to assert progressive and pro-Western leadership in North Africa. When the President fell ill immediately after greeting the king at the airport, the U.S. State Department took over most of this job. A more urgent problem needing the President's attention was being aired on Capitol Hill. Democratic Senator Lyndon Johnson began his investigation into the U.S.'s progress

and lack of it, in missile development and research. Speaking for the Administration, Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy assured the Senate subcommittee on preparedness that steps are being taken to speed up missile production. But other witnesses were not so optimistic. In testimony which lasted four hours, Physicist Edward Teller, the "father" of the H-bomb, gave the U.S. a stark picture of serious weaknesses in its defenses and urged the U.S. to do "more, very much more about shelters" (LIFE, March 18).

Teller's testimony was seconded by Dr. Vannevar Bush, once chairman of the U.S. Research and Development Board, who said "we


have been complacent, and we have been smug." Both men warned that the Strategic Air Command, which last week got operational control over the Air Force's missiles, must disperse its planes over more bases to prevent them from being knocked out at once in a surprise attack.

But the biggest scare of all came from Allen Dulles, director of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and brother of the Secretary of State. Dulles talked behind closed Senate doors, but one item in the CIA testimony leaked out afterward: the Soviets, who have a fleet of submarines which is far larger than that of the U.S., are capable right now of using subs to launch ballistic missiles from 500 miles off U.S. shores.



SNIFFLING and bareheaded during airport greeting, Eisenhower listens as Robert McLaughlin (right) makes

welcoming speech to Morocco's King Mohammed V (wearing light-colored cap) and official party.



SUBMARINE WARNING came from CIA head Allen Dulles, here leaving secret session. The senators called his testimony that Soviet submarines could attack U.S. now with missiles "sad and shocking."



BLOWING NOSE, he continues ceremony in 45° weather as an interpreter translates king's remarks.

LOOKING UP (*below*), the President smiles as the interpreter continues. Now the king starts to snifle.





END OF RIVALRY over the intermediate range missile comes as Defense Secretary McNamara announces decision to produce both the Air Force Thor and Army Jupiter. Johnson said this was "good news."



CENTRALIZED PLANNING in the Pentagon is proposed by Scientist Vannevar Bush, who tells the senators that the rivalry between the military services has been "damaging and sometimes disgraceful."



"NOT GOOD ENOUGH" is Scientist Edward Teller's estimate of missile progress: "We must apply more money." He also criticized military services for called emergency water than in World War II.

GENERAL... planning "on more rapid basis than we are able to do it today" is proposed by retired Air Force General... U.S. continuity to the idea...



ILLNESS AT HEARING AS CHAIRMAN LYNDON JOHNSON (SEATED, CENTER) STOPS TO READ A BULLETIN

The Periscope

Reg. U.S. Pat. Off.

Periscoping the Nation

Fixing the Missile Blame
New Interservice Battle?

Dulles and Horner at Odds?
Why Zhukov Gets No New Job

Pentagon Pipeline

CAPITOL HILL — Privately, Sen. Lyndon Johnson blames former Deputy Defense Secretary Roger Kyes for ordering cutbacks in missile spending and present Deputy Secretary Donald Quarles for carrying them out. Don't be surprised if Quarles quits soon and is replaced by Wilfred McNeil, Defense Department Comptroller. It's no secret Quarles is disappointed he didn't get the top job. There's reason to believe, too, that the Senate probers may blame him publicly for missile lags.

ARMY HEADQUARTERS — On the heels of the sobering story Allen Dulles told Senate probers (see page 58), THE PERISCOPE learns the Army is developing a new tracking system with electronic brain for defense against submarine-launched missiles. Code-named "Plato," it is designed to detect and track the missiles and aim Nike-Zeus atomic rockets against them.

MOSCOW — Discount Soviet officials' statements that Marshal Zhukov is on a three-month leave and will then get a new assignment. The real story is this: He is now under close guard at his villa near Moscow where experts are trying to get a "full confession" that he ignored party leadership and sought personal glory. He has not yet admitted this (*THE PERISCOPE*, Nov. 18); that's why no new job has been announced for him.

zational work. (2) To finance a new spurt of party activities in the wake of the big Kremlin leadership meeting.

MOSCOW — Who masterminds Soviet policy in the Mideast? Observers here say it's little-known Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semyonov, called by some the "best brains" on the staff. Khrushchev often bypasses Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and consults Semyonov directly.

Lifting the Curtain

LONDON — Intelligence and security officers disclose these ~~are the~~ real reasons Russia is suddenly selling so much gold in Western markets: (1) To pay off big deficits run up by Western Communist parties in propaganda and organi-



Cloak-and-Dagger Conflict

Military intelligence thinks CIA is misleading White House and National Security Council about Russia's ability to continue race into space. CIA believes Khrushchev will have to slow down; military thinks this is wishful thinking and dangerous; that Soviet leaders still can whip their people into line, "persuade" them to tighten their belts.

Coolness between Sherman Adams and Nixon? There's a quote making the rounds which indicates the relationship is stiffly formal. It has Adams saying: "These days Nixon is doing his job and I'm doing mine."

Russia's Missile Firepower

For two hours one evening last week and for another four hours the next morning, members of the Senate Preparedness subcommittee listened with mounting alarm while Allen W. Dulles, the pipe-smoking chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, told them all he knew about the missile capabilities of Soviet Russia.

Delivered in the strictest secrecy—behind guarded doors—it was a chilling story that left the senators deeply shocked and disturbed.

In this report, Samuel Shaffer of NEWSWEEK's Washington bureau goes behind the subcommittee's doors to report what Dulles said.

Soviet Russia today has enough land-based, intermediate-range, missiles on hand and ready to fire to damage or destroy almost all overseas bases of the U.S. Strategic Air Command. Only three areas (Morocco, Spain, and Guam, and the Philippines) are beyond the range of the Soviet IRBMs.

Russia could, if it chose to, push the button for World War III, launch missiles with atomic or hydrogen warheads, from submarines 500 miles at sea that would all but wipe out New York City (or, for that matter, any other city on the Eastern Seaboard).

The Central Intelligence Agency has reported these and other facts of Soviet missile development to the National Security Council since mid-1953—but with no apparent result.

These were the most significant highlights of the secret testimony. Allen Dulles gave Lyndon Johnson's subcommittee (of the Senate Armed Services Committee) during the opening phases of its inquiry into the U.S. missile lag. Seldom had a Congressional committee been handed such a large dose of unvarnished fact. Never before had Dulles testified at such length.

To give the subcommittee a complete fill-in on what the CIA has been able to learn, Dulles went back to World War II, when he said the Russians systemat-

ically exploited defeated Germany. They captured and removed German operational and prototype missiles, they seized research and production facilities, and they collared "several hundred" of their missile specialists.

With this kind of help, the Soviets had a full-blown, coordinated missile program of their own, going by, 1948, long before the U.S. made any serious move.

No Guess: Since mid-1953, Dulles said, American intelligence agencies have been getting "hard" information showing just how successful the Russians have been (in the CIA lexicon, hard information is solid, substantial stuff, as distinguished from mere guesswork). At first the Soviet missiles were tested over a range of 75 nautical miles, but this rapidly went up to 100, 200, 300, 500, 700, 900, and, finally, to the intermediate range of 1,000 nautical miles.

It was knowledge of this progress in IRBM's that made possible, ultimately, the hard estimate that Russia has them "in operational units and on site" (as Dulles put it) and pointed at SAC bases in England, France, West Germany, Benelux, Italy, Greece, and Turkey.

Dulles informed the subcommittee that Russia was not quite so advanced with its intercontinental ballistic missiles, although still far in front of the U.S. So far it has tested four (of which two were

used to launch the sputniks) and is believed to be two years away from operational status (NEWSWEEK, Dec. 2). But, said Dulles, the U.S. must take into account the possibility that this estimate is in error—that the Soviets will get their ICBM into production sooner. Candidly he admitted that at one time the CIA was at least a year off in its timetable for the Russian IRBM's.



Subs: Equally as ominous as the report on Russia's missile strength was the CIA's picture of its capabilities in submarine warfare. Dulles said the Soviet Union has somewhere between 600 and 700 subs, of which fully 450 are of the newest, long-range type. The Soviets are working on atomic subs, and may have one (or soon will) operational.

What was more, they already have subs equipped to fire intermediate-range missiles with nuclear warheads into U.S. coastal cities. Dulles described this missile as an "air breather" which must fly within the earth's atmosphere. But he said it must be assumed that Russia can develop a ballistic missile, such as the U.S. Navy's Polaris, for submarines.

Dulles pressed on into other matters: That Russia's jet-plane force is 50 per cent larger than America's combined Air Force-Navy jet force, of some 9,500 planes; that its economic growth has been "tremendous"; that its development of scientific manpower has far outstripped our own. But the dazed subcommittee members had heard enough.

What bothered the senators as much as anything was Dulles's statement that the "hard" information gathered by the CIA had, seemingly, evoked no response from the National Security Council. The intelligence agency, he said, couldn't get the significance of its data across; no one would listen.

They began to listen, Dulles added, when Sputnik I went up, so



A Russian gibe at American power is badly based on fact.

Senate probers were told

December 14, 1957

they will probably not be able to establish the complex weapons system necessary to threaten the whole target system of this country until 1959.

All this suggests an obvious conclusion. The Gap—the time of deadly danger when the Soviets will have operational ballistic missile systems while we must rely on our manned bombers—is either upon us or very nearly upon us. This grim conclusion—which is accepted as substantially accurate throughout the Washington intelligence community—suggests a couple of questions. How did we let the Russians get so far ahead? And what can be done about it?

Another "great debate" on defense policy is getting under way. Although all concerned will protest piously that their motives are of the purest nonpartisan hue, the debate will have obvious political overtones. In fact, neither party can take much comfort from the real answer to the first question asked above.

For the main reason why the Russians are ahead is perfectly obvious. They started a lot sooner than we did—probably five years sooner. The best intelligence estimates are that they started an all-out effort to master the strategic missiles in 1948-49. That was the era of our "atomic monopoly"—and the illusion of the atomic monopoly oddly persisted for a long time after the Soviets tested their first atomic bomb in 1949. It was also the era of Louis Johnson, who hoped to ride to the Presidency on the boast of having "cut the fat" out of the American defense effort.

One bit of "fat" cut out in the Johnson era was the Atlas ICBM project which his predecessor, James Forrestal, had assigned to the Convair company. Another bit of "fat" was a pilot project for the satellite, which Forrestal had also started. The Atlas project was not revived until 1950, when Johnson ignominiously departed. One successor, Robert Lovett, was fully aware of the importance of the missile race. So was Secretary of the Air Force Thomas Finletter, and, perhaps especially, Air Force Under Secretary John McCone, who fought unsuccessfully for a "Manhattan Project" for missile development. Yet the long-range-missile effort never really got out of the slide-rule stage until early 1954.

This was partly because of the atomic monopoly illusion, partly because of the hostility of some SAC-minded Air Force officers to "all that long-hair missile stuff." But there was another reason, too, and a peculiar one.

Throughout the Truman years, there were no hydrogen bombs in the American stockpile. The existing atomic bombs had a destructive range of only half a mile or so against fairly sturdy targets. So an "accuracy requirement" for the missiles of "one in ten thousand" was laid down. This meant that a missile of five-thousand-mile range had to be designed to hit within half a mile of a target.

A missile can be rather accurately compared to a rifle bullet. During the brief initial period of its flight, it is guided, as a bullet is guided in the barrel of a rifle. Thereafter it flies free, like a bullet, and where it lands depends on the accuracy of its aiming and the atmospheric and other conditions it encounters on the way. If you aim a twenty-two rifle at the right elevation, the bullet will travel a mile or more. But aiming a 5000-mile missile so accurately that it will hit within half a mile of its target is like trying to put a twenty-two bullet into the mouth of a beer bottle at a range of a mile. The thing simply can't be done, except by luck.

Given the impractical one-in-ten-thousand accuracy requirement, the scientists and technicians were in effect chained to

their slide rules. Meanwhile, the Soviets had adopted a far more realistic one-in-a-thousand requirement—five miles of error to 5000 miles of range—even before they had tested their first atomic bomb. With astonishing self-confidence, they were then already looking forward to their hydrogen bomb.

For it is the marriage of the hydrogen bomb and the missile which makes the missile of strategic range a practical weapon. Only a hydrogen warhead provides the necessary radius of destruction. And it was only after—and quite a long time after—our own first hydrogen test in November, 1952, that our long-range-missile program really began to get off the ground.

Our first "thermonuclear device" was known as "Mike." Mike was a monstrous great thing, bigger than a big house. But its yield was also monstrous—about eight megatons, the equivalent of eight million tons of TNT. You can't shoot something as big as a house into space—not now, at any rate. So the problem was to thin Mike down, so that a hydrogen warhead small enough to be carried on a ballistic missile would still deliver a megaton-range punch.

Shortly after the Mike shot, Trevor Gardner, newly appointed Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, made a journey of inquiry. He asked the leading scientists in the thermonuclear field—men like Dr. Edward Teller, Dr. Ernest Lawrence, and Dr. Charles Lauritsen—the same question: "Can you give us a megaton for half a ton?" Being translated, this means: "Can you devise a thermonuclear warhead with a megaton punch weighing a thousand pounds or less?"

In each case, the answer was a flat "yes." (In fact, recent technical advances have made it possible to pack a good deal more than one megaton into a warhead weighing a good deal less than a thousand pounds.) The Gardner journey of inquiry was the real start of our long-range-missile program. For the scientists' "yes" made it possible to reduce the accuracy requirement to a realistic ratio of one in a thousand—the same ratio the Soviets had adopted long before.

But the mills of the Government, like the mills of the gods, grind slow. It was not until early 1954 that Gardner succeeded in reorganizing the strategic-missile program, getting it a high priority, and assigning Gen. Bernard A. Schriever to push it with all speed. It is ironical that both Gardner and Air Force Secretary Talbott, who backed his efforts, resigned under fire. Yet if you want to talk in political terms, the fact remains that the long-range-missile program only got seriously under way after Dwight D. Eisenhower became President.

But the story, alas, does not end there. The story is a story of falling between two stools—the stool of election promises to balance the budget and reduce taxes, and the stool of the hideous cost of the new weapons. The Eisenhower Administration tried to solve the dilemma by pouring the new missile wine into the old service bottles, at the same time reducing the size of the bottles. The result was an inadequate missile effort coupled with insanely complicated organization and unnecessary rivalry and duplication between the services.

The story of how we got beaten to the satellite punch illustrates this falling-between-two-stools process. As early as 1954, the Central Intelligence Agency—whose record in the missile field has been generally excellent—got wind of Soviet plans to launch a satellite. The SAC-minded Air Force officers violently opposed plans to beat the Soviets to the satellite punch—they regarded the satellite as "long-hair stuff." They were joined

Gosh, what an upset stomach...
my best customer's coming in to

I'd take Pepto-Bi
Hospital tests p
up
Wonde
or



Pepto-Bismol works where soda, seltzers and "tummy-aid"

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for chapped
cracked lips



TXN52 ALETIN FIRST LEAD PROBE

BY JESS LEE

WASHINGTON - NOV. 26--(INS)--CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CHIEF ALLEN DULLES WARNED SENATORS IN A SECRET SESSION TODAY THAT RUSSIA IS OUTSTRIPPING THE U. S. IN DEVELOPING A SPACE-AGE POOL OF SCIENTISTS AND TECHNOLOGISTS.

DULLES AND HERBERT SCOVILLE- DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE- TESTIFIED BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AT THE SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE'S PROBE OF THE U. S. MISSILE AND SATELLITE PROGRAMS.

SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMAN LYNDON JOHNSON (D) TEX.- THE SENATE MAJORITY LEADER- RELAYED NON-SECRET PARTS OF THEIR TESTIMONY TO NEWSMEN.

EARLIER- IN OPEN SESSION- THE PROBERS HEARD NAVY SATELLITE CHIEF JOHN P. HAGEN TESTIFY THAT MONEY LIMITATIONS AND EMPHASIS ON MISSILE DEVELOPMENT PREVENTED THE U. S. FROM LAUNCHING AN ARTIFICIAL MOON BEFORE RUSSIA ORBITED ITS SPUTNIKS.

HAGEN SAID THE U. S. WILL LAUNCH A SERIES OF THREE TEST SATELLITES- BEGINNING NEXT MONTH- TO BE FOLLOWED IN MARCH BY A "FULL-SCALE" OUTER SPACE VEHICLE PACKED WITH ELECTRONIC RECORDING INSTRUMENTS.

DULLES AND SCOVILLE WERE QUOTED BY JOHNSON AS SAYING THAT THE SOVIETS BEGAN THEIR MISSILE EXPERIMENTS WITH DEVICES THEY CAPTURED FROM THE GERMANS IN 1945.

JOHNSON SAID THE INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS ALSO BRIEFED THE SENATORS ON "IMPORTANT SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1948" INCLUDING THE "RECENTLY- REPORTED TESTING OF MISSILES IN THE INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE."

HAGEN CALLED THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND PLANS FOR U. S. SATELLITE LAUNCHING "INADEQUATE" AND DECLARED THAT "IF WE INTEND TO GO ANYWHERE" IN OUTER SPACE PENETRATION- A SINGLE COMMAND IS NECESSARY.

Russian Sputnik No Surprise to Experts

U. S. Intelligence Role Is Told

BY JOHN H. THOMPSON

Russian launching of two earth satellites surprised the public but not the scientific community which was aware of soviet capabilities, Frederick Ayer Jr., special assistant to the secretary of the air force for intelligence, asserted yesterday.

Ayer, addressing the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, 116 S. Michigan av., pleaded for full support of America's "gigantic" intelligence gathering and valuation effort. He said it has improved every year since 1941 when he first became associated with intelligence.

Gigantic, Costly Effort

"The existence of timely, accurate and credible intelligence may be the determining factor in our survival as a nation and as a people," Ayer declared. "Intelligence is a gigantic effort, expensive in men, money and machines, perhaps above all in the rarest commodity on earth, keen intuitive analytical brains."

"It is not a man disguised in a black coat and beard wandering around the men's room in the Kremlin."

Ayer, speaking he said as a

private citizen, told a Union League press conference earlier that he believed his uncle, the late Gen. George S. Patton Jr., was relieved of his 3d army command after World War II for expressing violent anti-soviet sentiments.

Recalls Patton Remark

"In a Paris hotel room, in May, 1945," said Ayer, "my



Frederick Ayer Jr.

uncle said the 1st and 3d armies could lick the Russians in six weeks, but that some day it might take 6,000,000 men and six years. He was right."

Ayer said he was convinced Patton's relief came when this report reached Washington, rather than because of a sub-

sequent remark attributed to Patton, that the Nazis were just like the Republicans or Democrats when out of office.

Ayer, author of "Yankee G-Man," a story of his experience as an agent for the federal bureau of investigation in Europe during the war, said too often accurate American intelligence reports and evaluation had not been heeded by higher authorities.

Intelligence Ignored

The Democratic administration, Ayer said, ignored in its radar and jet plane production, and its missiles,

to 1945 which stated that Russia would take over central Europe unless American policy changed. This, he added, would probably prove to be "the most costly blunder in the history of the free world."

Air force intelligence, Ayer said, also accurately estimated Russia would have the atomic bomb in 1949, contrary to the "national" estimate of 1952-53. Air force intelligence, he added, also forecast the soviet hydrogen bomb development, its radar and jet plane production, and its missiles.

In The Nation

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

Carrying on Government
After an Attack

By ARTHUR KROCK

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5—The speculative estimate made by intelligence units for the Senate Preparedness subcommittee of the devastation that could be wrought in this country by a Soviet Russian submarine equipped with nuclear missiles has emphasized the need for prompt Congressional action on a neglected problem the disaster would create. The problem is how to carry on government in the stricken area and the surrounding territory that also would be affected.

The subcommittee was told that the Russians have submarines, perhaps as many as four, which from 500 miles at sea could launch a missile that might possibly be capable of wiping out forty-eight urban square miles and poisoning the water for an additional forty-eight. The subcommittee was also told that the United States is not yet equipped with a submarine of this capacity.

Among the many tasks to confront the authorities if a missile found an urban target, one of the most important that remains to be charted is the maintenance of government. Doubtless this has been considered in the still secret report made by the distinguished committee appointed by Gordon Gray, director of the Office of Defense Mobilization, to survey the general problem of civil defense. Also, hearings are soon to be held on recommendations on the same general subject by the Hollifield subcommittee of the House. But until Congress takes some action, which should include a more precise demarcation of the provinces of the O. D. M. and the Federal Civil Defense Administration, respectively, no one will know exactly by what processes the local governments of stricken areas will be preserved. This is outside the O. D. M. function to maintain the national economy and the F. C. D. A. function to care for the population.

Professor Fairman's Proposal

The new regime of O. D. M., with the President's approval, appears to have abandoned the plan of "limited martial law" that was proclaimed in Operation Alert of 1955. This concept was attacked on the ground that it is impracticable as well as undesirable to impose a military administration to maintain the structure of government. Among the most effective of its critics was Prof. Charles Fairman of the Harvard Law School. His latest comments

on the general subject, made to the Industrial War College, particularly merit public and official attention in view of the launchings of the two Soviet satellites and the testimony before the Senate Preparedness subcommittee. The following is all too brief a summary:

¶It is inescapable that our common defense is a Federal responsibility. But in the event of nuclear attack this responsibility can be discharged only "by means of the energetic action of state and local governments." This creates a problem without precedent.

¶In advance of any possible attack "a sturdy channel of civil authority" should be established, "running from the President through the state governments to the country—a channel of legal and moral authority whereby the American people could be steadied and directed by the President's * * * voice."

¶"The function of the armed forces * * * would be, not to act as the great conduit between the national administration and the country, but rather to come in at weak points in the governmental structure, as needed and as available": food, kitchens, blankets, tents, transport, medicine, and so on.

¶The more military units become involved in civil business, the greater "the tendency to take over and dig in. * * * Once martial rule got into operation there would be enormous practical difficulties in getting it out of business."

A Plan of Action

¶"The appropriate mode of action * * * in time of an alert or attack, as in war, would be: Field representatives of the Federal departments and agencies would join the F. D. C. A. at a regional command post." This substitution would "transmit the power and leadership of the Federal Government." Units of the armed forces employed for civil relief and control would follow directives from the service channels, and would render specified aid requested by the local authority.

¶These units should avoid administering justice: nothing else is so likely to land the Pentagon "on the rocks, in military actions to meet a domestic emergency, as the military trial of civilians." "There is no reason to suppose that Federal and state courts would be destroyed," since there would be replacements for casualties. In this connection, state governors in time of war should have the same power to fill vacancies in the House of Representatives that they have to fill vacancies in the Senate.

The F. C. D. A., like the O. D. M., now reports directly to the President. The Administration is not disposed to raise it to a department from an agency, as has been proposed in Congress and by Professor Fairman. But this point is less important than his main thesis: that the 1955 concept of maintaining government by martial law after nuclear attack should be permanently abandoned and "the channel of command" be substituted.

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

DEFENSE SEEN MORE VITAL THAN BUDGET

McCormack Says Administration Is Unaware Of Urgency

By PHILIP POTTER

(Washington Bureau of The Sun)

Washington, Dec. 5 — Representative McCormack, of Massachusetts, House Democratic leader, warned the Administration today it had better give "strong defense" unquestioned priority over a "balanced budget" in the new fiscal year.

Obviously alluding to the optimistic conclusion of Congressional Republicans who conferred with the President yesterday that the 1959 fiscal year budget can be balanced despite increased outlays for missiles and improved defenses against the Soviet submarine menace, McCormack repeated a charge that the Administration "does not appreciate the urgency of the situation."

Plans Explained

This was the concerted theme of statements issued by Democratic leaders as they left the White House Tuesday after hearing the Administration explain for congressional leaders of both parties its plan to meet the challenge implicit in recent Soviet advances in military science and technology.

After yesterday's meeting for Republicans alone, James C. Hagerty, White House press secretary, told reporters those attending were assured the Administration aims to continue a balanced budget by offsetting increased spending for missiles with economies elsewhere in both military and other fields.

"Better Catch Up"

"President Eisenhower and the Republican leaders are evidently thinking of the defense of our country in terms of a balanced budget," McCormack said in a statement today.

"As between a balanced budget and a strong defense, they had better think in terms of a strong defense. We had better catch up with the Soviets in the field of intercontinental ballistics missiles within the next year.

"It is about time the Administration got out of its dream world and into the reality."

Confers With Leaders

McCormack has not himself served on congressional committees concerned with the state of the nation's defenses, but in the last few days he has conferred at length with such Senate leaders as Johnson, of Texas, chairman of an Armed Services Preparedness subcommittee which is investigating our missiles and satellite programs, and Russell, of Georgia, chairman of the Armed Services Committee.

Both have access to highly classified material from both the military and the Central Intelligence Agency as to the comparative military strength of the free and Communist worlds.

Both have given voice to alarm in the wake of Soviet advances in rocketry as evidenced in the half-ton sputnik lofted by Russia on November 9.

McCormack said in his statement that "If anyone thinks the Soviet's will let us catch up with them if they have the advantage, they are doing a disservice to our country."

He feels that we may have no more than a year to match the Russians in missile power, and that if we do not, we may be faced with an ultimatum from the Kremlin rulers who recently have been boasting that the next war will be fought on the American continent.

Democratic leaders on Capitol Hill profess genuine concern at what they regard as indecision in the White House on military problems posed by the new space age.

Wavering Noted

One said the President at Tuesday's briefing was less than reassuring when he was pressed by Senator Anderson (D., N.M.) as to the reasons for recent failures in missile tests. Anderson said he had personally witnessed several flops while visiting the White Sands Proving Grounds in New Mexico.

The President was reported to have admitted to some "confusion" as to how to proceed because he was unable to get any unanimity in the advice tendered by those he has concluded

Another at the briefing said

Mr. Eisenhower appeared to be informed on military matters, but was reluctant to take a strong hand in their direction for fear of being regarded as a "military President."

"Dilemma Posed"

"He seems to feel that his military position in history was secured by his command of the allied forces in World War II and he wants his record in the presidency to reflect his devotion to peace," the legislator said.

This, he added, posed a dilemma for the nation since until recently the great bulk of the citizenry regarded Mr. Eisenhower's word on our defense arrangement as gospel, and resented congressional interference in that field.

"With at least 20 per cent of our people still feeling that way despite the sputniks, and another 40 per cent only superficially aware of the implications of the nuclear and space age, it is apparent that only 40 per cent are aroused over the situation," the legislator said.

None Support Morse

"Only the President can arouse the others to the really frightening aspect of affairs."

There is no disposition among congressional Democratic leaders to support Senator Morse (D., Ore.) in his call yesterday on the President to resign and let Vice President Nixon take office, but there is a determination to exert congressional leadership to the utmost in an effort to push the President into acceleration of the development of space age military hardware.

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Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

Why a Secret CIA Report Upset U. S. Legislators

WASHINGTON—Missiles that span continents are not rated by military men as Russia's most dangerous weapons.

The less spectacular, but just as deadly, intermediate-range ballistic missiles are subject of a new report which upset U. S. Senators last week. The top-secret evaluation, given to the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee by the Central Intelligence Agency, was said to emphasize:

- Russians are able, right now, to fire an H-bomb-carrying missile from a submarine 500 miles off the U. S. coast and hit a city such as New York.

- Russia apparently has the intermediate-range ballistic missiles to do this job "in quantity."

On the optimistic side, Senators were told that the U. S. Navy is confident that it can detect and forestall a large-scale attack on the U. S. by Red subs.

Gen. Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff, declared, meanwhile, that the U. S. now has the Soviet Union "zeroed in from every direction" with its airpower. He announced, too, that the Air Force is at work on a new weapon of the future—an antimissile missile, the Wizard, to be used as a defense against missiles fired from other nations.

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

Soviet Is Said to Increase Heavy Jet Bomber Output

By JACK RAYMOND

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5—The Soviet Union is increasing its production of medium and heavy jet bombers, according to the latest information accepted by high authorities as authentic. The rise in Soviet production of manned bombers is considered significant in view of the advances in the development of long-range ballistic missiles claimed by Moscow.

An official source here rejected as incorrect a report that the Russians had halted production of manned bombers and were concentrating on long-range ballistic missiles.

The Soviet Union has contended it has perfected an intercontinental ballistic missile, presumably with a range of 5,000 miles. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Soviet Communist party chief, has argued that manned bombers were virtually obsolete.

Soviet Gains Believed

Mr. Khrushchev's recent statements, implying that the fleets of American bombers of the Strategic Air Command would be powerless in war against Soviet ballistic missiles, were expected from him.

United States authorities are ready to believe that the Soviet Union has perfected long-range ballistic missiles. This readiness is based on independently obtained information as well as the ballistic missile power displayed in launching the Soviet satellites.

However, according to the best available information, the Soviets themselves have not even begun to place their strategic

air power reliance on ballistic missiles rather than

The ability of the Russians to increase heavy bomber production at the same time that they presumably are beginning quantity production of long-range missiles represents a formidable military capacity on the part of the Soviet Union, it is pointed out.

Estimates Were Revised

A high source conceded that accepted information about the Soviet Union had not always turned out to be reliable. For example, last year the Air Force said that earlier estimates of Soviet bomber production had been too high.

A downward revision in the estimated production of the Soviet Union's equivalent of the United States B-52 was used to justify subsequent reductions in the rate of United States bomber production. Plans to produce twenty a month were cut back to fifteen.

In April, 1956, intelligence estimates indicated that the Soviet Union had 100 Bisons, bombers compared with seventy-eight the United States Air Force then had. Existing plans call for about 500 B-52's by the end of next year.

But last February, United States sources corrected their 1956 estimate and said the Russians had had only fifty Bisons. No figures were available today on the present estimated number of Soviet heavy jet bombers, dubbed Bison or the medium Bears.

The size of the Strategic Air Command is classified, but it has been estimated at 2,000, including medium range B-47's, the heavy B-52's and the heavy B-36's, which are being rethined in favor of the B-58's.

Bomber Output Rises

A rising rate of bomber production for the Soviet Union would indicate that the Soviets might have approached or even surpassed United States bomber strength.

A year ago it was estimated that the Russians had about 1,000 heavy and medium jet bombers and would have at least 2,000 of such types by mid-1959.

Discussing Soviet military capabilities, some sources called attention to recent reports of "shocking" testimony by Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Dulles testified Nov. 27 at a closed hearing of the Senate Preparedness subcommittee. The subcommittee is investigating the nation's defense capacity in view of reported Soviet ballistic missiles achievements.

Persons present at the hearing said that published reports of the testimony had neglected to distinguish between the Soviet Union's known and assumed military capacities. In a report, the Russians were said to be able to launch ballistic missiles from submarines. Such

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missiles armed with nuclear warheads could destroy United States seaports and contaminate the drinking water of cities, it was said.

A Hint by Russians

It was stressed that missile-launching capacity of Soviet submarines had been stated as a premise only because the Russians probably could build such ships. In an article in a Soviet newspaper yesterday, two experts hinted that the Russians could fire missiles from submerged submarines.

However, it was emphasized by those present at the subcommittee hearing that the Russians were not known as yet to have developed missile-launching submarines. No testimony that they had developed such submarines was presented by Mr. Dulles, it was said.

A report that the Russians now had the capacity to destroy United States heavy bomber bases, here or abroad, was described today by an official source as an incorrect version of Mr. Dulles' testimony.

At the same time, one of the persons present during the closed session said Mr. Dulles had reported a decrease in the number of heavy bombers being produced in the Soviet Union. This was in contradiction to official estimates in another quarter.

While taking a calmer view of Mr. Dulles' testimony than indicated by public statements of some Senators at the hearing, a source present at the meeting said that some estimates of authentic Soviet military capacity were considered causes for United States concern.

The subcommittee will resume its hearings Dec. 13, with William M. Holladay, the Pentagon's Director of Guided Missiles, as the first scheduled witness.

In the Dark of the 'Moons'

An Intimate Message from Washington

Registered in U. S. Patent Office

By Courtney Sheldon

Why shouldn't the American public be told more of what the American Government knows about Soviet military capabilities?

This question has become of paramount importance to those who feel the public would never have tolerated United States slippage in missile and satellite programs if they had been kept adequately informed. Certainly, once the sputniks paraded overhead daily, almost every segment of American opinion chorused first its surprise and concern and then its determination to catch up.

Senate hearings are now revealing that rather startling estimates on Soviet capabilities were indeed in the hands of administration officials long before the sputniks. When public hearings are resumed Dec. 13, administration officials undoubtedly will be asked what evaluation was placed on the then available intelligence data on the Soviets.

Why, for example, did the Defense Department cut basic research by 10 per cent only two months before the sputniks? In the light of current estimates of the rapid rate of Soviet progress in science and technology, this cut is widely regarded now as unwise. The new Secretary of Defense, Neil H. McElroy, has countermanded the cutback.

To this date there has been no candid official comparison of Soviet and United States missile progress. Before his reports to the public were interrupted by illness, President Eisenhower told briefly only of the United States family of missiles.

Administration spokesmen do not touch on specific Soviet gains in missiles. This continues to puzzle those who became excited (before the sputniks) precisely because of knowledge of comparative United States and Soviet progress in specific categories.

Though estimates vary, the following is a reasonable composite of missile detail from informed sources:

Intercontinental ballistic missiles with a range of 5,000 to 5,500 miles:

United States—Atlas tested unsuccessfully twice. No operational date.

Soviet—T-3 tested successfully 10 times. Limited operational use. Adapted to launch the sputniks.

Land-based intermediate range ballistic missiles with a flight of about 1,500 miles:

United States—Continued testing of

Thor and Jupiter, but production ordered. Operational late 1958.

Soviet—T-2 tested several hundred times. In operational use for one year.

Submarine-launched ballistic missiles:
United States—Polaris, with at least a 1,500-mile range, still under research and development. Operational by 1961.

Soviet—Comet II with about a 700-mile range now operational.

These are the big brothers of the missile family. In every instance the Soviets have a lead, if these common estimates are correct.

It is possible that intensive effort on the part of the United States will narrow the gap between United States and Soviet programs. But eminent scientists such as Dr. Edward Teller carefully point out that the Soviets' "rate" of progress is the real threat. With their head start, they could be off and away to other goals in the space world by the time the United States approximates their present level of progress.

For the United States the retaliatory power of the Strategic Air Command, with its long- and medium-range bombers and Snark, the subsonic unmanned bomber, has to be relied upon in the gap period.

SAC is not the deterrent it once was; it is now being recognized. Soviet defenses against air attacks have improved and SAC bases could be pinpointed by Soviet missiles.

The period between now and 1962 could be crucial. If the military race continues to develop unfavorably for the free world, there is the possibility that Soviet leaders might become dizzy with military might.

They might forget that a nuclear war could bring almost as much destruction to the victor as to the vanquished. Or they might take a chance on quick, limited war thrusts.

Administration efforts to strengthen SAC's capabilities and step up missile schedules are being intensified. Modernization of conventional forces for limited wars is being pushed. In the absence of an effective, enforceable worldwide disarmament program, these United States efforts will have to be sustained at a high level for years to come.

Continued public support will be essential. This has always been forthcoming when the score is known. It would be better not to wait again until a ninth-inning sputnik sails overhead.

Today and Tomorrow . . . By Walter Lippmann

The Role of the Opposition

THE BRIEFING of the Congressional leaders at the White House on Tuesday foreshadows, indeed it seems to make certain, a great party struggle on the issues of the country's response to the Soviet challenge. The Democrats, however, divided they may be on the problem of segregation, Lippmann



will be very much united in their criticism of the Eisenhower Administration for falling behind in the race of armaments.

They will insist that the Administration was well informed and clearly warned by its own intelligence services that the Russians were forging ahead that, nevertheless, the Administration suppressed and ignored these warnings, and that even after the sputniks and all that they signify, there has been no sense of urgency, no bold and resourceful planning to deal with the situation.

No doubt, there will be substantial majorities in Congress for specific requests for more money. But there is no prospect at this time that there will be the kind of non-partisan unity in the next Congress which there was, let us say, after Pearl Harbor. Why not? The country finds itself in a very serious situation, one which, if it is not righted, can have fearful consequences. Why, then, is there no good prospect that the Congress will close its ranks, and rally to the President's standard?

THE ANSWER, I am afraid, is that the President has raised no standard to which the country can rally. After Pearl Harbor, it was clear to everyone that the country must unite in order to win the war which had so nearly been lost, and that this meant raising and equipping great military forces. But after sputnik, there is no such clarity about our objectives and our duty.

For, as the scientists have been telling us, we have fallen behind in the race of armaments because we have fallen behind in our technological capacity as it relates to the instruments of power. This is a default that cannot be corrected quickly. Moreover, though it cannot be corrected without the expenditure of much more money and much more effort, no one inside or outside the Administration is as yet able to define adequately a concrete program.

A concrete program equal to the emergency in which we live can be worked out only after the real situation is known and realized by the country, and then only after there has been a searching public debate. We shall know what to do only as and when we have explored the causes of our great default and have discussed the many remedies which are proposed. This is a time when our salvation is most likely to lie not in trying to ignore the two-party system but in looking to it—its leaders being responsible men—as the only effective means by which the real situation can be brought home to the people, and the critical issues thoroughly discussed.

This is a time in our his-

tory when a loyal opposition is an indispensable organ of good government.

WHY, ONE MAY ASK, is it a time when the role of the opposition is so big and so important? The answer is that the Administration cannot be counted upon to furnish the leadership which our situation demands. There are two reasons for this. The one is that the great default took place because they ignored their own intelligence. Human nature being what it is, it is easier to acknowledge the real situation under the pressure of an opposition than it is to confess it voluntarily. The second reason is that the President is in no condition to exert the enormous energies which the situation calls for, and to endure the fearful strains of carrying out great programs.

Let us remember the situation in which we find ourselves. We have lost, or we are almost certain to lose in the near future, that command of the air on which our world position has rested. For many reasons, which seem to me good reasons, I do not think this means that we shall be attacked and devastated. But I believe it does mean that until and unless we are able to right the balance of power which is now against us, our influence will decline, our alliances will become enfeebled, our positions abroad will tend to disintegrate.

THE MEN among us who will know how to deal with this grim probability are those who know, not merely say but know in their bones, that there is no cheap and easy way out.

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HALL WE JEOPARDIZE OUR RISKS?

By ALAN MAX

SOME PEOPLE are moving to reopen the case of the discredited government scientist, Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, and I think that the whole precise concept of security and guilt association is being mangled. Dr. Oppenheimer was one of our finest atomic scientists, but in 1954 it was discovered that he had been associating with the wrong people during the period when he was associating with the right mole-



cules. The Atomic Energy Commission heard his case, by a vote of 4 to 1—a clear and democratic majority—proclaimed him a security risk and declared that the only way our country could keep a commanding lead in nuclear physics was by firing an outstanding nuclear physicist. Which we did—with the result that while we may have kept a commanding lead in numerology, we fell behind in nuclear physics.

THIS HAS made some people nervous and impatient, and there is dangerous talk going the rounds. Senator Javitz says Dr. Oppenheimer should be reinstated unless the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency

have more information about him than has been made public. And Thomas E. Murray, former Atomic Energy Commissioner who voted with the majority against Dr. Oppenheimer in 1954, now says: "I would not be at all displeased if he were reinstated."

To this I say "Hold on!" I am afraid we risk losing our security risks. If a man is a security risk in 1954, can he be a security un-risk in 1957? Whatever associations lay in Dr. Oppenheimer's past in 1954, aren't they still in his past? In fact, aren't they pastier than ever?

The argument that we now need Dr. Oppenheimer does not cut any ice with me. If we need

him now, we needed him then—and first thing you know people will be asking: what are we going to do about the Atomic Energy Commissioners responsible for firing a scientist who would be needed so badly three years later? At least it can be said for Dr. Oppenheimer that he did not associate with any Atomic Energy Commissioners.

IN THE END it may be necessary to reinstate Dr. Oppenheimer of course. But if we do, I hope we will retain the concept of security risk, although it may have to be re-defined somewhat. I would suggest, for example, that a security risk be

defined in the future as a person on the government payroll who fails to associate with representatives of the Soviet Union and thereby fails to keep in touch with the latest scientific developments and projects in that country. A security risk unpatriotically neglects to subscribe to all Soviet publications he can lay his hands on, and imprudently stays away from cocktail parties where he might mingle with some Soviet visitor in the know. It is clear that such a government employe is ready to risk our scientific prestige because of his political dis-associations, and does not deserve to draw a salary from the public till.

Inside Washington

By Robert S. Allen

RUSSIANS CAN LAUNCH

'SUPER-SPUTNIK'

Washington. Intelligence Director Allen Dulles made two jolting disclosures in his grim testimony before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Committee.

One was that Russia has the "definite capability" of orbiting a large and extensively instrumented Sputnik 22,000 miles above



the earth, and keeping it there indefinitely for military purposes, which could be catastrophic to the U.S. Such a Sputnik could jam U.S. defense and other communication systems and function as a Soviet "observation post" from which American cities and other vital targets could be bombed with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.

The other startling disclosure was that since 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency has submitted numerous reports containing "hard" and detailed information regarding Russian missile opera-

tions to the National Security Council. But this top policy-making agency of the Administration did nothing about them.

"Dr. John Hagen, head of the Vanguard (satellite) Project, confirmed that the Soviets have the sinister "capability" to orbit a militarily lethal Sputnik permanently thousands of miles above the earth. Replying to a query by Sen. Kefauver (D-Tenn.), he said:

"A satellite in an orbit some 22,000 miles above the earth would ... have extremely impor-

tant military advantages. For example, with the proper instruments, such a satellite could be used as a relay station to rebroadcast television programs to cover the whole of the U. S. with a single transmitter."

How much of the rest of this sensational testimony will be published is still to be determined by the committee.

All of Dulles' and much of Hagen's frank discussion was behind closed doors. Sens. Kefauver and Symington (D-Mo.) strongly favor making known

"all information about our (Soviet) missile and satellite developments that does not jeopardize our intelligence sources."

"Why keep these facts a secret from the American people?" demanded Symington. "They are secret to the Russians, so why shouldn't our people know about them? The only reason I can see for not letting them know is to keep them in ignorance of how serious our plight is."

U.S. Air Bases Abroad

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

Within Reach of Red Ready-to-Fire Missile



Herald Tribune—United Press
Allen W. Dulles

Senators Briefed by Allen Dulles To Ease Secrecy On Red Danger

By Rowland Evans Jr.

WASHINGTON, Nov. 30.—“Almost all” the American air bases in Europe and Africa are now within range of Russia’s “operational and on-site” intermediate-range ballistic missiles, American intelligence chiefs have informed the Senate Preparedness subcommittee in secret testimony. The subcommittee, which is in the midst of a serious inquiry into the American defense posture, is resolved to lift the secrecy barricade on this and other information to the ultimate extent possible within security limitations. The subcommittee’s present conviction, it can be stated, is that far too much information on Soviet military advances has been denied the American people.

To Publish Maximum

The question of where to draw the line between information that must be classified, and information that should be publicized if this country is to make the response that seems to be required by the Soviet technological and military challenge, was discussed at great length with Allen W. Dulles, Central Intelligence Agency director, it was understood. Mr. Dulles and other intelligence officials briefed the subcommittee on two days this week.

A tentative decision has been reached not to release a censored version of the C. I. A. testimony. Rather, the objective is to release the maximum possible amount of information

on Soviet achievements as part of the subcommittee’s report to the Senate in January.

Most Critical Element

The new vulnerability of America’s forward bases in Europe, Africa and the Middle East was regarded by several members of the subcommittee as the most critical element in the C. I. A. briefing. These forward bases are designed to guarantee massive retaliation by B-47 medium jet bombers in the event of a Soviet attack.

An operational missile system, 500 miles to 1,000 miles, as the minutes the all-important, creases and the weight of the nuclear warhead decreases.

3. An interpretation put on the testimony by some subcommittee members that intelligence reports to top civilian officials of the Defense Department, to the National Security Council and to the President had not had real “impact” until after the Russians orbited their first earth satellite. These reports presumably are provided on a regular basis. It was the view of some subcommittee members, resulting from the C. I. A. briefing, that these intelligence reports had never had the proper attention of high Administration officials until after the Russians proved their rocket capability with Sputnik I.

1. The missile-firing capability of Russia’s submarine fleet. These are not ballistic missiles but “air-breathers,” guided missiles that carry their own power supplies to the point of impact. Ballistic missiles exhaust their supplies of power when their rocket engines burn out and proceed to the target in free-flight, like a bullet.

Coastal Are Vulnerable

The C. I. A. demonstrated with maps the coastal and interior areas of the United States that are believed vulnerable to submarine missile attack, ranging inland to a depth of at least 500 miles. This testimony was particularly unpleasant to East Coast Sens. Styles Bridges, R., N. H.; Ralph E. Flanders, R., Vt.; Leverett Saltonstall, R., Mass., and Harry P. Byrd, D., Va.

2. The briefing on the air-defense system of Moscow and other chief Russian centers. The subcommittee was informed that a “very advanced” state of air defense had been constructed to protect the Soviet capital. The briefing also examined Russia’s techniques for developing and producing its intermediate-range ballistic missile. The range of this weapon, it was understood, has been gradually increasing from some

To Resume Dec. 13

The Soviet military capability was the main feature of Mr. Dulles’ Wednesday briefing. On Tuesday, the chief topic was Russian technology and scientific capability.

The subcommittee is in recess until Dec. 13, when, it is expected, civilian and military chiefs of the three services, military missile experts, research and development officials and perhaps civilian production executives will be examined. Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy, whom subcommittee members had not finished questioning by midnight Wednesday, will continue his testimony on Dec. 13. Chairman of the subcommittee is Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson, D., Tex.

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

220 East 42d St. **DAILY NEWS** NEW YORK'S PICTURE NEWSPAPER Tel. MURRAY Hill 2-1234

Published daily except Sunday by News Syndicate Co., Inc. 220 E. 42d St., New York 17, N. Y.
President, F. M. Flynn; Vice President, Richard W. Clarke; Secretary, P. R. Stephens. Mail
subscription rates per year: Daily U. S. or Canada \$15.00, Daily and Sunday U. S. \$20.00, Canada
\$22.50. Armed Forces Special Rates: Daily \$3.00; Daily and Sunday \$11.25.

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all the local news printed in this newspaper as well as all AP news dispatches.

SIGHT SUBS, SINK SAME

Seven members of the Senate Preparedness subcommittee listened this week to a top-secret report on Soviet Russia's military capabilities from the Central Intelligence Agency, and were somewhat shaken by what they heard.



Adm. Barbey

Among the CIA's news items was a warning that Russian submarines can fire nuclear-warhead missiles from 500 miles off our shores into any of our coastal cities. Thus, two or three well-placed shots could butcher the New York metropolitan area.

The Navy feels sure that it can detect and handle any large-scale Russian submarine movements which might indicate a planned attack on this country.

That's fine, and let's hope it's true.

But permit us once again to urge that our Government take a step proposed months ago by Vice Adm. Daniel E. Barbey, Ret. We should, says Barbey, notify the world that if any foreign submarine is found by our forces within 500 miles of any U. S. coast without a legitimate excuse for being there, it will be sunk immediately.

We believe that is the obvious way to meet this Russian submarine challenge, and the sooner the better.

Keeping the People Informed

Censorship of CIA Data on Red Threat Held Factor in U. S. Defense Lag

After listening to the long briefing by CIA Director Allen Dulles, the more impressionable Senators left the hearing room with the feeling that something had hit them in the pit of the stomach. "It was grim," was their comment.

Others more experienced in the way of our bureaucracy because of their longer terms of service were less distraught. They believe that the USSR is many jumps ahead of us in ballistic missiles and that their submarine force (close to 600 strong) is equipped with guided missiles. They also accept the CIA version of a new Russian army more dedicated to the Communist Utopia than ever in the past. However, some of the more hardened legislators were somewhat skeptical of the full accuracy of the CIA reports.

It is true that the intelligence organization with almost unlimited and unaccountable funds has thousands of operators throughout the world. But it is doubtful that any of them have penetrated the security curtain which divides the USSR even from its own satellites.

CIA agents could have picked up some intelligence in the periphery areas regarding the Soviet advances. This, together with information which can be gathered from the Russian scientific and military publications (some 600), could give an approximate but not necessarily complete picture of the Kremlin's strength.

The Russians have demonstrated without doubt that they have produced ballistic missiles. But it is doubtful that they are available in quantity. In order to be on

the safe side, however, the facts and figures presented by Mr. Dulles are accepted at their face value, because it is preferable to overestimate rather than underrate the enemy. Only by this process can the country be awakened from its past pleasant dreams that we can continue to be the world's greatest power simply by appropriating an imposing number of billions.

All those who listened to the hours-long presentation by Allen Dulles were shocked that none of the information which he has had in his possession for some time and had communicated to the proper authorities was ever revealed to the public as a warning.

A democracy can survive and develop effectively only if its people are taken into the confidence of its servants—the bureaucrats. When these arrogate to themselves the right of being the only possessors of secrets which may affect the people's well-being the republic ceases to be the democracy of which we are proud. People left in ignorance of the genuine facts of life cannot properly judge the needs of the Government and a natural opposition develops to the Executive's demand for higher expenditures.

It is deplorable that in the years since the outbreak of World War II facts which should have been imparted by the responsible authorities to the public have been kept top secret. The administrations of the last 15 years have clamped a neo-censorship on almost everything pertaining to national defense and international relations. The Roosevelt administration knew well in advance that the Japanese would attack us; yet the representatives of the people—including the administration's stalwarts—were

never told what was brewing in Tokyo.

Executive agreements of far-reaching consequences to the American people—as it became obvious many years later—were reached at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. It was a long time afterward that some portions of the Yalta agreement became known to the public. The State Department has still to reveal the actual contents of the Teheran and Potsdam executive agreements. The Republican Party blasted this method of secrecy so current in the 18th and 19th centuries when rulers considered themselves the anointed of God. Unfortunately, the Republican administration brought into office in 1952 has not only failed to remedy the errors of its predecessors but has followed them literally.

The vast armies of public relations officials in key Government departments consider it arrogant for representatives of the press to inquire about pertinent matters concerning national security, either in the military or diplomatic field. And the bigwigs of our military and diplomatic affairs consider it mild impertinence for Congress members to ask for top classified information. Only under the impact of the launching of the Sputniks have they mellowed somewhat.

Under this cloak of secrecy it is impossible for the legislators to do their part properly. They have to work in the dark and accept on many occasions the word of the executive appointees that everything is done for the good of the country and detailed information would not serve the public interest. This unwarranted secrecy is responsible more than anything else for the predicament in which we find ourselves today.

U.S. Rouses Defenses With Volley of 'Whys'

By Richard L. Strout

Staff Correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Like a sleeper roused by a dash of ice water, the United States is awakening into a world of stern challenges.

Steps are hastily taken to recover the armament lead most Americans complacently supposed they already possessed.

Deeper searchings are under way into slighted natural science and starved education. "How did it happen—who is to blame?" ask some, even while reaction is swift.

In history most nations have discovered too late and in wartime that they had let down their guard—as when France found that its Maginot Line was vulnerable, or Britain learned that a policy of appeasement does not prevent war.

The fortunate United States is to have a second chance and is girding itself with actions that—even as they are taken—bring the demand, "Why were they not taken before?"

Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has been rushed in as special White House assistant for natural science and technology.

To give expert advice and bridge the possible overlap of authority at top level between Dr. Killian and Neil H. McElroy, Secretary of Defense, and other officials, another agency—the President's Science Advisory Committee—has been moved directly into the White House executive office. It will have five new members, including Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle, retired. This group was previously under the Office of Defense Mobilization.

Secondly, the so-called First Missile Division has been assigned to the Strategic Air Command. It trains personnel to handle unmanned missiles.

Thirdly, the huge San Bernardino, Calif., Air Force base is being turned over for use of the expanding long-range ballistic-missiles armament.

Shake-Up Continues

These steps follow the announcement that the Defense Department has at last decided to go ahead with the long-range missiles Thor, and Jupiter, and start them into production.

Continuing the sudden shake-up, Gen. Thomas D. White, Air Force Chief of Staff, announced that the intercontinental ballistic missile program and the intermediate-missile program have been shifted.

They were under the Air Research and Development Command. They now are considered sufficiently out of the development stage to go into the Strategic Air Command, composed of long-range bomber groups.

Senators who are watching the swirling activity comment wryly that all these shiftings do not of themselves produce efficient ballistic missiles.

But they note with satisfaction the changed atmosphere in Washington—swept clean by the sputniks—from a period back when the Defense Department made a secret multi-million-dollar cutback a few months ago in funds for natural science research and development.

Cutback Restored

This cutback now has been restored, and the whole emphasis has been shifted, with emergency defense needs put before a balanced budget.

Of all the evidence heard by the Senate committee investigating defense headed by Lyndon B. Johnson (D) of Texas, the secret testimony of Allen Dulles, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, appears to have made greatest impact.

What rouses Senator Estes Kefauver (D) of Tennessee, one member of the Johnson committee, is that Mr. Dulles testified that he had been making reports of the Soviets' growing strength for years, and that little or nothing was done about it.

According to Mr. Dulles, he forecast the date of the sputnik's launching almost exactly in confidential reports. The men to whom he reported, however, apparently failed to see the significance of the warning.

Secrecy Irks Senators

As far back as 1952, Stalin ordered the biggest rocket motor obtainable to be built, it is understood. That is why the Soviets today are able to throw a 1,100-pound satellite into the sky compared to the two or three-pound satellite which the United States hopes to launch soon.

Senators asked why top officials did not react to the Dulles warning. He is reported to have shrugged and said that was not his responsibility.

Senators were told that the Soviets now can fire a missile armed with an H-bomb from a submarine 500 miles at sea, all but destroying a city such as New York.

Continued secrecy irritates senators. One of them commented that he had supposed "secrets" were facts not known to enemy.

NOV 30 1957

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

CIA REPORT ON SOVIET MISSILES STARTLING

The intelligence estimates on Soviet military capabilities continue to be gloomy. The Central Intelligence Agency director, Allen Dulles, briefed the Johnson subcommittee on preparedness, leaving several senators with their mouths open.

A top-secret report on the Soviets has been deposited now at the White House by the so-called Gaither committee, which was headed at first by H. Rowan Gaither, Jr., former president of the Ford Foundation. The committee of outstanding military, scientific, and industrial men conducted a wide-ranging set of interviews and investigations. There have been several leaks of information from the report.

One disclosed that a massive, very costly shelter program to protect the populace from atomic radiation was recommended. Another said that the report emphasized that the Soviets are so far ahead of the United States in missile development that it will take three or four years to catch up.

The interval between was said to be full of danger for the free world. If the Soviets produced quantities of intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, they could threaten SAC bases. The free world is relying on SAC as a war deterrent until the United States can accumulate an arsenal of long-range missile weapons.

U.S. SET TO EXTEND WARM HAND TO NASSER

There is talk here that Washington is ready to patch up its quarrel with Egypt's President Nasser. Colonel Nasser's Foreign Minister is coming

Reds Lead U. S. In War Factors

By Drew Pearson

It may not be palatable for us to digest this at Thanksgiving time, or at any other time, but the unquestioned, unpleasant truth that we have to take along with our turkey dinner is that Soviet Russia today is ahead of us in all phases of warfare, except submarines.



Pearson

The reader may well ask how such positive statements can be made regarding Russia's strength. The answer is that American intelligence has been excellent. When James Younger, brother of the Secretary of State, has submitted reports after reports to the White House, giving the alarming facts.

Unsugar-coated Facts

From this, plus other authoritative sources, we have learned the following unsugar-coated facts about Russia's military might:

Nuclear power — Russia, whose first A-bomb was exploded four years behind ours, today has practically caught up with us in nuclear fire power.

We have reduced the H-bomb to a more compact warhead and designed a so-called "clean" bomb, relatively free from radioactive hazard. But less important than the compactness and size of the warhead is the fact that Russia definitely does have the hydrogen warhead.

Russia is also known to be ahead of us in developing an atomic rocket capable of space flight.

Despite this, the Administration is still refusing to spend \$8 million that Congress has already appropriated for nuclear power rocket work.

Congress originally appropriated \$25 million for nuclear rocket work for the fiscal year 1956. This was called "Project Rover." The Administration, however, impounded \$10 million of this amount, against the wishes of Congress. As a result, the Liver-

more Radiation Laboratory in California had to shut down.

In June, 1956, Congress voted an additional \$9.1 million for Project Rover; but the Administration would spend only \$1.1 million.

Last week Secretary of Defense McElroy authorized the Air Force to go full speed ahead with the project and the \$10 million originally impounded was released for construction of test facilities. However, the Budget Bureau, which operates directly under the White House and can overrule the Secretary of Defense, still won't release the remaining \$8 million.

Air power — Numerically, the Soviet today has the world's largest air force. She has thousands more combat planes than we, and her factories are producing them faster. Our technical intelligence has made detailed examinations of several Red planes that have fallen into our hands, and these autopsies show Russian technology lagged behind us from 1945 until 1952. Since 1952, the Russians have equaled our best efforts in air weapons.

In planes that count, Russia has over 13,000 sleek modern jets assigned to combat units. Our total, counting both Air Force and Navy, adds up to less than 9,500 jets. The Russians have twice as many intercontinental jet bombers and swarms more jet fighters considered slightly superior to ours.

The Red army — the massive Red army — is 10 times the size of ours.

The Russian divisions are highly mobile, armed with rockets, and trained in atomic warfare. They are a match for our vaunted pentomic divisions, which likewise have been streamlined for atomic warfare.

The Red army relies on helicopters and armored personnel carriers for mobility.

Naval power — In a few years the Russian navy has jumped from a handful of ancient impotent vessels to the rank of 2d in the world.

It is in submarines, however, that Russia has made the most awesome and dangerous progress. More details on this menace will follow.

Say Red Sub Might H-Bomb N.Y.

Washington, Nov. 28 (UP).—The Russians could fire a missile armed with an H-bomb from a submarine 500 miles at sea and all but wipe out a city like New York—but they'd have a tough job getting past the U. S. Navy.

Disclosure of the Red submarine striking power was part of a top-secret report on Russia's military might made to the Senate Military Preparedness subcommittee yesterday by the Central Intelligence Agency. The U.S. secret agents' report shocked the seven Senators who heard it.

Mass Production

One of the Senators said Russia has already put into mass production intermediate range ballistic missiles and apparently has them in quantity.

But our Navy, it was reported, is sure that it can detect and cope with any large-scale Russian submarine movements which would foretell a major attack on the United States.

The CIA report, made at a closed-door session by Director Allen W. Dulles and his top aids, covered Russian power in mis-

siles, submarines and strategic bombers.

How much of the CIA report would be made public eventually was not known.

The Defense Department, meanwhile, pushed for quick production of two American IRBM. Defense Secretary McElroy yesterday ordered both the Army Jupiter and the Air Force Thor put into full-scale production.

22 Shopping days to Christmas



INDEX TO FEATURES

| | Page | | Page |
|------------------|------|-------------------|------|
| Beauty | 16 | Obituaries | 15 |
| Bridge, Goren | 17 | Parents, Children | 9 |
| Business | 19 | Patterns | 16 |
| Correct Thing | 18 | People's Voice | 11 |
| Crossword | 8 | Powerhouse | 21 |
| Editorial | 11 | Recipe | 17 |
| Edit. Cartoon | 11 | Serial Story | 16 |
| Fashions | 9 | Short Story | 8 |
| Fishing | 19 | Sports | 20 |
| Food | 17 | Ed Sullivan | 14 |
| Hedda Hopper | 14 | Bob Sylvester | 14 |
| Horoscope | 17 | Theatres | 17 |
| Inquiring Fotog. | 11 | TV, Radio | 23 |
| Jumble | 9 | Dr. Van Dellen | 7 |
| Love Advice | 17 | | |
| Comics | | | |
| Gasoline Alley | 9 | Smilin' Jack | 23 |
| Dondi | 18 | Smitty | 17 |
| Moon Mullins | 21 | Brenda Starr | 19 |
| The Neighbors | 16 | Terry | 8 |
| On Stage | 12 | Dick Tracy | 12 |
| Orphan Annie | 16 | Winnie Winkle | 19 |

NOV 29 1957

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

Inside Washington

By Robert S. Allen

Washington.

Russia is increasing its monthly launching of Sputniks to two in December.

One will be the smallest and the other the largest orbited by the Soviet.

The smaller one will be a 25-inch sphere and weigh around 22 pounds. Particular function of this Sputnik will be to "outshine even stars of the first magnitude."

The larger Sputnik will weigh one ton, almost twice the size of Sputnik II, which the Russians claim weighs 1,200 pounds. Reported weight of Sputnik I is 184 pounds.

The scheduled one-tonner, in addition to more and larger instruments, will also have a "multiple animal cargo"—probably a



monkey and rats, as well as a dog.

That is what the Central Intelligence Agency has advised the White House, Pentagon and other authorities in its latest report on Soviet Sputnik plans.

The CIA findings indicate strongly the Kremlin is bent on springing new Sputnik sensations to overshadow an expected safe-ty launching by the U.S. in December.

So far, Russia has provided no data regarding its first two Sputniks.

Intimations have come from Soviet scientists that reports will be made to the Committee for the International Geophysical Year. But there has been no sign of such reports or any indication of when they are likely to be submitted.

* * *

There IS something new under

the sun, after all—a Senate committee is investigating itself.

This phenomenon is taking place in the Senate Judiciary subcommittee which has jurisdiction over the long-pending legislation to return more than \$600,000,000 in enemy alien assets confiscated during World War II.

Sen. Johnston (D-S.C.), chairman, instituted the probe to get at the bottom of reports of "pay-offs" to committeemen and staff employees.

According to a flurry of backstage charges, money and other "gratuities" have been dispensed by "lobbyists" for inside information and support on this controversial issue. Some of these reports are as sensational as the one which caused President Eisenhower to veto the natural gas bill.

NOV 29 1957

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

CIA Report Is Quoted

Red Submarines Could Hit U.S. Cities With H-Missiles, Senators Are Told

By Raymond LaHr

United Press
Russia can fire a missile armed with an H-bomb from a submarine 500 miles at sea and all but wipe out a city like New York, according to United States secret agents. This evaluation of Russia's military might was one scrap of a top-secret report made to the Senate Military Preparedness Subcommittee Wednesday by the Central Intelligence Agency. The report shocked the seven Senators who heard it.

One informant who refused use of his name said the CIA told the Senators that Russia now has the capability of launching an intermediate range ballistic missile with an atomic or hydrogen warhead

from a submarine. He set the effective range at 500 miles.

Another Senator, who also heard the CIA report, said Russia has already put the IRBM into mass production and apparently has them in quantity.

The Navy, it was reported, is sure that it can detect and cope with any large-scale Russian submarine movements which would foretell any major attack on the United States.

The Defense Department, meanwhile, pushed for quick production quantity of two American IRBMs. Defense Secretary Neil H. McElroy Wednesday gave the order to put both the Army Jupiter and the Air Force Thor into full-scale production.

McElroy took the action under heavy pressure from Congress and the swift Russian missile advancements, despite the fact that neither the Jupiter nor the Thor have been fully tested. He said, however, that tests so far have warranted the gamble.

The CIA report, made at a closed-door session to the Senate subcommittee by CIA Director Allen W. Dulles and his aides, covered Russian power in missiles, submarines, and strategic bombers.

How much of the CIA report would eventually be made public was not known. Subcommittee staff members planned to digest it and other testimony in preparation for the group to make its report and recommendations.

U. S. Lag in Missiles 'Shocking' to Kefauver

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

By the Associated Press

Senator Kefauver, Democrat of Tennessee, said today three days of testimony on the status of the United States missiles program shows the situation "worse than I thought it was."

Senator Kefauver, a member of the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee conducting the missiles-satellite probe, said in an interview the testimony by defense officials, intelligence specialists and scientists added up to "shocking evidence of how the country has gotten behind" Russia in certain scientific-military fields.

But the Tennessean said "the picture is not hopeless," adding:

"We've got to give more money and attention to missiles, satellites and scientific development and education. We can catch up and get ahead if we only put our will to it."

Refuses to Elaborate

In saying testimony showed the United States missile position in relation to Russia is worse than he thought it was, Senator Kefauver refused to go into detail.

Other subcommittee members who sat in on a closed-door intelligence briefing Wednesday said afterward they heard a "sad and shocking" story on Russian military-scientific progress. The briefing was given by Allen Dulles, chief of the Central Intelligence Agency.

These Senators, too, declined to say just what they learned from the CIA chief. But it was reported last night that the subcommittee was told Russia now has a few submarines, possibly four, capable of firing a missile with a nuclear warhead up to 700-900 miles. Other vessels in Russia's sub fleet, estimated at about 450 vessels, were reported being readied for such missile equipment.

One informant said the reported Soviet sub-missile capability "means they are practically in a position to wipe out any major city on the Eastern seaboard." He did not say, however, that any of the Russian subs now are stationed within missile range of the East Coast.

Submerged Launchings

The CIA was quoted by one source as reporting the Russian subs could launch missiles while still submerged. The weapons were described as of the "cruise" type—presumably guided ballistic missile.

The United States Navy has a small number of submarines



SENATOR KEFAUVER
"Shocking Evidence"

—AP Photo

subsonic missile capable of carrying a nuclear warhead up to about 800 miles.

In addition, the Navy is developing the Polaris, an Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, designed to be fired from beneath the surface of the ocean. However, development of the Polaris has been described as being behind that of the Army's Jupiter IRBM and the Air Force's Thor. IRBMs have a planned range of up to 1,500 miles.

Secretary of Defense McElroy announced Wednesday that orders had been issued for production of the Jupiter and Thor. He did this while testifying before the subcommittee which later recessed its hearings until December 13. This decision appeared to have resolved an Army-Air Force rivalry. Both services had sought to gain acceptance of their own missiles.

Senator Kefauver said he was encouraged by Mr. McElroy's announcement, but he said the action should have been taken "a long time ago."

Quarles Statement Disputed

The Tennessee Senator disputed a statement by Donald A. Quarles, Deputy Secretary of Defense, that the United

States missile program is ahead of Russia. Mr. Quarles also told the subcommittee that "as a whole, the United States missile program is ahead of Russia."

The United States, Senator Kefauver said, is two years behind Russia in both the IRBM and ICBM programs.

In announcing the production go-ahead for the Jupiter and Thor rockets, Mr. McElroy said, "It is now clear that while neither of the missiles can be regarded as having completed its development phase, they are both at a point at which we believe we can . . . program additional production for operational purposes."

Bases in Range of Russia

The defense chief said that by making use of available production capacity "an operational capability can be achieved by the end of 1953 in the United Kingdom." American officials hope to emplace IRBMs in other countries as well after arrangements are worked out. Such European bases would be within IRBM range of Russia.

Vice President Nixon told newsmen President Eisenhower, who was stricken Monday with a slight stroke, had made a tentative decision to order the Jupiter and Thor into production. Mr. Nixon said a group of eight officials made the decision final.

In another action aimed at speeding missile work, Mr. McElroy was reported by officials to have ordered resumption of overtime pay "or work on the Thor and two Air Force ICBMs, the Atlas and the Titan. Both ICBMs still are in the development stage."

An Air Force spokesman said the Douglas Aircraft Co. has been engaged for some time in limited production of the Thor.

Fund Request Due

Army sources said production facilities at the Redstone Arsenal near Huntsville, Ala. would be used to meet early requirements for the Jupiter, with production activities gradually shifting to the Chrysler Corp. plant in Warren, Mich. This plant now makes the shorter range Redstone rocket.

Mr. McElroy said whatever new money will be needed to speed production of the IRBM will be requested from Congress when it reconvenes in January.

Before the hearing recessed late Wednesday night, subcommittee Chairman Lyndon B. Johnson, Democrat of Texas, said the order to produce both the Thor and the Jupiter made it clear Mr. McElroy is the "real czar" in the missiles program and that he has "the power of decision."

McElroy announced other decisions to come, adding: "I hope they will come just as soon as possible."

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

CIA Chief Testifies

By Courtney Sheldon

Staff Correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Startling disclosures of the vulnerability of continental United States to Soviet attack are making investigating senators more tough-minded about United States defense programs.

Informed sources say that Central Intelligence Agency officials have told Senate investigating subcommittee members that the Soviets now have submarines able to launch missiles with nuclear warheads at United States coastal cities.

The senators themselves refused to give the details of the CIA briefings, but both Republicans and Democrats were unmistakably disturbed by what they heard.

One report of the CIA story

was that the Soviets have perhaps four submarines capable of firing missiles with a range of from 700 to 900 miles.

The members of the subcommittee on preparedness, chair-manned by Senator Lyndon B. Johnson (D) of Texas, heard Secretary of Defense Neil H. McElroy immediately after listening to Allen Dulles, CIA director.

Plans Measured

They were visibly measuring Mr. McElroy's plans against what they had heard from Mr. Dulles and his assistants.

Because of his newness in office, but probably more because the McElroy attitude indicated a change or reversal of past Pentagon attitudes, the senators treated Mr. McElroy with deference.

The Secretary preceded his testimony by announcing that both the Army's Jupiter and the Air Force's Thor would be produced immediately. This stepup in scheduling obviously met with senatorial approval.

It apparently indicated to the senators that the Pentagon now was feeling the same sense of urgency conveyed to the committee by Dr. Edward Teller, who helped develop the H-bomb. Dr. Teller says he regards the Soviet rate of progress in scientific and technological fields as perilous for the United States.

McElroy Claims Reins

Under questioning, Mr. McElroy conceded that the real power to expedite missile programs and establish new ones was in his hands.

This has been apparent to observers for some time, but the White House has not spelled out the missions of all involved clearly enough so that Congress and the public understood Mr. McElroy's responsibility.

It is noteworthy that the final decision to produce both intermediate-range Thors and Jupiters came on the evening of the day the President was reported ill.

Though President Eisenhower was undoubtedly in on preliminary discussions, the crucial decision was made by Mr. McElroy and other high administration officials. That is one measure of the urgency the Pentagon attaches to IRBM stockpiling.

IRBMs would be effective from bases in Europe. They have a range of 1,500 miles, and thus could pinpoint major targets in the Soviet Union.

Impact on Budget

They would be a counter to the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile, which has a range



United Press

CIA Chief Dulles (Left) and Senator Johnson

of 5,000 miles. The Soviets would need a missile of that range if they were to hit the United States from land bases in the Soviet Union.

Mr. McElroy estimated that the first IRBM squadron would be operational in Europe by the end of 1958. Earlier, it was anticipated IRBMs would not be available until 1958 at least.

It is estimated that each IRBM will cost at least a \$1,000,000. Along with other priority projects, the impact on the budget may be greater than presently anticipated by the administration.

On other fronts Mr. McElroy told senators:

That the "alert time" for both the Strategic Air Command and carrier-based planes was being revised downward.

Dispersal of SAC Planes

That SAC planes would be dispersed on more bases, thus reducing the danger of Soviet missile attack by Soviet junior IRBMs, or missiles capable of about 800 miles' flight.

That development of the anti-missile missile would be speeded up. Thus far only defense against the ICBM has been talked about. How to cope with IRBMs, fired from submarines or from land, is a far more difficult problem because there is less time to act.

That the Pentagon is pursuing outer-space and moon projects without regard to their immediate military application (Reconnaissance by satellites is one of the most likely projects).

That this country's missile-carrying submarine program is being pushed. It is anticipated that the Polaris IRBM will be fired from submerged submarines. This is similar to the Soviet program reported to the Senate committee.

Research Speeded

That research and development programs are being speeded up.

That the roles and missions of the Army in missile warfare may be changed. The Army is now limited to 200 miles. However, the Army is working on a junior IRBM and the Pentagon may give it operation control over it.

Mr. McElroy indicated that although he felt some of Pentagon paper-work layers were needed because of the complexity of the problems involved, he nevertheless would make efforts to streamline the military establishment.

On the whole, the committee appeared to find Mr. McElroy a very cooperative witness, one whom the committee was prepared to go an extra mile or two until there is time for his decisions to take effect.

Approved For Release 2003/04/02 : CIA-RDP86B00269R001400170001-7

Allen Dulles' Testimony on Russia

From Herald Tribune Bureau

WASHINGTON, Nov. 26.—Allen W. Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, testified today before the Senate Preparedness subcommittee. The following digest of his secret testimony was released by Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson, D., Tex., subcommittee chairman.

The C. I. A. presentation covered assessments of the Soviet guided missile capabilities and intentions and a review of the

basic economic and scientific elements of Soviet technical strength.

The C. I. A. briefing was based on the United States intelligence community's latest estimate of the situation. It pointed out that the Soviet economy had been growing rapidly faster than that of the United States. And that the Soviet productions of military goods and services was roughly equal in value to our own, although its gross national product was only 42 per cent of that of the United States. This was due to the high priority which the Soviet Union was placing on military programs and the smaller amount of gross national product which was devoted to consumer goods.

Outstripping Of U. S. Confirmed

It was pointed out, however, that U. S. S. R. was encountering growing difficulties in maintaining the high level of military expenditures and investment in heavy industry, and at the same time improving living standards as a stimulation to high productivity.

The C. I. A. confirmed reports that the Soviet Union is now outstripping the United States in developing a scientific and technological manpower pool. Every Soviet student by the time he finishes high school has had five years of physics, five of biology, four of chemistry, and ten of mathematics. In 1957, the Soviet Union will have 140,000 graduates in science and engineering as compared to only 100,000 in the United States. All evidences suggest that the Soviets, realizing the importance of science and research to their military and economic future, are turning out highly skilled technicians not only for use at home but to have them available in large numbers to send

as advisers in support of economic and industrial scientific programs of penetration in the underdeveloped areas.

Made Full Use Of German Gains

In the field of guided missiles the Soviet Union systematically exploited what they acquired from the Germans in World War II when in 1945 they took over the operational and prototype missiles, with ranges up to about 200 miles as well as research and production facilities and equipment and several hundred German missile specialists. By 1948 they had a co-ordinated native Soviet Union missile research and development program.

The C. I. A. brief then covered an analysis of important Soviet developments since 1948 which included the extensive testing of various types of short and medium range ballistic missiles leading up to their recently reported testing of missiles in the intercontinental range.

(PROBE)

THE SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE CONTINUES ITS PROBE TODAY OF THE LAGGING U-S MISSILE AND SATELLITE PROGRAMS. CHAIRMAN LYNDON JOHNSON REPORTS, MEANWHILE, THE GROUP IS HAVING WHAT HE TERMED EXTREME DIFFICULTY IN DETERMINING WHO ARE THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR VARIOUS PHASES OF THE PROGRAMS. SAID JOHNSON, WHO IS DEMOCRATIC LEADER OF THE SENATE: "I DO NOT BELIEVE IN SHAKING EVERYTHING UP AND TURNING THINGS UPSIDE DOWN. BUT WE WILL HAVE TO FIND OUT HOW TO STREAMLINE THE ORGANIZATION."

(SESSION)

THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS RECALLED ALLEN DULLES, DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, AND DR. HERBERT SCOVILLE, DIRECTOR OF THE C-I-A'S OFFICE OF SCIENTIFIC INTELLIGENCE, FOR FURTHER CLOSED DOOR QUESTIONING TODAY. BOTH MEN TESTIFIED YESTERDAY AT A SECRET SESSION ON ACTIVITIES BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN.

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|--|---------------------|---|------------------------|------------------------|
| CIA TOP SECRET CONTROL NUMBER | | CIA COPY/SERIES NUMBER | | DOCUMENT DATE (YYMMDD) |
| XXX Office | TS 104248 Number | 58 Year | 17 Copy Series | 1958 |
| NON-CIA DOCUMENT RECEIPT DATE (YYMMDD) | | COLLATERAL TS ATTACHMENT(S)—Control Numbers | | LOGGED BY: |

Gaither Rnt

NON-CIA ORIGINATOR (Dept, Agency) Control No., Copy No.

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